INDOLOGICA HALENSIS

THE YUKTIDĪPIKĀ

A RECONSTRUCTION OF SĀṄKHYA METHODS OF KNOWING

EDELTRAUD HARZER



GEISTESKULTUR INDIENS. TEXTE UND STUDIEN.

Edeltraud Harzer earned her first degree "promovaný filolog", in Indology and philosophy, at Charles University in Prague. After receiving her Ph. D. in Sanskrit from the University of Washington in Seattle, she taught at the University of Puget Sound, University of Washington, Stanford, and Indiana University. Her present position in the Department of Asian Studies of the University of Texas at Austin since 1998 engages her in teaching courses in Sanskrit, Indian Philosophy, Indian Epics, and the Culture of Food in India. She spent five years in India, primarily in Varanasi studying Indian Philosophy with traditional pandits. Among several awards, was a fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities. She holds membership in the American Oriental Society, Association of Asian Studies, American Literary Translators Association, and American Academy of Religion. She has published in scholarly journals and has written articles for the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Routledge/Courzon Encyclopedia of Hinduism and Macmillan Encyclopedia of Religion.

The monograph attempts to reconstruct two methods of knowing, inference and perception, of the Sāṅkhya school, from Buddhist and other texts of the second half of the first millennium CE. The basis for the reconstruction is the *Yuktidīpikā*, the most extensive and incisive commentary on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

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In Memoriam Laura Grover

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Preface

The *Yuktidīpikā* is an anonymous commentary on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*. The *Yuktidīpikā*, written some time after the middle of the sixth century A.D., is the most extensive and comprehensive philosophical treatise of the Sāṅkhya school. Apart from being a commentary on a basic text, it primarily focuses on arguments against Sāṅkhya opponents and on establishing the Sāṅkhya theories.

The commentary is divided into four sections with subdivisions into chapters. Each of these follows several verses of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, which the commentary treats as the *sūtras*.

The criterion for selecting passages for translation and analysis was determined by the epistemic subject matter of the study with primary focus on the instruments of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). The first selection constitutes the *Yuktidīpikā* on *Sāṅkhyakārikā* verses 5 through 8, the second selection the *Yuktidīpikā* on verse 28.

The study of the *Yuktidīpikā*, and the criticisms of Sāṅkhya offered by its opponents provide sufficient material so that in this study, for the first time, the following features of the classical Sāṅkhya epistemology can be reconstructed and demonstrated:

(*i*) that the Sāṅkhya system postulates two levels of perception, non-propositional and propositional;

(*ii*) that perception is external, that is, sensory perception, and internal, that is, mental and yogic perception;

(*iii*) that the classical Sāṅkhya primarily focused on that one form of inference which proves supersensory objects;

(*iv*) that the correct use of the exclusionary proof should not be confused with negative concomitance;

(*v*) that the basis for the division into inference as acquiring new knowledge and inference as presenting knowledge to others lies in the division of the ten members of inference, providing a base through five members for each of the categories.

At the same time, on the basis of the study of the *Yuktidīpikā*, and the criticism of the Sāṅkhya by teachers of other schools, primarily Dignāga, it is possible to suggest the date of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* as around 550 A.D.

The *Yuktidīpikā* provides an opportunity to show that not only did the opponents' criticism, especially the criticism of the Buddhist logician Dignāga, influence the shaping of the Sāṅkhya epistemology, but also that some of the Sāṅkhya features were taken up by

prominent thinkers of the classical period, for example, Dignāga, or the Naiyāyika Uddyotakara, and transformed into powerful tools for which the classical and medieval logic of Hindu philosophy became known.

My initial interest in this area of study was stimulated by Erich Frauwallner's works. Frauwallner died before my work on this study began. It was Karl Potter's insightful interpretation of philosophical matters which was a constant inspiration for the project. This study is a revision of my doctoral dissertation submitted at the University of Washington in Seattle. Many of the revisions were suggested by the late Professor Bimal Matilal of All Souls, Oxford. During the time of working on the dissertation, I received helpful suggestions from Richard Salomon, David Seyfort Ruegg, Collett Cox, Allen Thrasher, and again Karl Potter. Richard Salomon was especially helpful to me in the final stages of the dissertation. During my stay in India which was sponsored by the American Institute of Indian Studies, Chicago, I benefited from the traditional training of two pandits, Śrī Nārāyaṇa Miśra and Ram Shankar Bhattacharya. Pt. Dayanand Bhargava was very generous in sharing with me the first draft of his (and Shiv Kumar's) translation of the text itself. For my work on the Tibetan materials I received help from Ngawang Samten of Sarnath and Christian Lindtner of Copenhagen. Albrecht Wezler of Hamburg extended information and support since the beginning of the project. The University of Washington aided in the completion of this study by a dissertation fellowship. Many friends deserve my gratitude for their help. Most recently I need to include also my new colleague and friend Oliver Freiberger.

Although I completed this monograph in 1999, recent scholarship should at least be acknowledged, if not engaged in my arguments toward establishing the reconstruction of the Sāṅkhya methods of knowing. Numerous contributions on Sāṅkhya are collected in an issue of Asiatische Studien 53.3 (1999), edited by Johannes Bronkhorst. Some of these, such as E. Steinkellner's "The Ṣaṣṭitantra on Perception, a Collection of Fragments" and Eli Franco's "Avīta and Āvīta" bear directly on this work, so I will address them at the appropriate places in endnotes. They are part of my new research on Sāṅkhya, along with the critical edition of the *Yuktidīpikā* by Wezler and Motegi (1998).

Just as scholars publishing their studies on Sāṅkhya in 1999 still based their own scholarship on Pandeya's edition (1967), cf. Bronkhorst's volume on Sāṅkhya in AS 53.3 (1999), so my translation of the selected passages of the *Yuktidīpikā* here is based on Pandeya's edition. Therefore it will be helpful to furnish the parallel numbering of the Wezler and Motegi critical edition. I have entered the page and line numbers of the recent

edition by Wezler and Motegi to the numbers of the Pandeya edition, separating the two sets by a comma. Wezler and Motegi's numbers are always much higher, as the text is spread out by housing the critical apparatus at the second half of each page. Only in such instances where I had originally made corrections to the Pandeya text I do not refer to Wezler & Motegi. In preparing the text as the basis for my translation, I corrected the passages, in order to establish the best reading. These corrections of the Pandeya text found support in the Poona and Ahmedabad manuscripts and P. Chakravarti's *editio princeps* of 1938, all of which Pandeya used. In addition, I have also collected incomplete manuscripts and fragments, such as Banaras and Kashmir mss. After consulting V. Raghavan's "Correction and Emendations...," Hisayoshi Miyamoto and myself went through the whole text of Pandeya's edition, exchanging notes on reading and discussions of our respective traditional teachers in Benares, his K. D. Tripāṭhī and mine Śrī Nārāyaṇa Miśra.

I appreciate Steinkellner's sharing of his astute detection of an omission of a couple of lines in my translation and his taking the trouble to send me his errata. A portion of the translation and a part of the study initially appeared as an article "Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Two-Level-Perception: Propositional and Non-propositional" in the *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 18:305–340, 1990, they are included here with kind permission of Springer Science and Business Media. I also wanted to extend my appreciation for their help to Steven Lindquist and Matthew Sayers, both graduate students at the University of Texas at Austin at the time. My gratitude goes to Walter Slaje for the kind support he afforded me throughout his editorial task. Finally, I would like to thank my husband, John Clear, who produced the Index and whose understanding of the labor required helped to bring this work to light.

Edeltraud Harzer
Austin, Texas

Introduction

THE STUDY OF SĀṄKHYA EPISTEMOLOGY

This study on Sāṅkhya epistemology belongs to the area of history of philosophy and aims to reconstruct the epistemology of the Sāṅkhya school in its classical period, that is, the middle or latter half of the first millennium A.D. This reconstruction of the epistemology of the Sāṅkhya school employs as its major source of original reference a commentary on the Sāṅkhya basic text, the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*. This commentary is known as the *Yuktidīpikā*.

The Sāṅkhya school, although going back to proto-philosophical times, became a fully developed system in time. Such a claim can be supported by the focused criticism of the Sāṅkhya opponents and by the study of the *Yuktidīpikā* itself. Nevertheless, the school is primarily known for its metaphysics and ontology. Other areas of philosophy such as epistemology have been treated as if nonexistent. But by exploring both the *Yuktidīpikā* and the criticism of the opponents, it is possible to reconstruct the Sāṅkhya epistemology of the classical period.

DELIMITATION OF THE STUDY: METHODOLOGY

The primary source for reconstructing Sāṅkhya epistemology in its classical period is the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* and its commentary, the *Yuktidīpikā*. Since the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* has very little to offer apart from rudimentary statements regarding epistemology, it is primarily the *Yuktidīpikā* which serves as basis of this study. The only other Sāṅkhya source that contains some information for the study of epistemology is the *Jayamaṅgalā*, a commentary on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*. From the non-Sāṅkhya sources it is largely Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* that offers the essential material for this reconstruction. There is also valuable information in the works of Mallavādin, Uddyotakara, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Praśastapāda, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla—scholars who responded to the criticisms of Dignāga and who lived approximately at the same time period, just after the middle of the first millennium A.D.

This study comprises a translation and annotation of the *Yuktidīpikā* on *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5–8 and 28. The passages selected for translation were determined by the topic of this study, namely, the instruments of knowledge. The instruments of knowledge are dealt with in *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5 and 6, although the discussion continues through *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 7 and 8.[1]

Sāṅkhyakārikā 28 contains an original discussion on perception and was therefore included in the present study.

This translation formed a basis for the study and determined the issues for discussion. The study itself comprises six sections each dealing with an issue of epistemology. These sections are, in fact, arguments for establishing two overall hypotheses: one proposing the existence and content of Sāṅkhya epistemology, the other that Dignāga was instrumental in shaping the Sāṅkhya epistemology and was also influenced by it.

A note on terminology should explain the choice of philosophical terms in this volume. Terminology is a matter of choice on the part of the author. The choices are (*i*) to adopt what has been used, (*ii*) to adopt and modify some of the most frequently used terms, (*iii*) to invent descriptive terms in English (as did Ninian Smart in his *Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy*), or (*iv*) to borrow from other disciplines. Most of all I did not want to use terminology that is established in one sense and import it into the Sāṅkhya teachings with a different meaning. I have attempted a blend of all the above. For example, *prakṛti*, one of the two basic principles, has the meaning of nature, of the physical matter. But the word "matter" is better known in the way contemporary physicists use it, not in the sense as Greek thinkers used *physis*. Just like Greek *physis*, Sāṅkhya's *prakṛti* constitutes everything from inorganic matter to mind. All the same, I did not consider it a suitable choice to use a Greek word. I therefore translate *prakṛti* as material stuff, which is also used for translating the Greek word *physis*.

For the most part, the choice of words for many terms used in translating the Sanskrit philosophical terms of the *Yuktidīpikā* is based on extensive discussions and consultations both with native Indian logicians and with teachers of Indian philosophy in Western universities. I have provided a glossary on pp. 133-134 of the several important terms. Most of all I aimed at using terminology that will make the material also accessible to a contemporary philosophical audience. I avoided at all cost to use unintelligeble words which so frequently are employed in translations of philosophical texts translated or expounded by philologists without any sensibility for the philosophical material.

THE BASIC TEACHINGS OF THE SĀṄKHYA SCHOOL

Some of the early naturalistic schools of philosophy denied the authority of the Vedas, others accepted it. The Sāṅkhya school remained uncommitted. Although it became part of the mainstream of the Brāhmaṇical tradition which presupposed loyalty to the Vedas, Sāṅkhya remained ambiguous in its commitment towards them. Perhaps the expressed reverence for the Vedas was rather tacit. Their vacillation between idealistic or metaphysical and naturalistic or materialistic tendencies is evident from the fact that they maintained a dualistic metaphysics.

Sāṅkhya moved beyond simplistic naturalism, such as that of the materialist school of Cārvāka. The Cārvākas believed that everything is its own cause (*svabhāvavāda*). The Sāṅkhya, on the other hand, holds that the effect already exists in the cause (*satkāryavāda*). The school's theory is a good example of the *satkāryavāda.* The primeval material stuff is undifferentiated until it is disturbed. Once disturbed, it evolves into twenty-three primal entities from which the world is formed. It is in containing these primal entities within itself in the pre-existent form that, for Sāṅkhya, the effect is contained in the cause. A distinct entity, consciousness (*puruṣa*), brings about the initial disturbance in the primeval material stuff (*prakṛti*). The exact manner in which this disturbance is effected, or what is the relation of consciousness to this material stuff, has never been satisfactorily explained. For consciousness is of an altogether different nature—it is motionless, it is pure, and it is conscious. This pure entity cannot itself do anything. Yet it is said to be instrumental in materializing the world by disturbing the primeval material stuff.

Twenty-three parts evolve from the primeval material stuff. All evolutes are material, even though the initial ones make up what we ordinarily consider our mental faculties: reason, ego, and mind. Although they fall into the Sāṅkhya category of material things, consciousness is said to "lend" consciousness to these otherwise material evolutes through its "proximity." These three evolutes are followed by five sense faculties, five action faculties, five subtle elements, and five gross elements. These evolved parts, the material stuff, together with consciousness, comprise everything there is.

But what accounts for the differences among entities in the world, some of them light and active and others heavy and dull? The answer is that the primeval material stuff is composed of three elemental forces: "intelligence"(*sattva*), energy, and inertia. Different combinations of these three account for the differences among wordly things. None of these elemental

forces are ever found by themselves. They exist only in different combinations, separating and recombining, in differing degree.

The relation between the primeval material stuff and consciousness is obscure. It is never clear what kind of relation there could be between material stuff and consciousness. In the *Yuktidīpikā* (88.25, 183.20) an example of a relation between a cow and space is given. This obscurity of relation between the two entities is particularly noticeable when a bit of knowledge arises. At other times these two entities, like man and woman, are described as being attracted to each other. But the exact nature of the relation either at the point of evolution or at the point of the production of knowledge is never clearly explained.

A number of questions arise. If consciousness and the material stuff interact (so to speak) when they are near each other, where are they in relation to one another when they are not interacting? Both entities are eternal; they exist without a beginning or end. If they are both eternal, are they not also omnipresent? And if not, what kind of spatial limitation are they subject to? If they are eternal entities, why do any limitations at all apply to them?

Sāṅkhya describes the relation between the material stuff and consciousness only in figurative terms. Since they are different from each other, they support each other like the lame and the blind. They complement each other. The material stuff performs in order for consciousness to have something to see. The material stuff's activity is also conducive to separating the material stuff from consciousness. Knowledge of this separation (or isolation) of consciousness from the material stuff means liberation for the individual who realizes this.

Knowledge is liberating. Sāṅkhya shares this point with most Indian philosophical schools. For Sāṅkhya, at the time of liberation the manifest material stuff disappears. It folds itself back up, as it were, in a process of reverse evolution.

Epistemic concerns arise in connection with the theory of causality in general, and in particular with the transformation theory (*pariṇāma*). The primeval stuff transforms itself into the twenty-three evolutes, as we have seen above. This transforming or unfolding of the primeval stuff takes place because of ignorance. This ignorance consists in not knowing that consciousness and primeval stuff are irreconcilably different. Knowing the difference between consciousness and primeval stuff leads to liberation from the bondage of repeated lives. Ignorance is the necessary condition for the repeated cycles of lives, for the bondage of consciousness.

Since both entities, the primeval material stuff and consciousness, are beyond sensory grasp, Sāṅkhya had to reach for another means of establishing their existence. Inference was

a readily available means. The development of the inferential method is not traceable, but we know that the Sāṅkhya school was considered one of the leading schools of logic, especially in the formative period of Indian philosophy. Their two methods of simple proof and exclusionary proof have not survived very well. The exclusionary method (*avīta*) especially has been at times confused with the negative concomitance (*vyatireka*). I surmise that this exclusionary proof was employed especially for establishing consciousness, simply because no inferential relation could be formed with consciousness. There is nothing else in resemblance, and there is nothing else to which consciousness could have a relationship. Therefore the only means by which the existence of consciousness could be established was exclusion (*avīta*). This exclusionary method was employed in distinguishing consciousness from the material stuff, whether in its unmanifest or manifest form or both.[2]

It is obvious that separating the two entities, consciousness and material stuff, must have been of primary concern to the Sāṅkhya philosophers. But why was the distinction so important?

It should be noticed that the universe according to Sāṅkhya could have been self sufficient, without any need for consciousness, considering that one of the elemental forces of the primeval material stuff was "intelligence" (*sattva*). "Intelligence" is conceived of as being material, but it seems to have been considered only borderline material or even beyond material. That is to say that, at the least, it was not purely mechanical and unconscious. Yet consciousness was said to be necessary to illumine the cognitive processes by its mere proximity. We can quote the *Yuktidīpikā* (103.14–15, 203.12–13), for example, that senses grasp, internal faculty conceptualizes, and consciousness illuminates. Why was there such a complex division and reassociation of consciousness and material evolutes that otherwise perform the functions of consciousness?

Apart from such figurative expressions and complex divisions, the Sāṅkhya also provides concrete accounts of cognitive processes. According to the Sāṅkhya, every cognition is a modification of reason. Reason gets help from ego and the mind. These, in turn, rely on the senses to deliver up data. Data are sounds, patches of color, and so on. These are the corresponding objects of their sense faculties.

For want of clear evidence of the development of the Sāṅkhya teaching, I can only propose here that the extant records reflect overlapping, uneven development, and a variety of ideas that were once well asserted and accepted. Just as with the development of the concept of *brahman*, the development of the concept of consciousness (*puruṣa*) from the Upaniṣadic times is a struggle of borrowing, overriding, and accepting a primary cause in

the universe. It can be argued that consciousness in Sāṅkhya was, at a certain point and for certain Sāṅkhya teachers, nothing more than the known material stuff and did not exist separately from anything else.[3] We may speculate that in moving beyond simple materialism or naturalism, in which the universal role of the material stuff could no longer satisfy all the functions necessary for a complex universe, consciousness assumed a separate existence. Consciousness was later separated from the material stuff as a distinct metaphysical entity, at least in part for philosophical reasons but perhaps also in part for religious purposes. Having a separate conscious entity fulfilled the requirement of the times for a sort of an agent "to motivate" the material stuff to function. In comparison with other religious and philosophical teachings, this agent seems, so to speak, impotent or "half baked," since consciousness does not act on its own accord.

It is not within the scope of this study on Sāṅkhya's framework to show whether the idealistic position, that is, needing consciousness as a separate entity, was a simultaneous development from the early times. All the same, it is evident that there were divergent teachers, perhaps many, perhaps only a few, and that not all ideas have been transmitted with the same emphasis. Today we know only that Sāṅkhya ranges from metaphysical materialism to epistemological idealism. Therefore from what is available we can only draw an incomplete picture. We can reflect on the controversies and propose some reconstructions.

INTRODUCTION TO SĀṄKHYA EPISTEMOLOGY

The *Yuktidīpikā* is an anonymous commentary on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and belongs to the second half of the first millennium A.D.[4] The *Yuktidīpikā* is the only extensive commentary on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, the Sāṅkhya basic text. It also is the only commentary on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* that deals with Sāṅkhya theories by way of philosophical argument. The *Yuktidīpikā* makes it evident that Īśvarakṛṣṇa wrote the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* to reaffirm the Sāṅkhya position. Assuming that the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* is loyal to his tradition, his account provides new insight into the development of one segment of the intellectual history of India. This new insight is that the Sāṅkhya in its classical period not only exerted a rejuvenating effort but also formulated anew its epistemological theories as a direct response to its fiercest opponents, primarily the Buddhist logician Dignāga (480–540

A.D.).[5] The rejuvenated effort was in direct proportion to Dignāga's attack on Sāṅkhya epistemology. In his critique of the various philosophical schools, Dignāga paid a good deal of attention to the Sāṅkhya. It was Dignāga's survey work, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, that instigated various thinkers to establish anew their respective philosophical teachings.

Within his own Buddhist school, Dignāga became its new spokesman after criticizing the theories of the *Vādavidhi*, ascribed to Vasubandhu. The responders to Dignāga's criticism of the other schools are for the Nyāya school, Uddyotakara in his *Nyāyavārttika*; for the Vaiśeṣika school, Praśastapāda in his *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*; and, for the Mīmāṃsā school, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in his *Ślokavārttika*. Although Dignāga did not criticize the Jaina school in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, the Jaina teacher Mallavādin in his *Dvādaśāranayacakra* addressed his critical response against the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.[6]

Similarly, the Sāṅkhya school tried to defend itself. As will be shown below,[7] Īśvarakṛṣṇa wrote the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* as a new manifesto of the Sāṅkhya school which later became the Sāṅkhya basic text. The *Yuktidīpikā* provides the proof for such a claim by its arguments, which were directed against Dignāga among others.

Without the *Yuktidīpikā* it would have not been possible to suggest such a hypothesis about the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*. The *Sāṅkhyakārikā* is written in aphorisms which the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* interprets as arguments in accordance to the rules of forming an inference.[8] He, for example, suggests that the first aphorism of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* constitutes the first member (inquiry) and third member (purpose of the inquiry) of the inference.[9] That is to say, since frustration[10] is the most dominant experience in human life, it is necessary to inquire what would be the means for removing the frustration. The sixteenth aphorism constitutes the sixth member (thesis) of the Sāṅkhya inference: the primeval material stuff is the cause.[11]

As for epistemology in the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, Īśvarakṛṣṇa gives brief definitions that differ from what is known of his predecessors'. Īśvarakṛṣṇa declares that there are three instruments of knowledge: perception, inference, and verbal testimony (*Sāṅkhyakārikā* 4, 5). The instruments of knowledge are the means for the removal of frustration in that they prove the truth about reality which is the only means to liberation from frustration. As epistemology is an area of philosophy which is concerned with the questions of the nature, limits, and validity of knowledge, it is a larger term than the Sanskrit *pramāṇa*; although here the term "epistemology" is employed for translating *pramāṇa*. *Pramāṇa* in Sanskrit is the term for the means by which it is possible to establish truth or falsity of a proposition.
In the Sanskrit philosophical literature, the term *pramāṇa* is basically employed in two

ways: (*i*) as instrument of knowledge and (*ii*) as veridical cognition. Since the Sāṅkhya school distinguishes these two ways as two separate things most of the time, *pramāṇa* in this study will almost exclusively refer to the instruments of knowledge.[12] The translation of *pramāṇa* as epistemology is a matter of convenience rather than precision.

From the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, as well as its commentaries, it is evident that in examining truth or falsity of something, the Sāṅkhya epistemology engages three instruments of knowledge: perception, inference, and verbal testimony. The author of the *Yuktidīpikā* claims that essentially there is only one instrument of knowledge since there is only one intellect, but because of certain conditions the system operates by means of the three mentioned.

In his reconstruction of the pre-classical Sāṅkhya epistemology,[13] Erich Frauwallner has shown that Sāṅkhya epistemology drawn up primarily from Dignāga's criticism constitutes the epistemology of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, a work that he ascribes to Vṛṣagaṇa (see discussion on this name below). This epistemology can be described briefly in the following way: (*i*) perception is the functioning of the ear and the rest of the sense faculties and (*ii*) inference is the establishing of the two relata by means of perception on the basis of a particular relation; inference is of two forms: inference-from-a-particular and inference-from-general-correlation.

It will be evident that the Sāṅkhya epistemology of the classical period, that is, as represented by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, differs from its predecessor. Īśvarakṛṣṇa revised the Sāṅkhya epistemology, as I shall prove in this study, in the following respects:

(*i*) Perception is the non-doubting awareness of each faculty's respective sense-content, which defines the two-level-perception—sensation and mental construction—as opposed to the pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa definition. Furthermore perception is both external and internal and is of three kinds: sensory, mental, and yogic.

(*ii*) Inference, although said to be of three forms, is largely discussed as inference-from-general-correlation. It is divided into two types of proof, simple and exclusionary. Inference has ten members divided into two groups, five members for acquiring new knowledge and five members for presenting knowledge to others.

Although it was expressly said that the Sāṅkhya postulates three instruments of knowledge, the brief descriptions given here deal with only two. There are two reasons for this: first, since Dignāga's system has only two instruments of knowledge, he focuses in his criticism of Sāṅkhya on these two, perception and inference. In his opinion, verbal testimony is a part of inference. The second reason is that verbal testimony belongs to two areas of philosophy: epistemology and philosophy of language. The philosophy of language is a distinct

discipline of philosophy, not considered for scrutiny in the present volume and therefore verbal testimony is excluded from this study.

The primary focus of this study is to reconstruct the Sāṅkhya epistemology of the classical period, an unknown area of research. The material lends itself to establishing the following:

(*i*) Sāṅkhya had a comprehensive epistemology in its classical period.

(*ii*) Dignāga's criticism animated a response by way of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* and the commentary thereon, the *Yuktidīpikā*—just as was the case of *Nyāyavārttika*, *Ślokavārttika*, and so on, which were animated by Dignāga.

(*iii*) There is evidence of a lively dialogue between the Buddhist and Hindu schools, in particular, Sāṅkhya.

(*iv*) A more precise date of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* is possible.

(*v*) Dignāga's criticism was detrimental to Sāṅkhya's position to the effect that the school had to revise its teachings on epistemology.

INQUIRY INTO THE STUDIES OF THE SĀṄKHYA EPISTEMOLOGY

Before the *editio princeps* of the *Yuktidīpikā* in 1938, our knowledge of Sāṅkhya epistemology and logic consisted of a rather meager account based on two sources: the Sāṅkhya texts themselves and the texts of the Sāṅkhya opponents. By "Sāṅkhya texts" we refer to the literature of the pre-classical, the classical, and the post-classical periods, specifically the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* and the commentaries on it: the *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra, the *Gauḍapādabhāṣya* of Gauḍapāda, the *Māṭharavṛtti* of Māṭhara, and the *Jayamaṅgalā* of Śaṅkara. To this list we may add Paramārtha's Chinese translation of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* with commentary. Considerably later then these commentaries mentioned here two additional commentaries V_1 and V_2 were published, thus became accessible for a study. They fall into the same category with the above named commentaries as far as they concern the subject of epistemology and logic. In all these texts, the accounts of such topics as the instruments of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) do not go beyond a basic statement of a definition or cursory interpretation.

The second group of sources, the texts of the opponents of Sāṅkhya, were written by logicians such as those of the Buddhist schools, for example, Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and

their commentators. To this group also belong thinkers such as Kumārila Bhaṭṭa of the Mīmāṃsā school and Uddyotakara with Jayanta Bhaṭṭa of the Nyāya school. In these works, we find involved arguments against the Sāṅkhya tenets, focused to refute the Sāṅkhya teachings. Some of these disputes have traditionally provided most of the essential information on the epistemology and logic of Sāṅkhya. But it was the lack of evidence of any response to the opponents' arguments in the Sāṅkhya literature itself that generated the negligent attitude toward Sāṅkhya epistemology and logic.

Lack of attention given to the Sāṅkhya in general was also noticed by modern thinkers such as Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, who more than several decades ago attempted a creative reconstruction of the Sāṅkhya philosophy. In his essays "Studies in Sāṁkhya philosophy" published posthumously in *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. 1, he articulated the need for such a reconstruction. He assessed the school as follows: "Sāṁkhya is not the avowed formulation of religious experience which Vedānta is primarily, nor analytical and critical like Nyāya but is based on speculative insight and demands imaginative-introspective effort at every stage on the part of the interpreter" (p. 127).

The present study shares with Bhattacharyya's a kindred inspiration, but intends to reconstruct the Sāṅkhya philosophy from the available material of original sources and to present a possible coherent picture of Sāṅkhya epistemology and logic.

As a result of the lack of attention, the secondary literature considers the Sāṅkhya school as a school of philosophy of religion. It assumed that Sāṅkhya adopted only as much method of epistemology and logic as was necessary for presenting its arguments to other schools. Richard Garbe claims, for example, in *Die Sāṃkhya-Philosophie* that the statement of inference in *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5 and the exposition of it in the *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī* and the *Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya* of *Sūtra* 1.103 are an element alien to the Sāṅkhya system. Sāṅkhya texts incorporated such a statement only because it was fashionable. It might be objected that although Garbe was a significant scholar in the field of Indology, the first edition of the said book dates more than a century, and thus it may be expected that some of his suppositions are out of date.

It is necessary to bear in mind that modern study of Indian epistemology began around the turn of the century with Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, and this too was an isolated phenomenon along with the scholarship of Theodor Stcherbatsky. These early studies focused on logical treatises of the Nyāya and Buddhist schools. But there are only a few references to the logic of the Sāṅkhya even among recent publications. These also display a similar dismissive attitude to that of Garbe.

Before the Sāṅkhya volume in the series the *Encyclopedia of Indian philosophies*, the only comprehensive publication on Sāṅkhya was Gerald Larson's *Classical Sāṃkhya*. Larson briefly discussed the statement of the "means of knowledge" since they constitute *kārikās* 4 and 5. He gave a three-page account of inference which he drew up from three Sāṅkhya commentaries that are well known in English translation. He compared the *Gauḍapādabhāṣya* with Paramārtha's Chinese translation and the *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra. At the end of the brief description of the three "means," Larson says:

> Unfortunately, the *Kārikā* and its commentaries do not carry the discussion of the means of knowledge any further. Precisely what is meant by the threefold inference, for example, is not clear, nor is the role and function of reliable authority clear. To what degree the latter depends on the former is also unstated. Moreover, the reliance of classical Sāṅkhya on the Vedas is unclear, although the lack of reference to sacred scriptures in the *Kārikā* would tend to argue for a minimum of dependence. Reliable authority, therefore, is probably used primarily with respect to the tradition of Sāṅkhya teachers.
>
> In all of this, if one keeps in mind that classical Sāṅkhya is primarily concerned with the problem of salvation from suffering, perhaps the lack of detailed treatments of the means of knowledge becomes more understandable. There were probably more detailed discussions of these kinds of problems, but such discussions did not receive great emphasis of the doctrine (p. 159).

Larson did not refer to works which deal with inference in the Sāṅkhya tradition. He occasionally mentioned the *Yuktidīpikā*, he still did not point out that epistemology and logic are treated here more exhaustively than elsewhere.

Why Larson did not make greater use of Frauwallner's reconstruction of the pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa epistemology in "Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṃkhya-Systems" is not clear. He did notice Frauwallner's provocative suggestion that the Sāṅkhya school was, together with the Vaiśeṣika school, the leading system of Indian logic, which influenced other significant figures of Indian philosophy, such as Śabarasvāmin and Candramati.

The present work was completed before the most recent publication by Larson and Ram Shankar Bhattacharya *Sāṃkhya: A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy* (in the series *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, ed. by Karl Potter). In it the *Yuktidīpikā* receives more of its due. The volume also includes a summary of the *Yuktidīpikā* by three Indian

scholars, D. Bhargava, Shiv Kumar, and Raghunatha Sharma. But the virtues of philosophy that the *Yuktidīpikā* is so rich are not readily apparent.

Another example further increases the feeling of dissatisfaction with the condition of the study of the Sāṅkhya. Michel Hulin, who had previously produced a lengthy study on the subject of the ego-sense of Sāṅkhya, published a general summary, *Sāṃkhya Literature* (in the series *A History of Indian Literature,* ed. by Jan Gonda). There Hulin passes hastily over the topic of the "means of right knowledge" in two paragraphs and claims: "As a fundamentally religious philosophy, the Sāṃkhya has nothing very original to say concerning that problem" (p. 144).

In describing what "discriminative knowledge" (*viveka, vijñāna*) is, he continues:

> [Discriminative knowledge is] a sort of intuitive insight which has nothing to do with empirical knowledge. On the other hand, it is quite normal that the Sāṃkhya as a system of philosophy, should heavily rely on inference (*anumāna*), since its most fundamental *tattvas* are "unmanifested," i.e., inaccessible to ordinary perception. In k. 6 we read:
>
> "That imperceptible thing which cannot be known even through that (i.e., inference) is known through trust-worthy Revelation (*āptāgama*)."
> [Quoted from the *Tattvakaumudī,* ed. by Sharma (p. 35)]

It is difficult to understand why Hulin supports his brief claim for the necessity of inference, the second instrument of knowledge in the Sāṅkhya system, by quoting that part of *kārikā* 6. This *kārikā* stresses the importance of "trustworthy Revelation," that is, verbal or scriptual testimony, the third instrument of knowledge.

Readers would have benefited from Hulin's taking into consideration the information provided in works by Frauwallner, which Hulin cites in his selected bibliography. Frauwallner pioneered the task of reconstructing Sāṅkhya epistemology and logic. His erudition in the field of Indian philosophy led him to a number of original approaches and discoveries in this area. His article "Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṃkhya-Systems" is a major contribution to the study of this subject. Here he attempts to reconstruct Sāṅkhya epistemology and logic and points to the influence that Sāṅkhya exercised over schools. As perhaps might be expected, Frauwallner finds his material in the Buddhist tradition, in Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and its commentary by Jinendrabuddhi, the *Viśālāmalavatī,*

preserved in Tibetan translation. Frauwallner verifies that the theories found in the Buddhist commentary are authentic comparing them with those in the *Yuktidīpikā.* He does so in spite of the fact that the *Yuktidīpikā,* though intimating a lot of lost material, does not present complete information. Frauwallner is one of the few who utilize the *Yuktidīpikā* as an original source.

Another article of significance for our study is Frauwallner's "Candramati und sein Daśapadārthaśāstram." Here Frauwallner pieces together a Sāṅkhya theory of inference, using the results in support of his argument that Candramati virtually borrowed the Sāṅkhya system of inference. One considerable part of Frauwallner's two-volume *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie* surveys the Sāṅkhya teachings. It is a comprehensive study of Sāṅkhya which gives a clear picture of the important developments in the system. Still it is far from exhaustive. Here also Frauwallner makes good use of all available material, including the *Yuktidīpikā.*

A number of Frauwallner's studies either deal with Sāṅkhya proper or with other materials which also provide information for our inquiry. Frauwallner's works are still important secondary source for the study of Sāṅkhya epistemology and logic.

A few of Frauwallner's students carried out further studies on the Sāṅkhya teachings. F. M. Nowotny-Pedain wrote a dissertation entitled *Die Sāṃkhya-Philosophie auf Grund der Yuktidīpikā und die Fragmente der Werke alter Sāṃkhya-Lehrer.* It is a useful history of the subject and could serve well as a basis for any study or précis of the *Yuktidīpikā.*

Among a number of followers of Frauwallner's tradition is Gerhard Oberhammer. His numerous articles deal with logic, among other subjects. He incorporates Sāṅkhya theories with equal attention into his studies. He makes good use of the *Yuktidīpikā.* His study, *Strukturen Yogischer Meditation,* has a section dealing with Sāṅkhya based primarily on the *Yuktidīpikā.* His suggestion that Sāṅkhya was one of the three *Vāda*-schools in classical India, including the Nyāya and the schools of Vasubandhu and Dignāga, is quite discerning.

A Japanese scholar, Naomichi Nakada, has published on Sāṅkhya. He is one of the handful of scholars who have studied the *Yuktidīpikā* in India, and he has published a series of interesting studies that demonstrate the technical nature of Sāṅkhya philosophy, including epistemology. Quite a few of these articles are in Japanese and unfortunately are not readily available to most scholars outside of Japan.

A significant contribution to the study of Sāṅkhya is Albrecht Wezler's and Shujun Motegi's critical edition of the *Yuktidīpikā,* reflecting Wezler's distinction of two texts within the *Yuktidīpikā.* In his article "Some Observations on the *Yuktidīpikā* " (1974),

Wezler argues the hypothesis that the *Yuktidīpikā* actually comprises a *Rājavārttika* and the actual *Yuktidīpikā*. Wezler's theory is that this *Rājavārttika* is incorporated into the present text of the *Yuktidīpikā*, consisting of analysis immediately following each of the *kārikās*. The philosophical discussion following the analysis is the *Yuktidīpikā* text proper. In support of his hypothesis, Wezler draws a comparison with the two distinct, yet interwoven texts. These two texts are Kātyāyana's *Vārttika* on Pāṇini's *Sūtra* and Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, as discovered by Franz Kielhorn. Thus the text known to us as the *Yuktidīpikā*, according to Wezler's theory, is comprised of *vārttika* and *bhāṣya* texts, which he separates on the grounds of stylistic peculiarities of the two styles of writing.

Another contribution to Sāṅkhya and Yoga epistemology is a descriptive survey of the subject by Shiv Kumar in his *Sāṅkhya-Yoga Epistemology*. This is a rather hurried introduction that does not examine the material thoroughly, in spite of Kumar's familiarity with the *Yuktidīpikā*. He, for example, compares the definition of perception of Vindhyavāsin with that of Īśvarakṛṣṇa, but only wonders why Īśvarakṛṣṇa omits a statement on the sense faculties and resorts therefore to the explanation found in the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya*. Shiv Kumar actually did not notice that Īśvarakṛṣṇa discussed sense faculties and their functions separately. It is, nevertheless, a first work of its kind by virtue of the choice of topic.

The most recent contribution to the Sāṅkhya scholarship is a collection of research papers on various aspects of the Sāṅkhya edited by Johannes Bronkhorst in *Asiatische Studien* 53.3 in 1999. Among the number of seminal papers, I refer to a couple of them, namely those authored by E. Steinkellner and E. Franco.

Text

MANUSCRIPT TRADITION

A critical edition of both the *Yuktidīpikā* and the *Rājavārttika* has been published by Albrecht Wezler and Shujun Motegi. Since Professor Wezler of Hamburg University undertook this project some years ago,[1] I hoped to use his edition and did not duplicate his efforts. As the basis for my translation and study I used Ram Chandra Pandeya's edition (1967). Pandeya based his edition on the *editio princeps* of the *Yuktidīpikā* by Pulinbehari Chakravarti (1938) and on two manuscripts: the Poona manuscript, which was the sole source for Chakravarti's edition, and the Ahmedabad manuscript.[2] Pandeya planned to republish his 1967 edition in order to correct the errors of the previous edition.[3] Wezler criticized Pandeya for not making better use of the available sources, since Pandeya was promising an improvement over Chakravarti's edition by following the Poona manuscript exactly and emending it with the help of the Ahmedabad manuscript.[4]

Although I have not prepared a critical edition of the section of the *Yuktidīpikā* that I translated, I did correct and emend the text. I have included the corrections and emendations in the notes to the Translation. Apart from Pandeya's edition, for corrections and emendations I used the following:

(*i*) Photocopy of the Poona manuscript from the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, described as follows: "VIII, Collection of 1875–76, No. 374, 122 folios, 12 lines per folio, material birch bark, purchased from Kashmir, author Vācaspati Miśra, new copy" (*devanāgarī* script).[5]

(*ii*) Photocopy of the Ahmedabad manuscript from the Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Indological Institute, Ahmedabad, No. 173, described as follows: "Yuktidīpikā-Sāṅkhyakārikā Ṭīkā, incomplete, 47 folios" (*devanāgarī* script).[6]

(*iii*) Two incomplete manuscripts: one photocopied from the Manuscript section of the Central Library in Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, listed under 3A/2194 C4083 (*śāradā* script). I had this manuscript transcribed into *devanāgarī* by Pt. Janārdana Śāstrī Pandeya, but because the fragment starts with *kārikā* 38 and my translated selections from the *Yuktidīpikā* do not go beyond *kārikā* 28, it was of limited value. The second manuscript is from Śrīnagar, where Allen Thrasher photographed the text for me; unfortunately, due to technical difficulties he photographed only a part of the manuscript.

(*iv*) The *editio princeps*: Pulinbehari Chakravarti, *Yuktidīpikā*.[7]

(*v*) Rāmaśaṅkar Tripāṭhī, Īśvarakṛṣṇaviracitā *Sāṅkhyakārikā*...Rāmaśaṅkaratripāṭhīviracitayā tattvaprabhākhyayā vyākhyayā ajñātakartṛkayā yuktidīpikākhyayā vivṛtyā ca vibhūṣitā. R.S. Tripāṭhī based his edition on the edition of Pandeya, but he made corrections and emendations without any apparatus. He also added his own commentary (called *ṭippaṇī* in the text) in Hindi.
(*vi*) V. Raghavan, "The Yuktidīpikā on the Sāṅkhyakārikā—Corrections and Emendations in the Text." *Annals of Oriental Research* 12 (1955): 1–14; 14 (1958): 1–8; 15 (1958): 1–12; 15 (1959): 1–10.
(*vii*) I also received manuscript suggestions from Pt. K. D. Tripāṭhī,[8] Pt. Śrī Nārāyaṇa Miśra, Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, and Richard Salomon.

Of this material the Poona manuscript is the most complete and most reliable. Since Pandeya in his edition of the *Yuktidīpikā* made use of both the Poona and Ahmedabad manuscripts, consulted Chakravarti's *editio princeps*, and adopted some of the suggestions Raghavan proposed in his articles on Corrections and Emendations of the *Yuktidīpikā*, my translation of the selected passages from the *Yuktidīpikā* is primarily based on Pandeya's edition. It was, however, necessary to reexamine some of the same sources that Pandeya had available and/or some other philosophical texts, such as the *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, to correct a reading. Corrections and emendations in the selected passages could be divided into several categories. A few examples of the distinct categories follow:
(*i*) Correction of a corrupt reading by comparison with another philosophical text: for example, 103.18, where Pandeya indicates the corrupt reading *nirghahati* with a question mark, Chakravarti has *nir...hati* (123.3), Poona manuscript has *gha* in the margin, and Raghavan did not comment on this at all; the *Nyāyamañjarī* 2.48.23–25 contains an identical clause, repeated twice, with the reading *nirvahati*. With this double evidence, there should not be any doubt that the reading is *nirvahati*.[9]
(*ii*) Rearrangement of lines that appear out of place: for example, 103.16 sentence *atha karmendriyāṇāṃ kā vṛttir iti*, including *ucyate* that follows appears out of context. Raghavan suggests deleting the sentence since the same is repeated on line 29 of this page, where it seems appropriate in introducing the section on the organs of action. Another case of a compound out of context led Wezler to surmise that the compound *liṅgaliṅgipūrvakam* is part of the *vārttika* text, 37.1. I do not think that this is a case of a *vārttika*. I surmise that this phrase should have been printed in bold as it is the third *pāda* of *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5. Otherwise the whole third *pāda* is missing from the text, as is the commentary thereon. I do not have any suggestion for the reason of the occurrence of *liṅgaliṅgipūrvakam*, the

definition of consistent relation or concomitance on which inference is based, in the middle of a discussion on various types of perception, mental and yogic.

(*iii*) Contextual correction: for example, 46.24–25 when an *alpha privativ* disappeared and at the same time a dittography occurred. Since the Buddhists do not believe in *ātman* or in "all-pervasiveness" the sentence has to read "...are not true...." The proposed emendation is as follows: instead of *dharmyasiddhatvādāyo yathārthās* should read *dharmyasiddhatvād ayathārthās* in the sentence *tasmād yathā vibhur ātmā sarvatra sukhādisaṃbhavād ity evam ādāyo bauddhaṃ prati dharmyasiddhatvādāyo yathārthās tathā vedaśabda api prāyeṇeti.* The *akṣara yo* at the end of the first compound was probably a dittographic repetition of the preceding *akṣara yo* in *ādāyo*, and therefore the *akṣara yo* should be dropped. As for the contextual correction, a short *a* as *alpha privativ* before the second compound should be supplied to concur with the meaning of the sentence "objects which are not established (*asiddha*) are not valid (*ayathārtha*)," and therefore the text should be corrected as follows: *dharmyasiddhatvād ayathārthās.*

(*iv*) Correction of a corrupt reading by comparison with the correct reading in the gloss on the verse: for example, 40.24 and 40.28. The verse reads incorrectly: *ākṣepa* and *pariśeṣitaḥ* in the phrase *arthāntarākṣepād itaraḥ pariśeṣitaḥ.* The gloss reads correctly: *prasaṅgināṃ kṣepam apohaṃ kṛtvā pariśeṣataḥ.* Also 44.7, *pariśeṣataḥ.* The verse can be corrected to *arthāntarakṣepād itaraḥ pariśeṣataḥ.*

(*v*) Correction of obvious misprints: for example, 104.3 reads *samyakstrotomārgānusāriṇo* can easily be corrected to *samyaksrotomārgānusāriṇo* by leaving out the "t"; the corrected reading is confirmed by the Poona manuscript.

PLACE OF THE TEXT IN THE SĀṄKHYA TRADITION

As with so many Sanskrit texts, it is impossible to determine either the date or the authorship of the *Yuktidīpikā.* After Wezler's suggestion in 1975 that a text called *Rājavārttika* is imbedded in the *Yuktidīpikā*,[10] the question became all the more difficult because it was now necessary to consider two separate texts, and therefore possibly two authors. Wezler claims to have revised his opinion, but did not publish anything to the effect. He only remarked on this in his Preface to the Critical Edition of the *Yuktidīpikā.*

The *Yuktidīpikā* is one of the commentaries on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The

Sāṅkhyakārikā is usually dated somewhere between 350–500 A.D. As I shall show in chapter 4, the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* was possibly written in response to Dignāga's criticism of the Sāṅkhya system and obviously before Paramārtha's translation of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* into Chinese. Dignāga's dates are commonly accepted as 480–540 A.D. Paramārtha translated the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* around 560 A.D. This consideration would place the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* close to the middle of the sixth century A.D.

A few scholars have attempted to date the *Yuktidīpikā.* Pandeya does not commit himself, but notes the fact, as do others, that the *Yuktidīpikā* quotes Dignāga's definition of perception; and yet the *Yuktidīpikā* does not deal with the definition of Dharmakīrti. This fact led scholars to speculate that the *Yuktidīpikā* was written soon after Dignāga.

This study will propose that the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* was possibly written in response to the criticism of the Sāṅkhya levied by opponents, especially by Dignāga. This, of course, gave the *Yuktidīpikā* reason to focus on Dignāga, whether it was written before or after Dharmakīrti. The puzzling point is that we do not find any reference to the *Yuktidīpikā* or even to the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* in the writings of other schools. Later criticisms of the other schools directed against Sāṅkhya continue to be based on the ideas that Dignāga criticized; the Sāṅkhya literature itself with the exception of the *Yuktidīpikā* does not provide evidence for a defense against the criticisms of the other schools. None of these considerations are helpful in determining the date of the *Yuktidīpikā.* Since it is possible to say only that the *Yuktidīpikā* was written sometime after the middle of sixth century (that is, the composition of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*) but without a *terminus ad quem*, it is impossible to give the date of the *Yuktidīpikā.*

A still greater problem arises with the question of authorship of the *Yuktidīpikā.* In the colophon of the Poona manuscript the authorship is ascribed to Vācaspati Miśra, but this cannot be the famous ninth or tenth century A.D. polyhistor of the same name. Therefore this single piece of information cannot be taken as decisive evidence. Since the author remains unknown, wherever I refer to the author of the *Yuktidīpikā,* I will use the term Yuktidīpikākāra, which literally means "the author of the *Yuktidīpikā.*"

The *Yuktidīpikā* is the only one among the several commentaries on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* that goes beyond the simple explanation of words of the *kārikā,* characteristic of the other commentaries on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā.* This function is fulfilled in part by the *Rājavārttika,* while the *Yuktidīpikā* is a rather independent work defending the Sāṅkhya positions in the form of philosophical arguments. Therefore needless to say, the *Yuktidīpikā* gives an insight into Sāṅkhya positions that had not yet been known.

Apart from the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* and its commentaries there is only one earlier Sāṅkhya work that is accessible, and that only to a very limited extent. This is the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, a work that has unfortunately been lost but is known primarily from Frauwallner's reconstruction from sources of Sāṅkhya opponents.[11] The *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, as reconstructed mainly from Dignāga's criticism, contained a fully developed theory of epistemology and logic, otherwise neglected in the Sāṅkhya literature. In recent years Steinkellner uncovered additional material for the reconstruction of the same, particularly perception, published as "The *Ṣaṣṭitantra* on Perception, a Collection of Fragments, " in *Asiatische Studien* 53.3.

The commentaries on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* are:

(*i*) The *Gauḍapādabhāṣya*, dated perhaps as late as eleventh century A.D. Its author is sometimes identified with the author of the *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* and also considered the teacher of Śaṅkara's teacher. All of this information is, however, subject to doubt. The commentary has much in common with the commentary of Māṭhara.

(*ii*) The *Māṭharavṛtti* is an early work according to T. Mainkar (1972) and others. S. Belvalkar (1917) believed it to be the original Sanskrit version of Paramārtha's translation into Chinese; according to A. B. Keith (1924) and S.S. Suryanarayana (1931) it is of late date. E. Solomon's (1973) publication of the two manuscripts, which she designates as V_1 and V_2, suggests another hypothesis. According to her, V_1, *Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti*, is the *Māṭharavṛtti* and V_2, *Sāṃkhyavṛtti*, is the original of Paramārtha's translation.

(*iii*) The *Jayamaṅgalā* is also of an unknown date. The authorship is ascribed to Śaṅkara, who should not be identified with Śaṅkara the Vedāntin. This commentary makes references to the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* and gives some valuable information from it.

(*iv*) Paramārtha's translation of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* (with commentary) into Chinese. Apart from the Chinese version there is a French translation by J. Takakusu, and this translation was translated into English by S.S. Suryanarayana. In addition to this material, N. Aiyaswami Sastri translated, or rather reconstructed, the Chinese version into Sanskrit.

(*v*) The *Rājavārttika* was referred to in philosophical texts such as in the *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra. In the *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, there is a reference to a teacher of the Sāṅkhya known by the name Rāja. The *Kapilasūtravivaraṇa* refers to the *Rājavārttika* as the work of Bhoja (twelfth century A.D.), who is the author of a *Yogasūtra* commentary. Wezler after careful scrutiny established that the text of the *Rājavārttika* is incorporated in the body of the *Yuktidīpikā*; on the model of Kielhorn's discovery of Kātyāyana's *Vārttika* in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, the *Rājavārttika* would be the *vārttika* on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, and the *Yuktidīpikā* the *bhāṣya*. Mainkar speculated that

there is a separate text called the *Rājavārttika*, thus disagreeing with Pandeya's identification of the *Yuktidīpikā* with the *Rājavārttika*. He also took note of the reference given by the Yuktidīpikākāra to a *bhāṣyakāra*, consequently he considered the existence of a *bhāṣya* type of commentary but refrained from any identification.

(*vi*) The *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī* is the best known commentary on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* by the polyhistor Vācaspati Miśra, whose dates, originally placed in the tenth century A.D., have recently been revised to the ninth century. His interpretations are revealing, well informed, but at times also puzzling. The *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī* also generated a half a dozen commentaries on itself.

(*vii*) The *Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti* (V_1) was discovered and published by E. Solomon. She considers this commentary to be a version of the *Māṭharavṛtti*.

(*viii*) The S*āṃkhyavṛtti* (V_2) discovered and published by E. Solomon, according to whom this was the original of Paramārtha's translation into Chinese. Naomichi Nakada also produced an edition of the same text.

(*ix*) The *Yuktidīpikā* itself, although a commentary of unknown date and authorship, is nonetheless the most valuable Sāṅkhya source for its insightful and extensive elaboration through philosophical arguments true to its name "Elucidation by Means of Argument." This study aims to show that the *Yuktidīpikā* argues in support of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* which was written to prove the Sāṅkhya position against its opponents such as Dignāga.

ON THE TEXT OF THE *YUKTIDĪPIKĀ*: SYNOPSIS OF THE SELECTED PASSAGES OF THE *YUKTIDĪPIKĀ* AND THE RESPECTIVE VERSES OF THE *SĀṄKHYAKĀRIKĀ*

Interestingly enough, the Yuktidīpikākāra makes a strong case for the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* to be a proper scientific work[12] in the traditional way, though "modernized" by the standards of his time. He does this by considering the *kārikās* to be *sūtras* which are followed by a *bhāṣya* commentary. According to Wezler the *Yuktidīpikā* actually consists of a *vārttika* and a *bhāṣya* commentary.[13] If this set up is intentional on the part of the Yuktidīpikākāra in order to give the Sāṅkhya school the standardization of the literary tradition as other philosophical schools had, could one ask whether the Yuktidīpikākāra could be the author of both the commentaries, the *Rājavārttika* and the *Yuktidīpikā*?

The entire text of the *Yuktidīpikā* is divided into four sections (*prakaraṇa*) whereby it imposes a corresponding division into four sections on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*. Another subdivision is into eleven chapters (*āhnika*). Each section has two to three chapters, while each chapter contains several *kārikās*. The division is as follows:

Section (*prakaraṇa*)	chapter (*āhnika*)	*kārikā*
1	1	1–2
	2	3–8
	3	9–14
2	4	15–16
	5	17–21
3	6	22–27
	7	28–34
	8	35–45
4	9	46–51
	10	52–59[14]
	11	64–71

It is apparent that the division is based on grouping according to subjects. Pandeya seems to follow a division that Mainkar outlined.[15] According to Pandeya the subjects are:[16]

Chapter 1: Necessity of liberation
Chapter 2: How liberation is obtained
Chapter 3: Examination of effects
Chapter 4: Proof for the primeval material stuff
Chapter 5: The nature of consciousness
Chapter 6: Nature of senses
Chapter 7: Functions of senses
Chapter 8: Senses and objects
Chapter 9: Results of evolution
Chapter 10: Evolution of bodies
Chapter 11: Liberation

The passages selected for translation and study were determined by the topic, namely, the instruments of knowledge, the means by which one can cognize an object veridically. The instruments of knowledge are dealt with in *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5 and 6, although the discussion continues through *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 7 and 8. Besides these *kārikās*, *Yuktidīpikā* on *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 28 offers a unique insight into the theory of perception.

A brief synopsis of the selected passages of the *Yuktidīpikā* is as follows: *Yuktidīpikā* on *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5 commences with a list of definitions of perception from the various philosophical schools. Dignāga's definition is listed last, though without mentioning Dignāga's name. The Yuktidīpikākāra argues against Dignāga on difference or non-difference between the instrument of knowledge and its result, knowledge. Dignāga claims there is no difference between the two, whereas the Yuktidīpikākāra establishes the difference between the instrument of knowledge and its result on the grounds of their different substrata.

The discussion continues with the examination of the various parts of the definition of perception. The early definition of perception had to be revised since it was too narrow. The revised definition had to be able to include not only sensation, mental and yogic perception, but also non-doubting awareness to complete the Sāṅkhya definition of perception.

The analysis of the definition of perception in *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5 justifies the use of the prefix *prati* which is instrumental in delimiting a respective sense-content; "respective" indicates that the ear, for example, can have as its sense-content sound only and nothing else. At the same time, the prefix *prati* indicates the immediate presence of the sense-contents. Finally the whole definition "the non-doubting awareness of each [faculty's]

respective sense-contents" is interpreted as an *ekaśeṣa* compound. That is to say, although the compound is mentioned only once, it should be understood as if it were mentioned twice: once for the sensory perception, the second time for mental or intuitive and yogic perception.

The second *pāda* of *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5 (*trividham anumānam ākhyātam*) deals with the threefold division of inference. Īśvarakṛṣṇa does not say expressly what the threefold (*trividham*) stands for. But all the Sāṅkhya commentaries unanimously explain it as three forms of inference: inference-from-cause-to-effect (*pūrvavat*), inference-from-effect-to-cause (*śeṣavat*), and inference-from-general-correlation (*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*). In addition to the three forms of inference, the Yuktidīpikākāra introduces two kinds of proof that ensure a valid inference. These two proofs are the simple (*vīta*) and the exclusionary (*avīta*). The exclusionary in particular is helpful in cases of adventitious or vitiating elements interfering with an inference. All examples will be subject to examination as to the proper place, time, and characteristic marks. The Yuktidīpikākāra enumerates three fallacies of reason: the unestablished (*asiddha*), the contradictory (*viruddha*), and the not decisive (*anaikāntika*).

The text of *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5 of *pāda* 3 is missing and so is the commentary. The discussion from *pāda* 2 carries over directly into *pāda* 4 which deals with verbal testimony (*āptaśruti*). Verbal testimony is of two kinds: first, tradition which was revealed and is not of human origin, and second, tradition which was recorded by Manu and others.

The *Yuktidīpikā* discusses *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 6 and 7 together. This part deals with inference-from-general-correlation (*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*). The text gives examples of the inference-from-general-correlation. Two kinds of proof are briefly introduced by a quote of an unidentifiable source. Their definition is explained and inference is divided into the precondition-for-analytical-description-of-inference (*vyākhyāṅga*) and the demonstration-to-others (*parapratipādanāṅga*). This twofold division constitutes the set of the ten members of inference. All the ten members together also form the simple proof (*vīta*), although in *Yuktidīpikā* 68.19, the proof used for establishing the unmanifest material stuff (*avyakta*) is the simple proof which has only five members. The exclusionary proof is also briefly discussed.

The commentary on *kārikā* 7 is interspersed within the text of the commentary on *kārikā* 6. The commentary on *kārikā* 7 gives reasons for imperceptibility and discusses the various kinds of hindrances which interfere with the perceptual process.

After completing the discussion on *kārikā* 7, the text of the *Yuktidīpikā* returns to *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 6 claiming the necessity to distinguish inference from testimony. The

opponent, quite likely Dignāga again, tries to establish his own position of not distinguishing inference from testimony. The Yuktidīpikākāra continues his argument that his opponent is mixing together a shared property (*sāmānya*) and a whole (*samudāya*) which are two different things. Moreover it is necessary to accept the difference between inference and testimony because there are three kinds of objects—manifest and unmanifest material stuff, and consciousness—that require separate instruments of knowledge: perception, inference, and testimony.

Sāṅkhyakārikā 8 claims that the existence of the primeval material stuff (*pradhāna*) can be proved through the effects of the material stuff, which shows that objects of knowledge though imperceptible can be established by means of inference with the assistance of the exclusionary proof. To the opponent's question as to why it is necessary to introduce the similarity and dissimilarity of the effects of the primeval material stuff, the Yuktidīpikākāra explains that in order to attain liberation one has to have discriminative knowledge of the primeval material stuff, the manifest material stuff, and the knower.

The *Yuktidīpikā* on *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 28 begins with a section on the functioning of the faculties. The text offers a two level process of perception. It distinguishes sensation (*grahaṇa*) and mental constructing (*pratyaya*). Vācaspati Miśra in his *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī* ascribed this distinction to the Sāṅkhya perception, for which he became a target of criticism.

The text continues with a refutation of the Nyāya interpretation on the nature of the sense faculties. The Yuktidīpikākāra disagrees with the notion of the sense faculties being elemental (*bhautika*), on the grounds that if they were elemental, how could they be effective when an object of knowledge is at a distance? Therefore they are not elemental, but they are agents capable of becoming effective due to their property of being an agent. Faculties of action, a special feature of the Sāṅkhya, are also briefly defined.

TEXT AND TRANSLATION OF THE *SĀṄKHYAKĀRIKĀ* 5–8 AND 28

prativiṣayādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭaṃ trividham anumānam ākhyātam /
talliṅgaliṅgipūrvakam āptaśrutir āptavacanan tu[17] //5//
sāmānyatas tu dṛṣṭād atīndriyāṇāṃ prasiddhir[18] anumānāt /
tasmād api cāsiddhaṃ parokṣam āptāgamāt sādhyam[19] //6//

atidūrāt sāmīpyād indriyāghātān mano'navasthānāt /
saukṣmyād vyavadhānād abhibhāvāt sāmānābhihārāc ca //7//
saukṣmyāt tadanupalabdhir nābhāvāt kāryatas tadupalabdhiḥ[20] /
mahadādi tac ca kāryaṃ prakṛtivirūpaṃ sarūpañ ca //8//
rūpādiṣu[21] pañcānām ālocanamātram iṣyate vṛttiḥ /
vacanādānaviharaṇotsargānandāś ca pañcānām //28//

[5] Perception is the non-doubting awareness (*adhyavasāya*) of each [faculty's] respective sense-content (*viṣaya*). Inference is declared to be of three forms preceded by or based on [the consistent relation between] the logical reason and *pūrvakam*). Verbal testimony is reliable statement.
[6] Supersensory things are established through inference-from-general-correlation. And that mediate object (*parokṣa*) which is not established from that [that is, inference-from-general-correlation] is to be proven by means of scriptual testimony.
[7] [Some objects are imperceptible] because of excessive distance, vicinity, an impaired sense faculty, distraction of the mind, subtlety, interference, overpowering, and admixture with similar things.
[8] The imperceptibility of that [primeval material stuff] is due to its subtlety, not its nonexistence. It is perceived through its effects. And its effects are the large one (*mahat*), etc., which are similar and dissimilar to material stuff.
[28] [We] maintain the function of the five [senses] is pure sensation of color (*rūpa*) and the rest. Speaking, taking, moving, evacuating, and enjoying [are the functions] of the five [faculties of action].

TRANSLATION OF THE YUKTIDĪPIKĀ ON SĀṄKHYAKĀRIKĀ 5–8 AND 28

Yuktidīpikā on Sāṅkhyakārikā 5–8 (P 34.27–47.33, WM 76.15–107.24)

(The *Yuktidīpikā* is written in the classical style of debate. The views, questions, objections of the other party are introduced with the word *āha*. In order to take into consideration the variety of expressions that *āha* stands for, the present translation renders *āha* as "objection," in spite of the fact that there is no lexicographical connection between the two words. The

Sāṅkhya speaker is introduced by the word *ucyate* which can be rendered suitably as "response.")

Objection [34.27, 76.15]: [Referring to the previous discussion on the instruments of knowledge:] Very well; so be it. Because [you have] not declared any definition, the definition is not known (*apratipatti*). Therefore the definition [should be] declared. For, since there is a variety of views [on perception], the definitions of perception and the other [instruments of knowledge] are not established.

[For example,] some [Naiyāyikas] say (*iti*): "Perception is a cognition that arises from the relation of the object to the senses, is not verbal, is not erroneous, and is definite."[22]

Likewise, others [Vaiśeṣikas] say: "[Still] another [instrument of knowledge] is the one which arises from the relation to the *ātman*, sense faculties, and the *manas* with the object."[23]

Others [Mīmāṃsakas] say: "A cognition arises upon the contact (*samprayoga*) of a person's sense faculties with something real (*sat*); this [cognition] is perception."[24]

Vṛṣagaṇa's followers say: "[Perception] is the functioning of the ear and the other [sense faculties]."[25]

Others [Dignāga] say: "[Perception] is without mental constructs."[26]

In this way, perception and other [instruments of knowledge] are not known because there is no established definition. Therefore [you] ought to declare their definition.

Response [35.2, 76.25 & 77.3]:

PERCEPTION IS THE NON-DOUBTING AWARENESS OF EACH [FACULTY'S] RESPECTIVE SENSE-CONTENT.[27]

Sound, etc., are sense-contents in that they "draw toward" (*viṣiṇvanti*),[28] or else they "are drawn toward" (*viṣīyante*), that is (*ity arthaḥ*), they are perceived. And these [sense-contents] are of two kinds, particularized and unparticularized. The particularized are defined as earth, etc., and are cognizable by people like us. But the unparticularized are defined as the subtle elements (*tanmātra*)[29] and are cognizable by yogis and other perfected beings.[30] As [the text] will say below: "...the sense faculties have five particular and unparticular sense-contents..." (kā. 34); and also "...intellect (*buddhi*) is non-doubting awareness." (kā. 23). The phrase "...of each [faculty's] respective sense-content" means (*iti*) that each functions toward its respective sense-content. What does "each" refer to? To each sense faculty. "The non-doubting awareness of each [faculty's] respective sense content is the non-doubting awareness with respect to it. That is to say (*iti yāvad*), perception (*dṛṣṭa*) is defined as that which has an illuminative nature, follows immediately the functioning of the

faculties that have appropriated [their] contents,[31] [and] because of the preponderance of *sattva* is without *rajas* and *tamas.* That direct cognition is called "perception" and is an instrument of knowledge. The result [attained] by this is the stimulation (*anugraha*) of the conscious power. Sound, etc., are objects of knowledge. Also see below for the relation of the instrument of knowledge and its result.

Objection [35.12, 77.11]: But is this result a different thing from the instrument of knowledge itself, or is it not a different thing?

// [If you ask (*iti*):] How, in the first place, could it possibly be a non-different thing?

Objection [35.13, 77.14]: How? Because it consists of veridical experience (*adhigama*). Now cognition (*jñāna*) consists of veridical experience. Since (*iti*) the object is understood by the very arising of that [cognition], how could it be different from the result? //[32]

Response [35.14, 77.16]: In this case (*idānīm*), how could [you account for] the property of being an instrument (*karaṇabhāva*) [belonging to the instrument of knowledge]?

Objection [35.14, 77.17]: The property of being an instrument [is established simply] by its being well known [as such]. The property of being an instrument is accepted by way of postulating that the arising of cognition takes on the appearance of the content; although it consists of veridical experience, [it] is perceived on the phenomenal level (*loka*) as if it were accompanied by an operation (*savyāpārā iva*). But this is not accepted on the ultimate level.[33]

Response [35.16, 77.20]: The result is a different thing, because it has a different substratum. The instrument of knowledge is designated as non-doubting awareness [and] has its substratum in the intellect; the result is characterized by stimulation (*anugraha*) [and] has its substratum in consciousness. It is not possible that two things with different substrata can be the same. As for your claim that the result is the cognition itself, because it consists of veridical experience, that is not acceptable. Why? Because it has not been proven. Just as objects such as pots without cognition cannot be known to consist of that [veridical experience] or not to consist of that, just so, without comprehension [which is stimulated] by consciousness, neither [can] cognition be known to consist of a content, nor to fail in consisting of a content.[34] For it is said in the *śāstra* [*Sāṅkhyakārikā*]: "...because of connection with it [consciousness], the unconscious intellect (*liṅga*) appears as if conscious..." (kā. 20). Therefore it is not established for the Sāṅkhya system that cognition consists of veridical experience without comprehension by consciousness. And this is accepted as a verbal convention (*vyavahāra*) according to the common knowledge of both parties. If [you] say, this is not correct because consciousness does not exist, [we say] no,

because [we shall] establish [its existence] below. We shall establish the existence of consciousness there (*atra*) on the grounds of the statement that: "Because it exists for another's purpose through being a composite thing..." [kā. 17]. Therefore it is proven that for one who maintains that non-doubting awareness is an instrument of knowledge, the result is something other than the instrument of knowledge.

Objection [35.24, 78.13]: If indeed the non-doubting awareness is the instrument of knowledge, how can the ordinary usage "a thing is directly perceptible (*pratyakṣa*)" be meaningful?

Response [35.25, 78.15]: The word "perception" is [applied] to a sense-content[35] because [perception] makes it [the sense-content] known and because it [sense-content] is a cause [of perception]. As a heap of rice measured by [the measure] *prastha* is called a "measure" [of rice], in this way an object (*artha*) measured by perception is [itself] designated by the word "perception."

Objection [35.27, 78.18]: No [this is not right] because this would result in the undesired consequence that it would apply elsewhere also [as with inference, etc.]. If the word "perception" is [applied] to a sense-content because it is known by means of perception, then an object known by means of inference would be called (*iti*) "inference." An object known by means of verbal testimony [would be] called "verbal testimony." But (*ca*) [things], such as fire and heaven, are not [in fact] designated by the words for their instruments of knowledge [that is, inference and verbal testimony]; therefore [the case of perception] is different. In this way, it is refuted that [the instrument of knowledge] is the cause of it [that is, the designation "perception"]. For someone who thinks that the designation "perception" cannot be ruled out for its cause [also] and who thus applies the word "perception" to its sense-content, would also have to apply [the designation] "inference" in the same way.

Response [36.2, 78.24]: If the cause is the same, the same designation [can be applied]. Thus, indeed, you [Dignāga] say [in *Nyāyamukha*], it is called "perception" because it functions directly upon each sense faculty [literally "eye"].[36] Conversely (*ca*), two things, the sense-content and the non-doubting awareness, respond to the sense faculty. The sense-content [responds to the faculty] as the stimulator, while the other [non-doubting awareness responds] as that which is stimulated. Therefore both of them have the same cause, and consequently they can be designated by the same word.

Objection [36.5, 79.4]: How is it then with respect to other instruments of knowledge?

Response [36.5, 79.5]: This does not apply elsewhere because this [namely, condition of

having the cause and designation the same] is absent. In the case of other instruments of knowledge, there is no common cause. How so? Inference is that by which one infers; nothing is inferred by the fire itself; therefore it [that is, the fire] cannot be designated by the word "inference."

Objection [36.8, 79.8]: For what purpose did you mention the phrase "non-doubting awareness" [in the definition]?

Response [36.8, 79.9]: In order to prevent an over extensive definition. If we were to say only that "perception [is that which responds] to its sense-content" it would follow (*āpadyate*) that anything at all which responds to the sense-content, whether by way of stimulating or hindering [it], would be "perception." But if it [the phrase "non-doubting awareness"] is included, that fault [namely, the over extensive definition] does not occur.

Objection [36.10, 79.13]: No, [even then it is not necessary] because the context (*adhikāra*) is the instruments of knowledge, so that the phrase "non-doubting awareness" is unnecessary. How so? The context here is the instruments of knowledge. Without non-doubting awareness, no sense-content is cognized whereby something is known.[37] Hence, we will assume[38] the "non-doubting awareness" because it fits [the context]. Thus for example in the context of study, if someone says: "Bring the Brāhmaṇas!"—only they who are studying are brought.

Response [36.14, 79.18]: [The phrase "non-doubting awareness" is included] in order to prevent doubt about its referring to the other faculties. Thus in that case, any one of the sense faculties, such as the ear and the [three] internal organs, as a group of four[39] respond to the sense-content as the faculties and the mind (*dvāradvārin*). Therefore the "non-doubting awareness" is included, lest there be any doubt about the phrase ["non-doubting awareness"].

Objection [36.16, 79.22]: But still there is room for doubt, in that a sense-content is not grasped by any one [faculty]. Therefore we shall prove that all of them [are conducive] to perception (*pratyakṣatva*).

Response [36.17, 79.24]: If [you say] that cognizing [is performed] by all [of them, you] violate the teaching of the [Sāṅkhya]. If again [you] accept all of them [that is, the faculties] as instruments of knowledge, then [again you] violate this teaching of the [Sāṅkhya], namely, there is only one instrument for perception (*darśana*), that one instrument is [just] this discerning (*khyāti*) alone.[40] And [according to your position the two statements which] the teacher [namely, Īśvarakṛṣṇa] makes below—"These are like lamps" (kā. 36) [and] "since intellect produces every experience of consciousness" (kā. 37)—would be

contradictory. Therefore the phrase "non-doubting awareness" must be included, lest there be any doubt [about including the phrase "non-doubting awareness"].

Objection [36.20, 80.3]: No, this is all subject to doubt. And in respect to all doubts this [statement] applies (*upa* + *sthā*): "A specific cognition is arrived at from explanation, nothing specific is arrived at from doubt."[41] With reference to this, we will explain [the definition according to our Buddhist view]: "Perception is non-doubting awareness,"[42] and this is without doubt because the functioning of the sense faculties is understood.

Response [36.23, 80.6]: So be it, if there is any doubt about this. But really there is no room for doubt. How is that? Sensation (*grahaṇa*)[43] [arises] from "the functioning of the ear, etc., alone."[44]

Objection [36.24, 80.10]: But what is the reason that, although there is no difference as to their causes, "the functioning of the ear, etc., alone" gives rise to sensation in the process of perception (*atra*), yet the internal organ itself does not [give rise to sensation] in the process of perception?

Response [36.25, 80.12]: Among these, the functioning of the ear, etc., is primary. How so? Because it is capable of sensing the sense-content directly. Not so the internal organ, since [its] cognition [occurs] by means of it [that is, ear, etc.]. Of the primary and secondary, the direct apprehension (*sampratipatti*) occurs in the primary. So, for example, a draft animal is not tied up, because [it is enjoined that] "A bull should be tied up [and so should] a goat which is [dedicated to] Agni and Soma."[45]

Objection [36.27, 80.16]: What fault would there be if it were admitted that this "functioning of the ear, etc., alone" is the perception?

Response [36.28, 80.18]: Discriminative cognition (*vijñāna*) that has passion as its content and involves (*pūrvaka*) [the relation of] a logical reason with the *sādhya* (*liṅgaliṅgin*)[46] and intuitive cognition, going beyond inference and verbal testimony, that arises for the yogis who are dwelling in [various] states of meditation, both (*tad*) [of the cognitions] should be included. How so? Because (*hi*) satisfaction and other such notions are not contents of the functioning of the ear, etc., nor is the supersensory cognition of the yogis. But if it [that is, perception] is taken according to [our] position (*yathānyāsam*), they [namely, satisfaction, etc.] are also contents; and then the non-doubting awareness of them is to be admitted as [part of] the process of perception. How can you deny [this]?

Objection [37.5, 81.3]:What is the purpose of the phrase "each respective sense-content?"

Response [37.5, 81.4]: The purpose of the phrase "each respective sense-content" is to exclude the things that do not exist. If we were to say only that "perception is non-doubting

awareness," then it would follow that non-doubting awareness would also apply to the perception of a mirage, castles in the clouds (*gandharvanagara*), [and] fire circles. But by the phrase "each respective sense-content," they are excluded.

Objection [37.7, 81.7]: If this is so, then you should simply say "non-doubting awareness of the sense-contents." What is the purpose of the words "each respective?"

Response [37.8, 81.9]: The words "each respective" express relation (*sannikarṣa*) [of the sense faculties to the sense-contents]. If we were to say only: "perception is non-doubting awareness of the sense-contents," it would apply to a sense-content as such. But when we include the words "each respective," "respective" denotes "a direct contact" (*ābhimukhya*).[47] Therefore it is understood that perception is non-doubting awareness which immediately follows the functioning of the sense faculties which are in relation [to their respective sense-contents].

Objection [37.10, 81.13]: What [instrument of knowledge] is then conducive to perception (*pratyakṣatva*) in [the case of] the supersensory relation?

Response [37.11, 81.14]: Inference [is the instrument of knowledge in such a case]. Why? Because it [namely, inference] applies to a content (*viṣaya*) which is not in direct relation [with a sense faculty] through observing its logical reason (*liṅga*).

Objection [37.12, 81.16]: Inference does not apply here, because that which is prescribed as a particular sublates that which is prescribed as a general.[48] After having prescribed that perception applies to non-doubting awareness of any content in general, [the text or teacher] teaches that inference applies to a particular content which involves [the relation of] logical reason with the *sādhya* (*liṅgin*). And that which is prescribed as particular sublates that which is prescribed as general. As in the example: "Give curd to the Brāhmaṇas, give buttermilk to Kauṇḍinya."[49]

Response [37.15, 81.22]: [Would you say] then that memory is conducive to perception (*pratyakṣatva*)? In this case (*tatra*), the [above mentioned] exception does not apply.

[Objection 37.16, 81.24]: No, memory is not conducive to perception, because the context [here] is the instruments of knowledge. This is the context of the instruments of knowledge and nothing is known through memory; for memory occurs [only] in connection with a previously known object.

Response [37.17, 82.1]: [Would you say] then that doubt is conducive to perception?

Objection [37.17, 82.2]: No, doubt is not [conducive to perception], since perception is defined (*ucyate*) as non-doubting awareness. And doubt is not non-doubting awareness because of its nature of being uncertain.

Response [37.19, 82.4]: But when it follows that sense-contents would incite[50] [to activity] non-corresponding sense faculties, even then no such fault arises. Likewise, when we specify (*iti*) that [non-doubting awareness] follows the functioning of the sense faculties while they are in relation to the sense objects (*indriyārtha*).

Objection [37.20, 82.6]: [Then you should] include passion, etc. If you accept that perception is non-doubting awareness which follows the functioning of the sense faculties when they are in relation [to the sense objects], then cognition that has passion, etc., as its content would not be perception because [passion is] a thing beyond sensory grasp. [But] it has to be included.

Response [37.22, 82.9]: These words "each respective" do not modify the sense faculty, in the way that perception is non-doubting awareness of that [faculty] which functions with respect to the various contents. How then [are the words "each respective" to be construed]? They modify the non-doubting awareness, that is, non-doubting awareness [functions] with respect to various objects.

Objection [37.24, 82.12]: If [we admit that the words "each respective"] modify the non-doubting awareness, then sound, etc., would be included. In themselves the [sense-contents] such as sounds are not[51] conducive to perception; therefore they have to be included. Why so? The internal organ is not able to be related to them [directly]. You proposed earlier, sir, that the words "each respective" indicate the relation [of a content to a sense faculty]. And now it is taken as modifying the internal organ. But no relation of the internal organ to sound and other sense-contents is possible, because it would then follow that the ear and other sense faculties would be useless, and that the relation between the mind and the sense faculties (*dvāridvārabhāva*) would be destroyed. Therefore although we have gone very far [in trying to justify it], the words "each respective" cannot escape either refutation or inclusion of passion, etc.

Response [37.29, 82.20]: So be it; the phrase "respective sense-contents" modifies the sense faculties. As for when you said that passion will have to be included, to that we respond: [this is] accomplished by explaining [the compound in the definition] as an *ekaśeṣa* plural.[52] Such being the case, we will use only one compound which will be representative of several of the same compounds; "non-doubting awareness of each [faculty's] sense-content" stands for two of the same compounds [in the definition]. Of these, the first includes perception by sense faculties which is external. The second includes intuitive (*prātibha*) perception by the internal organ; thus this includes cognition of passion, etc., and that of the yogis. In this way, perception has been explained.

Objection [38.4, 82.27]: Now, we have to discuss inference.

Response [38.4, 82.29]:

INFERENCE HAS BEEN DECLARED TO BE OF THREE FORMS.

The teachers declared inference to be three-fold: inference-from-cause-to-effect (*pūrvavat*), inference-from-effect-to-cause (*śeṣavat*), and inference-from-general-correlation (*sāmānya-todṛṣṭa*). Here cause is used in the sense of antecedent. In common parlance, when something is a cause of a thing, it is said to have that [cause] as its antecedent. Examples include: "Cloth has thread as its antecedent," or "Yajñadatta has Devadatta as his antecedent." Inference-from-cause-to-effect is so called because it [inference] is based on an antecedent. The word *śeṣa* means "effect" (*vikāranāma*), derived from the verb *śiṣyate*, "[it] remains." And likewise it was said: "the effect of fire is not produced from anything other than fire";[53] that is, an offspring cannot be born by any other [than his parents]. Inference-from-effect-to-cause is so called because it [inference] is based on an effect. Of these, the inference-from-cause-to-effect takes place when one has observed that the cause has occurred, and thus realizes (*pratipadyate*) that the effect will occur; as, for example, when a cloud appears [one realizes] that it will rain.

Objection [38.11, 83.9]: This is not a [proper] example, because it is not decisive (*anekānta*). For the appearance of the cloud does not inevitably cause rain, because it is possible that it might be prevented by a cause such as wind.

Response [38.12, 83.11]: What if I say (*tarhi*) that one realizes the manifestation of the effect when one has observed the causal power assisted by another concurrent power and free of impediment? // For example, when one observes a lump of clay which is in the hands (*adhiṣṭhita*) of a potter who is at work and who has all his tools such as iron rod ready (*sampanna*), one realizes that a pot will come into existence; then that is inference-from-cause-to-effect.

And inference-from-effect-to-cause is: when one observes the completion (*nirvṛti*) of the effect, one realizes the existence of the cause. // When one sees a little boy, [one realizes] that a couple had intercourse.

Objection [38.15, 84.5]: This is not a [proper] example, because it is not decisive (*anekānta*). For the coming into existence of living beings (*prāṇabhṛt*) is not necessarily (*eva*) from an intercourse of a couple; for the births of Drona[54] and others that took place in other ways are specifically recorded (*śravaṇa*).

Response [38.17, 84.8]: What if I say that when one realizes that the sun or moon has risen after observing the sky reddened with light, is that inference-from-effect-to-cause?

Objection [38.18, 84.10]: This is not a [proper] example either, because it is not decisive. For a red light in the sky is not necessarily (*eva*) occasioned by the moon or sun. How so? It could also be occasioned by a fire in the distance.

Response [38.19, 84.12]: But if [I say that] one realizes [there was] rain after observing the increase of water in the river, then is that inference-from-effect-to-cause?

Objection [38.20, 84.14]: This is not a [proper] example, because it is not decisive. For there are many reasons for the increase of water in the river, such as thawing of snow, breaking of a dam, playing of elephants, and so on. Therefore this is not correct.

Response [38.22, 84.17]: What if I say that when one realizes [the existence of] a lotus root, after having observed a leaf, or when one realizes (*iti*) a seed after having observed a shoot, then is that inference-from-effect-to-cause? Or rather (*athavā*) take again the preceding example [increase of water]. As for what you said, that [the examples] are not decisive, to that (*atra*) we respond [that they are in fact decisive] as they are confirmed (*sāmārthya*) by the two kinds of proof: simple and exclusionary (*vīta* and *avīta*).
We shall show that the intended object [can be] proven by means of simple and exclusionary proofs, both being [equally accepted] arguments (*hetu*). Exclusionary proof is applied by means of eliminating any adventitious elements (*prasaṅgin*); for example (*tatra*), if adventitious elements such as melting of snow are eliminated on the grounds of place, time, and characteristic marks, then the cognition (*pratipatti*) is without doubt. To begin with (*tāvat*), with respect to place, [we offer] this example: it is impossible [to postulate] thawing of snow in the south. With respect to time, [we offer] this example: it is during the rainy season. Likewise with respect to the characteristic marks, [we offer] this example: since mung beans, barley, *śyāmaka*-grains, wood and straw, urine[55] and feces, etc., are not perceived, yet (*tathā*) heat, turbidness, etc., are perceived—therefore it follows by process of elimination (*pariśeṣataḥ*) that the water is, in fact, cloud [that is, rain] water. Hence, this is a decisive [example]. And similarly the [other] preceding examples are correct, since they can be confirmed by examining (*vicāra*) the place, etc..

[The inference] called inference-from-general-correlation (*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*) is when somebody once perceives a consistent relation (*avyabhicāra*) between two things and [thereby] realizes [the same] consistent relation between two things of the same type in another place and at another time. For example, when someone perceives the relation between smoke and fire in one place, he then realizes the existence of another fire elsewhere by means of other smoke.

Objection [38.32, 85.8]: This is not a [proper] example, because it does not allow for any

distinction (*aviśeṣa*) among the [different forms of] inference. For whenever there is an instance of inference, one observes a consistent relation of two things of the same type in another place. For example, when one perceives the production of a pot from a lump of clay by someone who has the [appropriate] tools in one place, one realizes a production of another pot from another lump [of clay] by someone who has the [appropriate] tools [elsewhere]; also, when one observes rain from the increase of water in the river in one place, one is convinced (*avasīyate*) of another rain from another increase of water in another river. And so it would follow that there would be no distinction among the three forms of inference.

Response [39.4, 85.14]: What if I say that when one realizes a particular characteristic on the part of one of several things that are concomitant (*sahabhū*), and he infers that the other things also share the same characteristic, then is that inference-from-general-correlation? For example, when one observes that one fruit from a tree ripens, he infers that the rest [of the fruit on that tree] will ripen as well as (*ca*) on other trees?[56]

Objection [39.6, 85.18]: This is not a [proper] example either, because it is not decisive. For not all the fruit ripen at the same time: as [the ripening of the fruit] may take place (*niṣpanna*) earlier or later and as there are various causes (*nimitta*) [for the ripening].

Response [39.7, 85.20]: What if I say that when one tastes a single drop of water from the sea, and infers that the rest of the water is also salty? Or that when one tastes a single mouthful of cooked rice from a pot, and infers that the rest [of the rice] is cooked—then is that inference-from-general-correlation?

Objection [39.9, 85.23]: This is not a [proper] example, because it does not include all the cases (*akṛtsna*). The text will say below: "Supersensory things are established through inference-from-general-correlation" (kā. 6). If this is the case that [this] instrument of knowledge is supposed to be so, then through observing that cause and its effect and their combinations are of their own nature of satisfaction, frustration, and confusion, the cognition of subtle elements, ego, and primeval material stuff would be achieved; but not of consciousness, since no other object of that genus has been observed.

Response [39.12, 86.6]: What if I say that when one observes in connection with some object that there is a consistent relation of one property with another property, when he realizes, by observing that one property [in another object], the other property—although it is wholly unperceived in something that is not of the same genus—then is that inference-from-general-correlation? For example, in the case of Devadatta, one observes that he, by moving, reaches another place. [Then] one infers the stars had moved, because they reached

another place, [although their motion] is entirely beyond perception.[57] Likewise, as one observes that mansions, etc., become tall by gradual building, he infers that plants and trees grow since he sees that they are tall.

Objection [39.16, 86.12]: This is not a [proper] example either, because it does not differ from the previous one. You claimed earlier, sir, that inference-from-effect-to-cause is a veridical experience of the cause from the effect. In the above case too, the veridical experience of the cause, characterized as "going," comes from the effect, characterized as "change of place." Therefore it would follow that there is no difference between inference-from-effect-to-cause and the inference-from-general-correlation.

Response [39.19, 86.16]: No [there is a difference between the two], because [inference-from-general-correlation] is without a regular causal relation (*niyama*). We explicitly defined that when one cognizes a cause from effect through their regular causal relation that is inference-from-effect-to-cause. But that is not the case in the instance of inference-from-general-correlation. Why not? On one hand (*api*), [we can] see the proof of the general property of being for another's purpose from the general property of being a composite thing (kā. 17). As it was said: "[Reasons which] are known as qualified on account of their consistent relation (*avyabhicāra*) [with the *sādhya*] are instrumental for [inferential] cognitions." On the other hand (*api*), [we can also] see that two [different instances of inference] share the same consistent relation.[58] For example, sound is impermanent, because it is produced [just as a pot breaks, because it is produced]. In such a case, he who postulates a regular causal relation [in every instance of inference] will have to give up his own thesis (*pratijñā*).[59] By this we have refuted the fallacious reasons which are unestablished, contradictory, and not decisive.[60] For these are not instrumental for knowledge, because they are based on doubt, misconception, and ignorance [respectively]. Thus, inference has been explained.

Objection [39.25, 87.2]: Let me ask (*iti*): What is the definition of verbal testimony?

Response [39.25, 87.3]:

VERBAL TESTIMONY IS A RELIABLE STATEMENT (end of *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5).

A "reliable" utterance is made by a person who is free of passion, etc., and is one that has an important object whose cause is beyond grasp. *Śruti* means revelation. [The compound] *āptaśruti* [is analyzed as] the revelation which is reliable. Or else *āpta* is [used as a possessive adjective] in the sense of "belonging to a reliable person"; the letter "*a*" is used [in this case] to express possession, as in the small group of words known as "protuberant pot."[61] [Thus] verbal testimony is the testimony [obtained] from reliable persons. [This one

compound, "verbal testimony" stands for] two [compounds], "verbal testimony." One compound will be representative of several of the same compounds.[62] Of these, the first compound "verbal testimony" refers to the tradition, based on cognition of non-human origin, independent, conducive to the highest human goals, which is undoubtedly an instrument of knowledge. And the second compound "verbal testimony" established as an instrument of knowledge are the words of *smṛti* literature, composed by Manu and others; words of the Vedāṅgas, works on reasoning, epics, and Purāṇas; and also the statements of educated persons who are well skilled in different arts and uncorrupted of merit. The word *tu* indicates a restriction; a reliable statement is verbal testimony, it does not apply to just any words. Since this is so, then what was said by teachers of others schools—"Words like *śiṃśapā* are undoubtedly included in inference because [of being one of the three kinds] of the threefold mark"[63]—is easily refuted. Thus the instruments of knowledge have been explained. [And] the above mentioned objects of knowledge are made known by means of these [instruments of knowledge].

Objection [40.3, 87.18]: It may be true that one has awareness through perception of objects which partake of contact with the senses and that one also has awareness through inference of things which, [although] they do not partake of contact with the senses, do have observed relations [that is, consistent relation or concomitance].

But as for those positive entities (*bhāva*) that are beyond the senses, they are different from both [objects mentioned above], and there can be no awareness of them through either perception or inference. If [such awareness] is through verbal testimony, the result will be establishing of any view (*sarvavāda*); and then there will be no understanding at all.[64] So what was said, namely, that all categories can be made known by just those instruments of knowledge [that is, perception, inference, and verbal testimony] is not correct.

Response [40.6, 87.24]: That would be so, if you should teach (*adhīta*) that there is only one form of inference; but what if it is threefold? It may be very well true that even accepting that inference-from-cause-to-effect and inference-from-effect-to-cause have to do with previously experienced relations, contents, and results, it must be still accepted that not all categories of things (*padārtha*) are made known by those two [forms of inference].

THEN SUPERSENSORY THINGS ARE ESTABLISHED THROUGH INFERENCE-FROM-GENERAL-CORRELATION (beginning of *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 6).

Then it is by inference-from-general-correlation that the awareness of supersensory objects will be understood correctly. How so? For example, one first observes concomitance between being produced and being impermanent in a pot, and then infers impermanence of

something else such as sound by seeing that it is produced. Likewise, a chip of wood, etc., is established as having sandalwood, etc., as its antecedent, because it belongs to that genus; so a c Naomichi Nakada ause and its effect are established as having that [satisfaction] as its antecedent, because they belong to the genus of satisfaction, etc. And beds, etc., are established to be for another's purpose because they are composite, so too causes and effects are established to be for another's purpose because they are composite; thus (*iti*) we conclude (*iti*) that everything that is intended to be known (*iṣṭa*) is thereby comprehended.[65]

But for those who hold that inference-from-general-correlation is simply inference-from-effect-to-cause, which produces an awareness (*samadhigama*) from the effect, it follows that consciousness cannot be cognized.[66] If you reply (*iti cet*) that there is no fault [in this] because a [thing's] effect may be metaphorically applied to [its] function, then you seem to believe that one does not perceive the particular properties[67] of consciousness (which does not have an effect or operation), unmanifest and manifest material stuff, and ego, one may say they [can be] cognized by their respective functioning in the present time.[68] How so? Because it is maintained that the power of their function, which is metaphorically applied to their effect, links each [of them] with their own nature. But this is not correct. Why so? Because another reason was mentioned.[69] If apprehension of consciousness could have been easily established on the basis of its function, the teacher would not have offered as a reason the concomitance between compositeness and being for another's purpose. And this [concomitance between compositeness and being for another's purpose] is not a function; therefore it must necessarily be accepted that inference-from-effect-to-cause and inference-from-general-correlation are different things. It is therefore established that awareness of supersensory objects results from inference-from-general-correlation.

It[70] [instrument of proof] is of two kinds, by way of a distinction which refers to its application only. They are simple proof (*vīta*) and exclusionary proof (*avīta*). Their [respective differentiating] marks are cited as follows:

> "When the reason is applied in its own form to prove the *sādhya*, that is simple proof, the other [*avīta* gives a proof by] what remains after other [adventitious] things are excluded."[71]

The instrument of proof is actually (*hi*) of two forms: general and specific. Of these, the general is the property of a thing that is concomitant with the *sādhya* [and] which [can be] appropriately taken as the reason (*hetutva*) for cognizing that [*sādhya*]. The specific

[instrument of proof] on the other hand (*punar*), may be size, homogeneity (*anvaya*),[72] the composite thing's being for another's purpose, and so on. Of these [two], when other views are set aside[73] and the reason is employed in just its own form in proving the *sādhya*, then that is called simple proof. But when it [the reason] is employed in proving the *sādhya* as what remains after all adventitious things (*prasaṅgin*) other than that very *sādhya* are excluded,[74] then this is called exclusionary proof. // For example, if the world could not possibly (*sambhavati*) originate from atoms, consciousness, God, *karma*, fate, time, its very nature or chance (*yadṛcchā*), [and] can [have originated only] from what remains, namely (*iti*), primeval material stuff, then this again is called exclusionary proof. //[75]

In this case, when the proof is simple, the speaker, adducing (*ādadhāna*) some other cognition similar to the one held in his own intellect, first brings it to mind (*pratipādya*) and constructs (*upanīyate*) it into the form of the sentences of the inference (*vākyabhāva*), since without the sentences of the inference he could not communicate the meaning to another's intellect. He then construes the inference with [all] its [ten] members. And its members specified (*lakṣaṇa*) as inquiry (*jijñāsā*), doubt about the truth of the thesis (*saṃśaya*), purpose of the inquiry (*prayojana*), the possibility of a solution to the question (*śakyaprāpti*), and the resolution of the doubt (*saṃśayavyudāsa*) constitute [the members of] the precondition for analytical description of inference (*vyākhyāṅga*).[76] Thesis (*pratijñā*), reason (*hetu*), example (*dṛṣṭānta*), application (*upasaṃhāra*), and conclusion (*nigamana*) are [the members of] the demonstration to others (*parapratipādanāṅga*).

Of these [members], inquiry is the desire to know; as when someone approaches another and says: "I want to know about consciousness. Does it exist or not?" Then when he responds: "Where did this doubt come from?" He continues: "What [can]not be observed, can be understood in two ways. So [too] in this case, the unobserved thing may be perceived in two ways: as existent or as nonexistent. It is existent, for instance, in the case of the other side of the disc of the sun and the moon; it is nonexistent, for instance, in the case of a hare's horn. Now this self (*ātman*)[77] is not observed. Therefore there is doubt as to whether it exists or not."

When asked: "What is the purpose of this question?" He answers firmly (*vyācaṣṭe*) that [it serves the purpose of] veridically experiencing (*adhigama*) the truth (*satattva*) of the teaching (*śāstra*) [of the Sāṅkhya], whereby one obtains liberation. How so? If this self does indeed exist, then liberation will simply be attained from knowing discriminately (*vijñāna*) the truth [that consciousness] is different from material stuff, is neutral, is omnipresent, etc. [This knowing discriminately] is opposed to the erroneous notion that there is no self, and

thus (*iti*) the teaching that liberation is attained FROM KNOWING DISCRIMINATELY [the difference between] THE MANIFEST, THE UNMANIFEST MATERIAL STUFF, AND THE KNOWER[78] becomes purposeful."

But if (*atha*) it is believed (presumably by the Buddhist opponent) that it [consciousness] does not exist, it follows from inference-from-general-correlation that other categories of things (*padārtha*) also do not exist; and having thus rejected the entirely deceptive (*vipralambha*) philosophy of the seer,[79] by doing away (*vigama*) with the dogmatic view (*dṛṣṭi*)[80] of cognizing consciousness, [it follows that] one acquires the content (*viṣaya*) of meditation which is empty, other-wordly, and not dependent on anything (*anavalambana*). Then it follows that you will attain absolute extinction which is defined by destroying the afflictions that belong to the three realms (*dhātus*).[81]

Once it has been established that it is possible to believe (*niścetum*) that this intended object (*artha*) exists by applying the three instruments of knowledge.[82] After resolving the doubt, the assertion (*avadhāraṇa*) of the *sādhya* [becomes] the thesis (*pratijñā*). // The thesis here is the assertion of the *sādhya*, namely, "consciousness exists." //[83]

The "reason" is a brief statement of the instrument of proof (*sādhana*). *Liṅga* is the instrument of proof, namely, "that by which [something] is established." "A brief statement" means a summary. The compound *sādhanasamāsavacana* is to be construed as "a brief statement of the instrument of proof." The term "instrument of proof" serves the purpose of ruling out what are only appearances of it [instrument of proof]; for they [namely, such fallacies] are not instruments of proof, because they give rise to doubt and misconception (*viparyaya*). The word "brief" serves the purpose of allowing for other members of the inference. "Reason" is simply a designation for the *liṅga*; the detailed description (*prapañca*) of it, characterized by its [reason's] concomitance with the *sādhya*, is articulated in (*iti*) the other members of inference.

"Example" here means "illustration" (*nidarśana*), that is, "instance." An example is an illustration of the concomitance of the instrument of proof with the *sādhya*. So, for example, the property of being for another's purpose is seen to belong to [things] that are composite, like beds, seats, carriages, and houses. But the negative example (*vyatireka*) is included (*antarbhūta*) in exclusionary proof (*avīta*),[84] because it consists of ruling out other things which are adventitious; it is for this reason that an example of dissimilarity is not mentioned [in the enumeration of the members of inference].

"Application" is the association in the same action of the *sādhya* and the example. Thus one associates in the same action the *sādhya*, the eye, etc., which is characterized as a thing

being for another's purpose, a bed, etc. Here since the *sādhya* and the example are different things, they cannot directly partake of a single action. Thus since [it might be said that] "This is not illustrated by that," the same action is figuratively applied to them, on account of their common properties. This is based on: "As this is, so also is that." So just as a bed is for another's purpose because it is composite, likewise the eye will have to be for another's purpose. That "another" is consciousness.

The "conclusion" is the repetition of the thesis on the basis of that [inference]; the conclusion is the repetition [of the thesis] in view of the reason, example, and application. For instance, "Therefore consciousness exists."[85] Thus the set with a particular meaning based on the mutual relation of the members is called "a sentence." And although there are many sentences, when their own meaning is secondary, they are mutually connected because they are [ultimately] instrumental to [acquiring] a meaning of something else. Then it can be certainly held that the [whole Sāṅkhya] teaching (*śāstra*) is one sentence (or argument).

Objection [41.31, 91.15]: There is no need to define inquiry, etc., because we come to know an intended object by an inference-as-a-process-of-acquiring-new-knowledge-for-ourselves[86] without [having] that [inquiry], and because we present the newly acquired knowledge to others just as we acquire it. It is correct to say that someone else is presented with inferential knowledge in just the same way that one acquires new knowledge oneself. Now he who acquires new knowledge of an intended object does not engage in [using members of inference] such as inquiry. Therefore the exposition of these [members of inference] is not necessary for presenting knowledge to others either.

The mention of doubt is also useless because the matter is already known. Both the proponent and opponent are confident with regard to their own views, so there is no purpose in inquiring into each other's doubts as to their [respective views].

Moreover [there is no need for] a statement regarding the purpose of inquiry (*prayojana*) or the possibility of a solution to the question (*śakyaprāpti*). Simply by admitting the logical reason [these two] are understood. Hence great men would not undertake [any] activity without a purpose, [nor would they engage themselves] in impossible efforts such as levelling the Himalayas. Therefore defining these two [members] is useless.

If you claim (*iti cet*) they are included in that [set of members of an inference] because they occur during [the process of inferential knowledge]—that may be so. One pursues an activity in order to know the truth [the twenty-five principles] when inquiry, etc., are present, and not when they are not. Therefore [you would maintain] that these too will

become instrumental in the proof. But this too is not correct. Why? Because [such a definition] is too wide. Since it is observed that the activity [for acquiring knowledge] takes place when consciousness, the internal instrument, the sense faculties, illumination, and sense-contents are present, these also would become instrumental in the proof.[87] But this is not desirable. Therefore inquiry, etc., is unnecessary.

The thesis, etc., were [also] ill formulated. How so? // Since you take the thesis as expressing the thing-to-be-proven,[88] this would also apply to the logical reason and the example; //[89] for the assertive statement of the thing-to-be-proven would apply to other members of inference too. If you say that the thesis is the assertive statement of what-is-to-be-proven, then it would follow that the assertive statement of the thing-to-be-proven or of the logical reason or of the example would also be the thesis. There is no difference in their causal conditions (*nimitta*); for the word "thing-to-be-proven" functions in a general sense, and it is not possible to restrict (*ava + sthā*) [it] to a particular [member] without [separate] effort.

Moreover the definition of the logical reason is not justified because the instrument of proof (*sādhana*) has not been [so far] explained. He who declares (*ācaṣṭe*) the definition of the logical reason to be "a brief statement of instrument of proof"[90] should have first mentioned (*abhi + dhā*) "the instrument of proof." [But since he did not do so,] he should have said "The reason is a brief statement of something-or-other (*amuṣya*)"; but (*ca*) it has not been stated in this way.[91] Therefore this [instrument of proof] is not a [proper] mark [of the reason].

Furthermore, the [stipulation that the reason be a] "brief" statement [is undesirable, as it] would result in prohibiting a detailed statement. For if you apply (*kriyate*) the word "brief" [in the definition], what is the result (*kiṃ prāptam*)? It is that you [would have to] say (*ity uktaṃ bhavati*) that a detailed description of the instrument of proof will not be [a description of] the logical reason—for example: "There is observed a composite of distinct things (*bheda*) under one genus which pertain to mind and body (*ādhyātmika*)[92] and constitute the causes and effects." Therefore the word (*grahaṇa*) "brief" is undesirable.

If you maintain that there is no mistake, because it [the instrument of proof] has been defined as the logical reason (*liṅga*), so be it; for the logical reason (*liṅga*) is to us [the same as] the instrument of proof, and therefore it need not be explained [separately].[93] Therefore if you say (*iti*) "This undesired situation is artificially created because of [your] own stupidity (*jāḍya*), but not on account of our confusion,"[94] this also is incorrect. Why so? Because the logical reason (*liṅga*), which is divided into two [types], is a fivefold

instrument of proof. For this logical reason is considered as simple (*vīta*) and as exclusionary (*avīta*). Thus it is divided into two [types]. And of these [two], the simple one is fivefold; thus it is impossible [to define] one [instrument of proof] extracted from the set (*samudāya*) [of five instruments] as the property of the logical reason.

And furthermore the definition of the example is not justified (*ayoga*), since it is undesirably broad in that it could apply to both the word and to the intended object. You said that (*iti*) the example is a pointing out. In such a case, would the example be the word by which the thing-to-be-proven and the instrument of proof are pointed out? Or would it be the intended object with reference to which (*yatra*) [they are] pointed out? What of that? Well, if you take it as the word, then the definition of application (*upanaya*) is sublated. Why so? Because "as is the statement [of the example], so is the thing-to-be-proven,"[95] is not applicable in a single employment (*ekakriyā*) [to the application but also to the example].[96] And if you take it [the example] as the intended object, the fivefoldness of the members of [the sentence expressing an inference] will be contradicted, since the object so designated (*abhidheya*) is not a member of the inference. Moreover there would be no difference between example, application, and conclusion, because they are [already] expressed in the logical reason and in the intended object (*artha*) in the thesis (*pratijñā*).[97] It is the very property of being an instrument of proof, defined as being concomitant with the thing-to-be-proven, that is conveyed in both, example and application. It is not correct that the intended object (*artha*)—that is, *sādhya*—be a separate member from the conclusion in the thesis.

Response [42.27, 93.12]: To your objection that inquiry (*jijñāsā*), etc., should not be defined within inference-as-a-process-of-presenting-knowledge-to-others, because these members of inference were included in inference-as-a-process-of-acquiring-new-knowledge-for-ourselves (*svaniścaya*),[98] we respond: No, this is not so, since we have already discussed it. It has been said above that inquiry, etc., are preconditions for analytical description of inferential knowledge. The scholars or teachers promulgated the analytical description of the teaching (*śāstra*) with the idea that everybody would benefit (*anugraha*), not just they or those who are of similar mental capacities [to their own]. When it is so construed (*kalpyamāna*), these [members of an inference] are not useless for those who are to be instructed (*vyutpādya*). Thus it is not correct to charge that we contradict the statement (*iti*) that our noble [teachers] proclaim [the teaching as] the settlement of disputes on the [Sāṅkhya] in order to benefit those whose minds are confused, misled, and uneducated. Moreover we have not applied any restrictive stipulation [for these members of an

inference]. We do not say that they absolutely must be defined; but when an opponent argues in this fashion (*iti*): "What do you inquire about?" then we must reply: "[I wish to know the nature of] sound; What is the property by which we know whether it is eternal or perishable?" [If the opponent asks,] "Why does this doubt arise?" "Because it [sound] has form." But if the opponent does not ask [about these], they do not have to be mentioned to him. If you then argue that if they were useless in some cases it would follow that they will be useless in all cases. This is not so, because this uselessness would also apply to the rest [of the members of inference]. Then (since) the thesis, etc., are sometimes not mentioned, it would follow that they too should be left out everywhere. And thus according to what you say (*tathā ca*), that if something is well known to somebody, one of the statements [of the concomitance] will also serve as an instrument of proof. Then since it is held that when two things (*artha*) are known, both of them need not be mentioned, just as in the case of sound (*śabda*).[99]

As for what you have said, that is not true: you do not need to mention doubt because [the proponent and the opponent] are confident (*niścitatva*).[100] Why? Because we already discussed it. It has already been stated that [only] when there is an inquiry with the object of refuting a statement (*paryanuyoga*) is it spelled out. In the same way [your objections to][101] the "purpose of the inquiry" (*prayojana*) and the "possibility of a solution to the question" (*śakyaprāpti*) are answered. That is, they should be explained to that person who actually would ask: "What is the 'purpose of the inquiry'?" or "Is it possible to know the intended object?"

As for what you have said, that they are included [in that set of members of an inference] because they occur [during the process of inferential knowledge][102]—that is not so, because we do not accept [that claim]. We do not say that "because when inquiry, etc., exist, the veridical experience of truth takes place, therefore they would have to have the property of being members of those [inferences]." What [do we say] then (*kiṃ tarhi*)? That they are instruments of proof (*sādhana*) [for the person] to whom they are the members of an inference in the [process of] knowledge.

It is not correct what you have said "since you take the thesis as expressing the-thing-to-be-proven, this would also apply to the logical reason and the example."[103] Why so? Knowledge takes place when inquiry and other [members of inference of this group] exist. Although this very word "thing-to-be-proven," being established as something unspecific, expresses other meanings also. Having removed doubt, the thesis is the assertive statement of the thing-to-be-proven, for the person who inquires, doubts, and finds the purpose and

possible solution. This does not apply to the logical reason and the example. Thus this [claim] is not true. Moreover there is no contradiction, even if it is such. But when inquiry, etc., do apply to the logical reason or the example, then their assertive statement does indeed become the thesis, as in: "Is sound produced or not produced?" or "Is intellect (*buddhi*) permanent or momentary?"

What you have said, namely, that the definition of the logical reason is not justified (*ayoga*), because the instrument of proof has not been explained,[104] is not true. Why so? Because it is commonly known. Just as when you are defining the thesis as the subject (*pakṣa*) which is desired to be proven, you do not define the thing-to-be-proven. Why so? Because it is commonly known that the thing-to-be-proven is that which has to be proven. Likewise when we are defining the logical reason as "a brief statement of the instrument of proof" we do not explain the instrument of proof. Why so? Because it is commonly known that the "instrument of proof" is to be construed as "that by which something is proved." Or else, [we can say that] we have accepted [this] since it belongs to the explanation of inference. As it has been said: "the logical reason actually (*hi*) is for us the instrument of proof," and that has [already] been explained.[105]

As for what you have said, that [the logical reason], while divided into two types, namely, simple and exclusionary, [the first one is] fivefold, on account of the instrument of proof.[106] To that we reply: this is not correct. Why so? By the force of the word "brief." For that reason the word "brief" is used, so it will be understood that the logical reason merely defines its own form of the instrument of proof. Its detailed description [is in] the other members of inference. In this way, [your] objection (*prasaṅga*) about prohibiting a detailed description [by the word "brief"][107] is rejected. How? On the grounds that this [prohibition of a subsequent detailed description] does not fit the meaning of the word "brief."

Then as for what you have said, that the definition of the example is not justified because it would lead to the undesired consequence that one would [have to] consider either the word [itself] or the intended object.[108] [We reply:] let the example simply be the word. As for what you have said, namely, that [in this case] the definition of application would be contradicted, this is not correct. Why so? Because it is known that if a function (*kārya*) does not apply to [one thing] it will apply to another member of the inference (*sambandhi*). If it is impossible to apply it to the word, we shall understand the function (*kārya*) [to apply] to the intended object. Or else, let the example be the intended object. Then as for what you have said, that this would contradict the theory of five members of an inference because the object so designated (*abhidheya*) cannot be a member of the set of members of an

inference.[109] [To that we reply:] since it cannot apply to the intended object, we understand the function to apply to the word.

As for what you have also said, that the example, the application, and the conclusion do not have the property of being [separate] members of the inference since they only describe [more precisely] the meaning of the thesis and the logical reason—this is not really a mistake. Why so? On the grounds of non-proposal, for we did not propose it. What then [are they]? The thesis is the statement of the object of knowledge (*prameya*). The logical reason is the statement of the nature as such of the instrument of knowledge; and the example is an illustration of the concomitance of that logical reason with the object of knowledge. The application is the association into a single act of the *sādhya* and the example because they have common properties. The conclusion is the explanation of the operation of the complete set of inferential members in establishing the *sādhya.* Therefore what you said is incorrect. Moreover because there is no fault in assuming that [the conclusion is the explanation...], [there is none] in assuming a single instrument of proof. As is the sentence, so too is its meaning. Both the word and its meaning are principal because both express the same intended object. Accepting this, the speakers have in mind (*buddhau* + *ava* + *sthā*) a single object which is undivided (*abhāga*) and immediate (*akrama*). They speak of that object separately as assuming the nature of *sādhya*, or of the instrument of proof, or of doubt because of the superimposition of causal efficiency (*śakti*), such as being audible, noneternal, produced, being an object of knowledge, and so on. But it does not follow that the definitions of the *sādhya*, the instrument of proof, and doubt are identical [simply] because they [can] apply to one and the same object. Thus according to us the description of causal efficiency such as the concomitance with the *sādhya* on the part of one instrument of proof would constitute a separate member. This is because of its being the logical reason, example, and so forth. [Thus] what you said about these, namely, that the example, application, and conclusion do not constitute separate members because [they are] defined as the thesis and the logical reason is not correct.[110] Therefore it is correct to say (*sūkta*) that simple proof has ten members of inference.

The teachers considered it correct that it [simple proof] be employed (*prayoga*) first (*purastāt*). For what reason? In order [to avoid] a contradiction of the definition of the exclusionary proof. For the exclusionary proof is defined as that which establishes (*anugraha*) the *sādhya* by means of exclusion. The definition of exclusion is contradicted: [one] when the object (*dharmin*), which is primeval material stuff (*pradhāna*), is veridically known through its own nature (*svarūpa*), for example, homogeneity. [Two] when the

application is merely an exclusion of other positions. Why so? In the case [of exclusionary proof], the exclusion [of other positions] is expressed at the very outset. Therefore it would be possible to argue that the manifest material stuff does not arise from atoms because that would be a contradictory reason. In the same way, it cannot arise from the primeval material stuff either because that too would constitute a fallacious reason (*hetvābhāsa*). Hence its [primeval material stuff's] delimitation (*vyavaccheda*) too is understood by means of exclusionary proof. If this is the case, what would this exclusion be? It is the case that the application is correctly conceived as delimiting the object through its own nature. If the manifest material stuff does not arise from the atoms, then by exclusion, it [the manifest material stuff] arises from the primeval material stuff alone. This is said on account of the previously mentioned [reasons of] homogeneity. Therefore it is established that the simple proof is applied first; and so the awareness of supersensory objects results from inference-from-general-correlation.[111]

Objection [44.15, 97.18]: No, this is not so; for it does not include objects that are imperceptible for other reasons.

[Response:] If it were accepted that one could know all the objects beyond sensory grasp by means of inference-from-general-correlation, it will follow that those objects that are not cognizable for other reasons will also be known by means of that [inference]. As it is said: "BECAUSE OF EXCESSIVE DISTANCE, VICINITY, AN IMPAIRED SENSE FACULTY, DISTRACTION OF THE MIND, SUBTLETY, INTERFERENCE, OVERPOWERING, AND ADMIXTURE WITH SIMILAR THINGS [SOME OBJECTS ARE IMPERCEPTIBLE]."[112] (*Sāṅkhyakārikā* 7)

Among these, an example for "excessive distance" is a bird soaring very high; for "excessive vicinity," [that one does not perceive] the eyeliner or other things [on or in one's own eye]; for "impaired sense faculty," [that one does not perceive] a sound;[113] for "distraction of the mind," [that one does not perceive] a vehicle;[114] for "subtlety," [that one does not perceive] an atom; for "interference," [that one does not perceive] gold;[115] for "overpowering," [that one does not perceive] the planets because of the [overpowering] glow of the sun; for "admixture with similar things," [that one does not perceive separately] the lights of several lamps. The word "and" [implies other things that are not perceptible] such as gods because of their divine power (*yoga*) [to make themselves invisible]. [To know these] is not possible [by means of inference-from-general-correlation] because it is impossible [to find] similar properties [elsewhere]. Therefore it is maintained that it is not correct that all the supersensory objects are perceptible by inference.

Response [44.24, 98.11]: First of all, some objects that are not perceptible for other reasons can be known veridically by means of inference-from-general-correlation. For example, one perceives with the eye a bird that is located in one's vicinity effortlessly; as it becomes more and more distant, fixing [one's] eye on [the bird, he still] perceives[116] [it], until it eventually disappears. In this case, understanding that the imperceptibility increases as the distance increases, one infers that the total disappearance which follows it is also caused by that reason. Likewise when those who employ inference do not recognize (*ava* + *dhṛ*) the indistinct form of some substance which is located extremely close, and then, as it becomes more and more distant (*ārāt*), they become capable of seeing [the object]. They infer that they did not perceive such things as the pupil of the eye or the eyeliner, because they were extremely close. Likewise when they have perceived a sound[117] which [can] be obstructed in being heard near a mountain, a river, or an ocean, when at another time they do not perceive any sound in that very place, they infer that their hearing is impaired.

AND THAT MEDIATE OBJECT [*PAROKṢA*][118] WHICH IS NOT ESTABLISHED FROM THAT [NAMELY, INFERENCE-FROM-GENERAL-CORRELATION] IS TO BE PROVEN BY MEANS OF SCRIPTUAL TESTIMONY. (*Sāṅkhyakārikā* 6)

With the phrase "and that which is not established from that" [the teacher] declares that inference-from-general-correlation does not apply to contents (*viṣaya*) of scriptual testimony. He designates (*pratinirdiśati*) "mediate objects (*parokṣa*)" as its content; and in saying "is to be proven by scriptual testimony" he designates (*āha*) that [scriptual testimony] as that which entertains the awareness of [its] content (*viṣayin*). This statement means that a content which cannot be proven even by means of that, namely: by inference-from-general-correlation, or [a content] which is not perceived by itself, although it [can be] a content of direct perception, or one whose property (*bhāva*) of being a content is obstructed by some other reason, or which is absolutely beyond perceptibility, for instance, heaven, liberation, or gods. [Such a content] not having any common property [with anything else] "is to be proven by means of scriptual testimony." If you object that this is not a valid argument because it would lead to establishing all views [wrong and right], so be it (*syād etat*). If you take scriptual testimony to be an instrument of knowledge, then you must accept without dispute (*avaśyam*) that everyone who is well versed in their respective teachings will be an instrument of knowledge.

[Objection 45.7, 99.16:] This being the case, it would follow that reasoning (*tarka*) proves (*vṛtti*) many different opinions since all teachers have authority. Then it would result that, in the absence of confident conviction (*apariniścitatva*), there will be [nothing but]

confusion. And such being the case, the aspirants' attainment of liberation would be obstructed. Therefore you have prescribed someone else's doctrine just like a physician, [but] that does not satisfy us.

[Response 45.10, 100.3:] This is also incorrect. Why so? Because the definition of "a reliable authority" (*āpta*) has not [yet] been established. We declare the property of being a reliable authority (*āptatva*) to belong to the gods and great seers who are free from faults such as passion, whose minds are not confused, and who visualized things beyond the reach of the senses. But [the property does] not [belong] to everybody. If someone else should have these characteristics, let him be an authority [too]. Moreover it is not wrong [to assume] authoritativeness in one's own area of expertise. It must be accepted beyond doubt that a statement in one's own area of expertise is an authority even without [other] proof. Otherwise there would be no knowledge of the customs, practices, and rules in the respective teachings, [as these are] things beyond sensory grasp. This [shows] that the scriptual testimony is a different thing from all logical reason (*liṅga*). Since logic (*yukti*) is aimed at (*anu* + *iṣ*) complex (*mahat*) statements (*abhidhāna*), scriptual testimony is a different thing from the logical reason which relies on the process of logic.

Objection [45.16, 100.13]: No, this is not so, because [verbal expressions] through the positive and negative examples [too] cause veridical experience. For instance, the property of being produced, etc., is observed in connection with impermanence, etc., but is not perceived in the absence thereof; and thus one adopts a belief (*niścaya*) [in the property of being produced] for an object that is impermanent. Likewise sound, being perceived in its own intended object, but not elsewhere in other things of its class, becomes a cause for knowledge. Therefore it is maintained that it [testimony] is not different from inference.

Response [45.19, 100.17]: In this case (*idānīm*), what knowledge would [you] get when having, for example, "moon," or such [words] with a unique content?

Objection [45.19, 100.17]: The word "moon" actually applies to several parts, since it depends on its parts, as well as on genus, substance, property, and action;[119] and so likewise words like "Ḍittha."[120] Therefore these kinds of words too do not differ from inference.

Response [45.21, 100.21]: How can [you] have inference of such things as heaven?

Objection [45.21, 100.22]: On the grounds of the noncontradiction of the statements of reliable authorities. Just as statements of reliable persons such as Manu (*Hairaṇyaka*) are infallible, likewise god and great seers are reliable [authority]. Therefore their statements are also infallible, and thus here too it is possible to postulate a commonality of contents. Therefore inference is the same as [scriptual] testimony.

Response [45.24, 101.4]: As for what you have said, that testimony is inference because it is conducive to veridical experience through the positive and negative examples. To that we reply: no, because it is not admitted. We do not say that testimony is for [knowing] things of our everyday life such as trees, but rather for contents that are absolutely imperceptible such as heaven. Since we do not accept this, we should not be reproached. Or, if we do accept it, [you are still not right,] because it depends on its particular speaker.[121] Or, even if we do accept it, [still] we claim that testimony of all words is different from inference. Thus the logical reason (*liṅga*) "on account of [something] being produced..." is conducive to belief (*niścaya*) which is dependent on the employed concomitance, even if it were [employed] by an outcaste or a Śaivite of a lefthand sect (*kāpālika*). It does not depend on a particular speaker. But testimony does depend on a particular speaker. Therefore it does not [function as] a logical reason. Moreover it [can be] erroneous. The logical reason does not fail to apply in other contexts. But [in other contexts] error is observed in the case of testimony. The very same testimony at some other place and some other time does not convey its meaning, but denotes some other object. If you were to say, [it is not so] because the relation [specific to this context] is not perceived in the other, so be it. The relation [in one context] is not perceived in another context. Therefore [there must be an] error in the meaning of the verbal expression.

This [possibility of error in verbal testimony] is not tenable, because it is dissimilar to the logical reason. This is not [possible] when something that possesses the logical reason (*pakṣa*) [a cow, etc.],[122] is known by means of cognizing (*abhimata*) through sight, then the logical reason [itself] of [being] cow, etc., is not perceived. But the verbal expression ["cow"], though perceived, is not perceived in the cow. Therefore it is not a logical reason.

Moreover [testimony is not inference] because it is restricted as to location, whereas restriction as to location is not observed in the case of the logical reason. But there is [certainly] a restriction to location in the case of testimony. For instance, the verb *śavati* is used to express the notion "to go" only among the people of Kamboja.[123] The people of the western [provinces] use *raṃhati*, and also the verb *dāti* meaning "to cut"; while *dātra*-meaning "scythe"[124] is used in the northern [provinces], but nowhere else. Therefore verbal expressions are not a logical reason.

Moreover, [testimony is not inference] because it is used according to the intention of the speaker, [whereas] the logical reason [reflects] the essential nature [of a thing]. For smoke cannot be separated from fire and placed in water, air, sky, or anywhere else. But a verbal expression is placed wherever a speaker intends to use it. For example, words like *vṛddhi*

which are commonly known to mean "increase in one's possessing" (*svārtha*), etc., are also applied to abbreviations *at* and *aic.*[125] Therefore they are not a logical reason.

If [you] claim that this is not a fault because the verbal expression has the capacity to express everything; so be it. The verbal expression has the capacity to express everything, and the intended object is capable of being described by every [verbal expression]. The capacity of both of them is delimited by a person's act. How so? "Let this very verbal expression convey or describe this intended object. And let this very intended object be called by this verbal expression." Only this much is the person's act. Therefore the intention of the speaker[126] suggests the natural relation of the verbal expression. This too is not correct. Why so? Because it involves the undesirable result that [the verbal expression] is a completely (*sutarām*) different thing from inference. If one postulated this, it also follows that the verbal expression is a completely different thing from inference. Why so? Because it is not the case that just as the capacity of the verbal expression which [is capable to denote] any intended object is delimited by the speaker's intention, so also the logical reason which [can express] any intended object is distinguished from another thing by the speaker's intention. It is also not the case that just as a single word—uttered in this way in the world—is capable of expressing any intended object, depending on the person's application, so also a single logical reason is capable of making known any intended object through one or other reasoning. Therefore a verbal expression is not a logical reason.

As for what you have said, that a universal is accepted in reference to "moon," etc., as dependent on its parts; this is not correct, because it is not a common property. It is a contradiction to say that an object can become well known by means of verbal expressions without inference. Moreover [testimony is not inference] because [the dependence of a word] on genus (*jāti*), etc., is [still] to be proved. The genus, quality, substance, and action are different things with respect to each other, yet (*ca*) their mutual interaction is to be established. Therefore it is not correct that the property of being a content of a universal depends on that [mutual interaction].

As for what you have said, that such verbal expressions as "heaven" are subject to inference because the speech of the trustworthy persons is generally nondeviant, to that we respond that this too is not correct. Why so? Because the context [of this ascription of nondeviance] is the instruments of knowledge [not their objects]. It is true that [one can] postulate a universal property, but this [postulation] concerns the instrument of knowledge, not the object of knowledge. You [that is, Dignāga] suppose that the object of knowledge in inference is a universal. This is contradicted in the case of heaven, because [heaven] is not a

universal property. Therefore give up your idea of identifying verbal testimony with inference.

Some other party who claims that there is no difference between verbal testimony and inference argues as follows. Verbal expressions such as "heaven" are not instruments of knowledge. Why so? Because the intended objects [expressed by] them are not cognized by another instrument of knowledge. For the verbal expression whose intended object is not cognized by means of perception or inference is not an instrument of knowledge. But other [verbal expressions] are instruments of knowledge. For instance, "[The mangoes] in the mango grove on the riverbank are ripe," or "A cart full of brown sugar is turned over on the road." But the intended objects of verbal expressions such as "heaven" are not cognized by other instruments of knowledge. Therefore [verbal expressions], which for the Buddhists have objects which are not provable, are not true[127]—for example, "the self is all-pervasive because [it has] the potential of [experiencing] satisfaction everywhere." This applies to Vedic statements in general. But this is not correct. Why so? Because it would constitute an exception to the meaning of the word "all" in an illogical manner (*anyāya*). What is the reason for the fact that statements (*vākya*) of authoritative persons concerning objects not perceived by people like us may be untrue? It should be accepted by everybody without hesitation that some persons are authoritative [or: reliable] and that their statements apply to intended objects which are beyond sensory grasp. Therefore the same difficulty [that you attribute to us] applies to you too [namely, that "all" does not apply to all].

Nor is it the case that an instrument of knowledge depends on another instrument of knowledge in establishing its own intended object. With respect to this (*tatra*), if the validity (*yathārthatva*) of a verbal expression relies on the need for some other instrument of knowledge, then it would follow that (*iti prāptam*) not only words such as heaven, but indeed (*kiṃ tarhi*) any verbal expressions, would be unauthoritative. And since it has been accepted that we gain knowledge (*gamakatva*) by means of inference which is independent from another instrument of knowledge, it would follow all the more that scriptual testimony is a different thing from that [inference] (*tataḥ*). Therefore it is firmly held that those who desire the best (*śreyas*) should stay far away from the heretical doctrines (*vāda*) which oppose the scriptual testimony [or: proper tradition]. And therefore (*iti*) a real thing (*vastu*) which is not established through inference is to be proven through scriptual testimony.

Thus the objects of the three kinds of instruments of knowledge, whether sensory or beyond sensory grasp on account of some cause or other, have been explained. And therefore it is understood that any [object of knowledge] apart from these does not exist.

Objection [47.1, 105.13]: If this were so, [then] the problem arises that the primeval material stuff would not exist, for we do not perceive that there is any one reason or other for its imperceptibility. Now if there is an object of perception which is not perceived, it is on account of excessive distance or some such reason. But it is not the case that it is due to excessive distance, vicinity, or interference that it is not perceived. Why so? Because it is all-pervasive. Nor is it due to the fact that the sensory faculties are impaired, since [even] those whose sensory faculties are perfect do not perceive it. Nor is it due to distraction of the mind, since [even] those whose minds are attentive do not perceive it. Nor is it due to subtlety, because [if it were so] it would result that a hare's horn and the like exist. Nor is it due to overpowering, because that is not possible. Nor is it due to admixture with similar things, because it is unique. Therefore for him who maintains that, in the absence of some cause or other for its imperceptibility, [something] imperceptible does not exist. The problem then arises that primeval material stuff also does not exist, just like a hare's horn. Therefore this is not tenable. One must specify some other cause for its [primeval material stuff's] imperceptibility.

Response [47.7, 106.4]: As for what you have just said, that if no particular cause for its nonperception can be given, it would follow that primeval material stuff does not exist. To this we say [in *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 8]:

THE IMPERCEPTIBILITY OF THAT [PRIMEVAL MATERIAL STUFF] IS DUE TO ITS SUBTLETY, NOT ITS NONEXISTENCE.

As for what you have said, it would follow that it does not exist, like a hare's horn; this is incorrect. Why so? Because there is a proof (*sādhana*). For there is a proof that the primeval material stuff is not perceived due to its subtlety, which is not [the case] with the hare's horn, etc. [You may challenge us:] What is that [proof]?

Response [47.11, 106.9, *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 8]:

IT IS PERCEIVED THROUGH ITS EFFECTS.

We shall establish below[128] that the primeval material stuff is perceived through its effects. But such things as a hare's horn have no effect. Therefore this argument is different.

Objection [47.15, 106.14]: If so, the other thesis[129] becomes useless because it is [already] expressed through that one. When we say that it [the primeval material stuff] is not perceived due to its subtlety, it is [automatically] understood that this is not due to its nonexistence. Therefore we maintain that mentioning it is useless.

Response [47.16, 106.17]: No, this [is] not so, because the purpose [of another thesis] is that [the proof for primeval material stuff] is included among the simple and exclusionary

proofs. This being understood, in presenting two theses in proving [a thing], the teacher indirectly communicates that the intended object [can be] proven through the simple and the exclusionary proofs. When he first proclaims that it is not perceived due to its extreme subtlety, he makes it known that the simple proof is to be applied first. In applying both to the same object, he explains that the object is achieved [by both the proofs] in combination.

What is proved [by this]? That what the adherents of other systems or schools have said, that the simple and the exclusionary proofs are not two reasons or proofs for knowing [an object] separately. We agree with this and accept it. In this case, the thesis of the simple proof is this: it [the primeval material stuff] is not perceived due to its subtlety. The exclusionary proof [complements the simple proof] by way of removing other adventitious things. The reason "not because of its nonexistence,"[130] is applicable to both [the proofs]. How so? The imperceptibility of [the object] which is not perceptible through direct perception [but] is known through its effects is //observed (*dṛṣṭa*)// on the grounds of its subtlety. //For instance, [that is the case with] the sensory faculties. But if its imperceptibility were due to its nonexistence, it would follow that it would not be perceptible through its effects either. Yet it is known through its effects. Therefore [its imperceptibility] is not due to its nonexistence. And if it were due to its nonexistence, [then it will be established] by exclusion that it is not perceptible due to its subtlety.//[131]

Objection [47.26, 107.11]: But what is that effect which you proclaim as the logical reason for the existence of the primeval material stuff?

Response [47.26, 107.13]:

AND ITS EFFECTS ARE THE LARGE ONE [*MAHAT*], ETC., WHICH ARE SIMILAR AND DISSIMILAR TO MATERIAL STUFF. (*Sāṅkhyakārikā* 8)

That effect consists of the large one, ego, sensory faculties, and subtle and gross elements, which are both dissimilar and similar to the primeval material stuff. We will explain below.[132]

Objection [47.29, 107.18]: This is not possible, because you have not introduced (*prastāva*) it yet. What of [the phrase] "its effects are the large one (*mahat*) which are similar and dissimilar to material stuff?"

Response [47.30, 107.20]: The context is that liberation is obtained through the discriminative knowledge of the unmanifest, manifest material stuff, and the knower.[133] This is introduced for the reason that these [objects of knowledge] cannot be known without an understanding of their respective dissimilarities and similarities. Therefore the introduction of dissimilarity and similarity is not irrelevant.

Yuktidīpikā on *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 28 (102.1–104.5, 201.1–204.18)

The section on the faculties is completed. Now, [we will] define the individual and combined functions[134] [of the faculties]. Having mentioned both of them, [we shall] first consider only the individual [and] not the combined function. Why? Because this still forms a part of the topic [of the faculties]. For [we have] discussed in due order the topic of the existence of the ear and other [senses]. [We have] said that they exist because they perceive[135] by means of a particular power.[136] Now, this particular power is called by us "the individual function." Therefore we shall discuss it [that is, the individual function] in due order.

Objection [102.4, 201.8]: If this is so, then please tell us, with respect to which object does a [particular] faculty function, or [give] the definition [of the functions].

Response [102.5, 201. 10]: As to what [you have] asked, namely, with respect to which object does [a particular faculty] function, to this we respond [with *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 28]: [WE] MAINTAIN THE FUNCTION OF THE FIVE [SENSES] IS PURE SENSATION[137] OF COLOR (*RŪPA*)[138] AND THE REST.

Function is the activity "of the five [senses]." [The senses are] the ear, skin, eye, tongue, and nose. [Their respective activity is] defined as hearing, touching, seeing, tasting, and smelling "of color and the rest." ["Of color and the rest" means] sound, touch, color, taste, and smell—each one is different from the other. Since in the specification of the function, the ear faculty is mentioned first, there is no reason for changing the order in describing their objects. Therefore (*iti kṛtvā*) it should read precisely: "...of the five [senses]...of sound and the rest."[139] But the previous formulation was a mistaken reading.[140]

Returning (*punar*) to [your] questions of what the definition is, we respond: "[We] maintain...[it] is pure sensation." "Sensation" is nothing other than "grasping."[141] The word "pure" conveys a particular exclusion. For example, when [we] say that "In this village only alms are acquired," no other particular [charity] is understood. [Or,] when [we] say that "The Brāhmaṇa youth studies the Vedic recitation only," [we mean that] he does not study anything else. In the same way, when [we] say that "[we] maintain the function" of the senses "is pure sensation" no other particular [function] is understood. What does this establish? This refutes what other teachers have said, namely that "The cognition of universals belongs to the senses [and] the cognition of particulars belongs to the intellect (*buddhi*)."[142]

Objection [102.16, 202.1]: But what is wrong with this view, so that [you] refute it?

Response [102.17, 202.2]: Since universals and particulars depend on each other, when one of them is present it is not contradictory to postulate the other of the two [because one of them, either the sense faculty or internal organ] would be useless. If the cognition of universals should,[143] in fact (*khalu*), belong to the senses, then (*tena*), since (*iti*) the universal is dependent on the particular, and the particular is dependent on the universal, it is not contradictory [to say that] wherever there is a cognition of a universal there is also a cognition of a particular. Both of them alike (*api*) would belong to the senses. Consequently it is useless to postulate the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*). Or, if the internal organ possesses a particular, what contradiction is there to [its having] a universal? Both [particulars and universals] alike (*api*) are possible there, [that is, in the internal organ, so] it is useless [to postulate] the sense faculty. Therefore it is held (*iti*) that the sense faculty does not construct mentally.[144] Just as the internal organ which constructs mentally has no restricted object,[145] the sense faculty, if it constructed mentally, would also not have one; but this is not the case. Therefore it is held that the sense faculty does not construct mentally.

Moreover it would result in the undesired consequence of extending its [sense faculty's] operation to [all] three times. Just as the internal organ which constructs mentally has objects in [all] three times [past, present, future], so the sense faculty, if it constructed mentally, would also have the same. But this is not the case. Therefore it is held that the sense faculty does not construct mentally.

Furthermore [this is not so], because [the senses] do not perceive memories. Just as the internal organ which constructs mentally can have the form of [an object] previously perceived (*ādirūpa*), the sense faculty, if it constructed mentally, would also have the same. But this is not the case. Therefore it is held that the sense faculty does not construct mentally.

Objection [102.27, 202.17]: Well, suppose that the sense faculty does not construct mentally. What then is the reason that it does not illuminate like a lamp, although the nature of it [that is, the sense faculty] is to grasp?

Response [102.28, 202.19]: No, it does not [illuminate like a lamp], because that would result in the undesired consequence of [requiring] another instrument.[146] Just as another instrument is required for objects such as pots which are illuminated[147] by it [the lamp], the sense faculty, if it illuminated like a lamp, would also be the same. But this is not tenable. Therefore the sense faculty does not illuminate like a lamp. If [you] consider this to be incorrect because the internal organ exists, [you] may believe (*mata*) that there exists another instrument, defined as *buddhi*,[148] which grasps the object illuminated by the sense

faculty as if by a lamp. Then you are just restating (*anuvāda*) someone else's doctrine, you do not refute it. But this is all wrong. Why? Because it would result in the undesired consequence of either the lamp or the sense faculty not being necessary. [If you were to claim that] both the sense faculty and the lamp are illuminative, then the undesired consequence would be that one or the other of them is not needed. Why? Because two things are not capable of affecting two sense faculties in a single act at the same time.[149] Moreover because [this would mean] abandoning [the requirement of] the internal organ. He who claims that the internal organ grasps directly the external objects illuminated by the sense faculty, as if by a lamp, abandons the internal organ itself. Therefore it is not correct [to say] that the internal organ can grasp [an external object directly]. If [you] suggest (*iti*) that *puruṣa* [can grasp], this is not so, because that would result in the undesired consequence that the [sense] organ would be useless. For him who maintains that *puruṣa* has the capacity to grasp [an external] object directly, there is the undesired consequence that the [sense] organ would be useless. Therefore it is correct to say that the sense faculty is grasping, but not illuminating, like a lamp.

Objection [103.8, 203.2]: Well, suppose the function of the sense faculty is pure grasping, without mental constructing. Now, what is the difference between grasping, mental constructing, and illuminating?

Response [103.9, 203.4]: Grasping (*grahaṇa*), the function of the sense faculty, is assuming (*āpatti*)[150] a similarity in form arising from the conjunction (*samparka*) with the object. And mental construction is a belief (*niścaya*) such as "This white cow is running," by means of imitating the function of the sense faculty with respect to the object.[151] Thus the difference between the two is this: grasping [is characterized by its performance during] the present time;[152] [that is,] when conjunction with the object ceases, the similarity in form to the ear-functioning and the rest ceases. But mental construction (*pratyaya*) [is characterized by its performance during all] three times:[153] from experience (*anubhava*) impressions accumulate, and they [that is, impressions] occasion (*pūrvika*) memory.[154] But the external light does not assume the form of the object. In the case of such things as pots, light removes the obstructing earthly properties which are defined as shadows and caused by impressions.[155] This light effects the manifesting [of objects and] assists the eye. Others say [that it assists] both the eye and the object. Therefore it is correct to say: the lamp, etc., is illuminating. The ear, etc., is sensing. And the internal organ constructs mentally (*vyavasāyaka*).

Now, what is the function of the faculties of action?[156] The followers of the Nyāya school

postulate this: The senses, which are the nose, tongue, eye, skin, and ear, are [produced] from the elements. By the expression "from the elements," [the text *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.12] establishes (*nirvahati*)[157] that the senses are characterized by cognizing their own respective objects since they are evolved from the elements [and] not otherwise. Again, the elements, that is, earth, water, heat, wind, and *ākāśa*, are the causes of the senses. The five senses: nose, tongue, eye, skin, and ear arise from these five [elements], respectively. "The property of being evolved from the elements" is explained as having the essential nature (*svabhāva*) of the elements which can be applied to [all] five senses alike (*api*). With the exception of the ear, the property of being caused by the elements is applicable to the other four [senses accordingly]. [This property] is applicable somehow (*kathaṃcit*) to the ear [as well], by way of conventional usage, in the sense (*abhiprāyeṇa*) that a portion of *ākāśa* is delimited by the orifice of the ear.[158] Thus since the elemental senses are each able to apprehend[159] their own objects, [and] as has been established they are characterized by them [that is, elements], and are said to be "from the elements."[160]

The Sāṅkhya teachers, however, do not hold this [opinion]. For the elders of the Sāṅkhya school said this: The senses [produced] from the ego-sense are able to establish an object [and] not otherwise. That is to say (*tathā hi*) an agent becomes effective (*prāpyakārin*)[161] only because of [its] property of being an agent. Then how can the elemental senses be effective when an object is at a distance? But those [that is, senses produced] from the ego-sense [are effective with respect to a distant object] because they have the property of being pervasive. The property of being effective is readily described in this way (*iti*): The function which consists of assuming the form of the object, being no different from [the organ] possessing the function, does indeed exist. Moreover the grasping of [something] small (*aṇu*) is possible if they [that is, the senses] have the property of the ego-sense, not of the elements. If the sense faculty had the property of the elements, then a sense faculty of a certain size could only grasp an object of that size.

Objection [103.29, 204.1]: Now, what is the function of the faculties of action?[162]

Response [103.29, 204.2]:

SPEAKING, TAKING, MOVING, EVACUATING, AND ENJOYING (end of *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 28). One should understand respectively the functions of voice, hands, feet, anus, and sexual organs, to be defined as "speaking, taking, moving, evacuating, and enjoying." Of these, "SPEAKING is [the function of the voice] in that it is by this that one speaks." Therefore an arrangement of syllables, defined as a word, sentence, verse, or composition which is capable of communicating meaning, is the object of the speech

faculty, [and] nothing else. "TAKING is [the function of the hands] in that it is by this one takes." The prefix *a-* is employed in the sense of "towardness" (*abhividhi*). And therefore whatever is the entire [scope of] taking (*grahaṇa*), including washing, cleansing, ritual washing (*upasparśana*), reading, clapping, creating an art object, or exercising, is the object of that faculty [hand, and] nothing else. MOVING means particular moving.[163] And therefore whatever [motion] be it level, bumpy, low, high, circular, whirling, dancing, exercising,[164] and so forth, is the object of that faculty [foot, and] nothing else. Likewise, EVACUATING [means] thoroughly emptying.[165] And therefore whatever is the emission of the digested food and drink, passing through the intestine[166] to the appropriate aperture, is the object of the faculty [the anus, and] nothing else. Likewise, ENJOYING [means] delighting entirely. And therefore whatever [is ENJOYING], defined as the culmination of bringing special gratification, is the object of the faculty [the sexual organs, and] nothing else.

Study

ĪŚVARAKṚṢṆA'S TWO-LEVEL-PERCEPTION: PROPOSITIONAL AND NON-PROPOSITIONAL

Perception before Īśvarakṛṣṇa

The *Yuktidīpikā* gives sufficient information on the theory of perception to reconstruct a theory that is innovative and yet compatible with other philosophical schools. This compatibility makes one surmise that the Sāṅkhya had been under strong criticism and therefore yielded to a certain conformity, which can be seen in their having given up the existing theory of perception and having formulated a new one. The new theory has some elements in common with other schools. This newly formulated theory of perception of the Sāṅkhya may have not been such a radical departure as it may seem at first. In fact, it may indicate an original development within the Sāṅkhya tradition. Perhaps the most revealing way to view the Sāṅkhya development in the area of the theory of perception will be to observe the changes that took place within the school.

There is little extant of Sāṅkhya epistemology from the pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa period. What we do have is so fragmented that it is difficult to draw a comprehensive picture. Nonetheless, the available fragments found in the works of other schools give us some clues.

From the pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa period two definitions of perception and one definition of inference are available. Vārṣagaṇya, apparently the author or compiler of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, and Vindhyavāsin, supposedly the author of an untraceable *Kanakasaptati*, are the thinkers to whom the two definitions of perception are ascribed. As for the definition of inference, the authorship is ascribed to Vārṣagaṇya. Since there is no separate formulation of a definition of inference known by Vindhyavāsin and no evidence that Vindhyavāsin differed from Vārṣagaṇya's in any respect, for all practical purposes we may assume that Vindhyavāsin shared the definition of inference of Vārṣagaṇya.

According to Erich Frauwallner's reconstruction of epistemology of Vārṣagaṇya's *Ṣaṣṭitantra*,[1] Vārṣagaṇya's definition of perception is as follows: "Perception is the functioning of the ear and other sense faculties" (*śrotrādivṛttiḥ pratyakṣam*). Frauwallner places Vārṣagaṇya in the early fourth century A.D. The chronological order of these teachers is: Vārṣagaṇya, Vindhyavāsin, and then Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Vārṣagaṇya's ideas are adverted to a few times in the *Yuktidīpikā* and in the works of other schools.[2]

Vindhyavāsin's definition of perception, "perception, which is without mental constructs,

is the functioning of the ear and other sense faculties" (*śrotrādivṛttiḥ avikalpikā pratyakṣam*),[3] is actually an amended definition of his predecessor Vārṣagaṇya, by way of adding the specification "without mental constructs" (*avikalpikā*). The reason for such an amendment can be surmised. Since it was important to Vindhyavāsin to specify perception as being without mental constructs, the nature of perception as with or without mental constructs must have been a contested issue. Teachers of various Hindu schools, among them, Pakṣilasvāmin, Praśastapāda, and Kumārila,[4] recorded such discussions on perception. In his *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* commenting on the definition of perception in *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.4., Pakṣilasvāmin or Vātsyāyana described the perceptual process. The definition of Nyāya perception is as follows: *indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṃ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣam*, or "perception is a cognition that arises from the relation of the object to the senses, is not verbal, is not erroneous, and is definite." Pakṣilasvāmin explained that *avyapadeśya* is the first encounter of the sense faculties with their objects, but this awareness is not expressed in words, although there are words for each object. A person becomes aware of the object as an infant knows it without having attached a name to it. But the awareness must be of a definite character (*vyavasāyātmaka*), otherwise nothing definite could be cognized by the mind. Thus first the sense faculties accomplish a step or level, which Pakṣilasvāmin called *vyavasāya*. This *vyavasāya* is followed by another step or level accomplished by the mind, which he called *anuvyavasāya* (*Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* 198.21–22).

Vācaspati Miśra, the polyhistor of ninth or tenth century A.D., interpreted the two steps or levels and equated *avyapadeśya* (without verbal expression) with *avikalpikā* and *vyavasāyātmaka* (having the nature of being propositional) with *savikalpika* (*Nyāya-vārttikatātparyaṭīkā* 220.9–10, 234.8.ff.) as the two levels in the perceptual process. He earned criticism for inventing a new interpretation for the *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* from later historians of Indian philosophy, such as Hemacandra in his *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*.

Although Vācaspati Miśra is credited with popularizing the distinction of the two levels in perception in classical Indian philosophy, Lambert Schmithausen traced this distinction to Trilocana, the teacher of Vācaspati Miśra. Schmithausen further indicated a reverse chain of influence in borrowing, from Trilocana to Śālikanātha who followed Kumārila in the twofold distinction of perception, but not in matters of ontology. All these thinkers may have been indebted in one way or another to Praśastapāda (ca. 530 A.D.). Bhāsarvajña (ca. 950 A.D.) also discussed the matter in his *Nyāyasāra*.[5] Formulated and reformulated by the thinkers representing the Vaiśeṣika, the Mīmāṃsā, and the Nyāya schools, the two-level distinction of perception was understood roughly as follows: The first level records objects

without a clear awareness of the object. That means that both parts, qualificand (*viśeṣya*) and qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*), essential to perception are there, but they are not grasped as such. This is the first level, called the non-propositional level (*nirvikalpa*). *Ātman*, according to the Nyāya system, prompts or stimulates the sense faculties, which in turn bring their information to the mind (*manas*), where the parts (qualificand and qualifier) are related. The relation between the qualificand and the qualifier is an awareness which can be articulated, for example: "I know this blue pot." This is the so-called second level of perception which involves language, mental constructs, and so forth. This second level is called the propositional level (*savikalpa*).

A strong opponent of the two-level-perception theory was notably Dignāga, although he discussed the psychological process of nonpropositional perception in a likewise fashion. His concern was with the ultimate reality, which can be experienced only through direct perception. He set forth a notion of perception as pure sensation, that is, without mental constructs. In relation to the terms discussed above, Dignāga's perception constitutes the first level (*nirvikalpa*) of the two.

Dignāga's definition of perception as "free from mental constructs" (*kalpanāpoḍham*) bears an apparent resemblance to the definition of Vindhyavāsin, that is, "without mental constructs" (*avikalpikā*); this resemblance was already noted by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his *Nyāyamañjarī*.[6] It is difficult to determine what this resemblance signifies, since we find that Dignāga focused his criticism on Vindhyavāsin's predecessor, Vārṣagaṇya, as did teachers from other schools. It seems as if Vindhyavāsin fell out of fashion altogether.

Still, it will be in order to observe that the origins of the two-level-perception must be sought in the discussion which aimed at defining the notion of perception as without mental constructs.

We have an authentic record of Dignāga's view available in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, the *Pratyakṣapariccheda*. From this record it is clear that Dignāga's specification "without mental constructs" means free from the association of name (*nāma*), genus (*jāti*), and so forth.[7] But we do not have such a fully articulated account of Vindhyavāsin's theory. In the absence of authentic material, we have to resort to references from various schools, which are the only sources available on Vindhyavāsin's theory of perception. For the most part these sources merely record Vindhyavāsin's claim that perception is the functioning of the sense faculties and is without mental constructs (*avikalpikā*). The question is in what respect does Vindhyavāsin's perception concurs with Dignāga's, and in what respect do both the definitions differ.

In searching for Vindhyavāsin's ideas, we find only a few scattered references. For example, Vādirāja Sūri, the Jaina author of the *Nyāyaviniścayavivaraṇa* (1025 A.D.) identifies a comment on the *Pātañjalayogasūtra* 2.6 as belonging to Vindhyavāsin. As a result of this, Vyāsa, the author of the commentary *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* on the *Pātañjalayogasūtra*, is identified with Vindhyavāsin.[8]

Similarly some scholars identify Vārṣagaṇya with Vindhyavāsin.[9] Ideas of Vārṣagaṇya presented in the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* 3.53, etc., could be then also taken as theories of Vindhyavāsin. Frauwallner proposes that Vindhyavāsin is actually the author of the commentary *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* on the *Pātañjalayogasūtra*. This is, however, insufficient evidence to accept the identification of Vyāsa with Vindhyavāsin. Still, for practical purposes in examining Dignāga's perception as free of mental constructs in pure sensation, we shall consider Vindhyavāsin and Vyāsa, the author of the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya*, as members of the same tradition. We shall use the material from the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* for a more precise interpretation of Vindhyavāsin's theory, for want of more substantial material which the available fragments do not provide.

First, the definition of perception given in the *Yogasūtra* characterizes perception as the functioning of the mind (*cittavṛtti*) implemented by the sense faculties. "This functioning has as its content (*viṣaya*) the experience of the external objects and has as its aim an assertion of a particular of the intended object whose nature is general and particular at the same time. Cognition consisting of the functioning of the mind belongs to consciousness (*pauruṣeya*) and is not distinguished from its result."[10] Apparently, this definition is not concerned with mental constructs, since mind is considered as just one of the instruments of the cognitive process. There is no reference to *kalpanā* or *vikalpa*.

Vikalpa is listed in the preceding *sūtra* 1.6[11] among the enumeration of the various functionings of the mind. A definition is then given in *sūtra* 1.9: "*vikalpa* is empty of a real object [and] follows immediately after a verbal cognition" (*śabdajñānānupātī vastuśūnyo vikalpaḥ*). *Vikalpa*, according to the Yoga school, lacks any reality and is a product of imagination or simply a product of mental construction.

In the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya, vikalpa* is a process in which two things are associated which in reality do not exist together. It is an imaginary object that is evoked merely by giving it a name. This position resembles that of Dignāga.

For Dignāga, *kalpanā* is an association of name, genus, and so forth, with a thing that is perceived. There are various kinds of words, proper names, adjectives, and so on, or words that express a relationship of a thing to its owner, etc., that are employed. But to Dignāga,

the cognizing of an object through *kalpanā* is not perception, but inference. In fact, his understanding of a mental construct is closely related to verbal expression. It resembles the theory of the grammarians, to whom the relation between mental construction and word is inseparable.[12]

It is necessary to bear in mind that not all schools shared the same view with respect to *vikalpa* and *kalpanā.* But in the schools' discussions on this subject, it soon became clear that *vikalpa* and *kalpanā* were different from pure sensation.

Hence it is possible to say that Dignāga, the authors of *Yogasūtra* and *Yogabhāṣya,* and pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa Sāṅkhya, that is, Vindhyavāsin, all concur in their theory of perception as being non-propositional. Their understanding of perception and of *vikalpa* differs substantially from the understanding of perception and of *vikalpa* in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṅkhyakārikā* and its commentary, the *Yuktidīpikā.*

Īśvarakṛṣṇa's theory

Pulinbihari Chakravarti, Erich Frauwallner, and other scholars of the *Yuktidīpikā* either overlooked, denied, or did not address the question whether the Sāṅkhya school holds a theory of the two-level-perception. And those who followed Vācaspati Miśra's generally mistrusted interpretation of the Sāṅkhya school concerning the two-level-perception, such as Jadunath Sinha and Shiv Kumar, did so merely in accordance with the interpretation of Vācaspati. They apparently did not examine for themselves what Īśvarakṛṣṇa may have established in that respect. This criticism especially applies to Shiv Kumar since he wrote a study titled *Sāṅkhya-Yoga Epistemology* in which he used material from the *Yuktidīpikā.*

This study aims at proving that the Sāṅkhya school did have a distinct notion of perception and that during the classical period it included the two-level-perception theory. This is documented in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Sāṅkhyakārikā* and more than adequately explained as such in the *Yuktidīpikā.*

When Īśvarakṛṣṇa defines perception in *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5, he says: Perception is the non-doubting awareness (*adhyavasāya*) of each [faculty's] respective sense-content (*prativiṣayādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam*). This definition is formulated in a different fashion than those of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's predecessors (Vārṣagaṇya's, *śrotrādivṛttiḥ pratyakṣam* and Vindhyavāsin's, *śrotrādivṛttir avikalpikā*). Īśvarakṛṣṇa's predecessors speak of the functioning of the sense faculties, whereas Īśvarakṛṣṇa stresses *adhyavasāya.* This *adhyavasāya* is explained by the Yuktidīpikākāra in this way: "...that which follows the

functioning of the sense faculties appropriating their [respective] sense-contents" (*...upāttaviṣayendriyavṛttyupanipātī yo 'dhyavasāyaḥ*).[13] The intellect (*buddhi*) according to *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 23 is identified as *adhyavasāya*, which the Yuktidīpikākāra explains as *pratyaya*.[14] But what is this *pratyaya*?

From the preceding it is clear that *adhyavasāya* is something different from the functioning of the sense faculties. In support for such a claim we find evidence in *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 28 and the *Yuktidīpikā* thereon. The *kārikā* itself defines the functioning of the sense faculties, and the commentary gives a rather original account of the functioning of the sense faculties and of *pratyaya* separately. The first line of *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 28 reads: *rūpādiṣu pañcānām ālocanamātram iṣyate vṛttiḥ*, or "It is maintained that the function of the five [sense faculties] is pure sensation of color (*rūpa*) and the rest."

The Yuktidīpikākāra specifies that this word "pure" (*mātra*) serves to exclude anything that is not sensation. In the following discussion, the Yuktidīpikākāra gives an account of the perceptual process that is novel to the Sāṅkhya literature. Here perception is distinguished as sensation (*grahaṇa*) and as mental constructing (*pratyaya*). Sensation is the function of the five sense faculties (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin). Mental constructing (*pratyaya*) is the function of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*). This discussion is further elaborated by the claim that the sense faculties grasp particulars, whereas the internal organ processes universals.

The mental constructing has three necessary conditions: (*i*) it has an unrestricted object (*aniyata*), (*ii*) the object exists during all three times (past, present, future), and (*iii*) the object has been previously perceived (*ādirūpa*); this explicitly requires memory.

The terminology employed here in the commentary differs from the terminology used in the *kārikās*. The term for sensation used in the commentary is *grahaṇa*, as compared to the *kārikā* where we find *ālocana*. And the term for mental constructing used in the commentary is *pratyaya* as compared to the *kārikā* where *adhyavasāya* is employed. It is not clear what the significance of the varied terminology is; one may think that perhaps Īśvarakṛṣṇa used the terminology of his contemporaries.[15] Or perhaps the Yuktidīpikākāra's terminology is his own terminology, or he might have drawn from an earlier Sāṅkhya source; though such a hypothesis could be confirmed only if further material becomes available.

The Yuktidīpikākāra's discussion of *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5 serves as additional support for the claim that Īśvarakṛṣṇa formulated anew the theory of perception as a two-level-perception. This section of the argument comes from the discussion of *adhyavasāya*.[16] The opponent asks how is it that both the levels of perception do not differ with respect to their causes, yet

the sense faculties give rise to sensation whereas the internal organ does not, to this the proponent answers:[17]

ucyate—tatra ca mukhyā śrotrādivṛttiḥ. kasmāt? sākṣād viṣayagrahaṇasāmarthyāt. nāntaḥkaraṇam, taddvāreṇa pratipatteḥ. gauṇamukhyayoś ca mukhye sampratipattiḥ. tadyathā—gaur anubandhyaḥ ajo 'gniṣomīya iti vāhīko nānubadhyate.

Response: Among these, the functioning of the ear, for example, is primary. How so? Because it is capable of sensing the sense-content directly. Not so the internal organ, since [its] cognition [occurs] by means of it [that is, ear]. Of the primary and secondary, the direct apprehension (*sampratipatti*) occurs in the primary. So, for example, an ox (*vāhīka*) is not tied up, because [it is enjoined that] "A bull should be tied up [and so should] a goat which is [dedicated to] Agni and Soma."[18]

Clearly, the Yuktidīpikākāra explains the functioning of the internal organ and the sense faculties as two different kinds of activity. He also designates the two functionings: one as primary and the other as secondary. In distinguishing two levels in the perceptual process and adapting them to the explanation of the theory of perception, the Yuktidīpikākāra interprets Īśvarakṛṣṇa's definition as encompassing both non-propositional and propositional perception. The functioning of the sense faculties can be equated with the non-propositional and the functioning of the internal organ can be equated with the propositional.[19] Both Vārṣagaṇya and Vindhyavāsin stressed the functioning of the sense faculties alone. Their definition can be designated as non-propositional, as also can Dignāga's definition of perception. Īśvarakṛṣṇa, like Pakṣilasvāmin, formulated a definition of perception based on the two levels. This radical departure of Īśvarakṛṣṇa must have been instigated by something which, though never explicitly stated, can be surmised from circumstantial evidence; namely, the indisputable effect of the criticism of teachers from other schools, such as Dignāga.[20] The Sāṅkhya position was no longer tenable. This criticism must have contributed to Īśvarakṛṣṇa's reformulation of the theory of perception.

Although Īśvarakṛṣṇa fashioned a notion of two-level perception, a distinction concurring with Pakṣilasvāmin's, he differed in details of psychology.[21]

The distinction between non-propositional and propositional perception was formulated through a larger discussion among the various schools. Its roots go to the time when the Buddhist as well as the Hindu schools departed from their predominantly religious aims and

sought for a structure in their methods of investigating. This included a thorough inquiry into the psychological process of cognizing. The main and most impressive result of these efforts was the Indian logic and epistemology that has since been cultivated in every school. The schools differed according to their own respective conditions within their doctrines. The origins of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's two-level-perception are to be found in the discussion, which aimed at defining the notion of perception without mental constructs, that is, non-propositional. The non-propositional perception is then a direct experience and can be equated with a mystical experience. The formulation and admission of propositional perception takes perception away from its religious context and moves it into the area of logic and epistemology. Īśvarakṛṣṇa and his anonymous commentator, the Yuktidīpikākāra, both established Sāṅkhya as a school that moved away from religious concerns and focused on philosophical pursuits.

CLASSICAL SĀṄKHYA AND DIGNĀGA'S THREEFOLD DIVISION OF PERCEPTION

In introducing *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5 (*prativiṣayādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭaṃ trividham anumānam ākhyātam / talliṅgaliṅgipūrvakam āptaśrutir āptavacanan tu*), the author of the *Yuktidīpikā*, commenting on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, gives a list of definitions of perception in various philosophical schools. After the definitions of the Nyāya, the Vaiśeṣika, and the Mīmāṃsā schools, he lists the definition of the followers of Vārṣagaṇya (*śrotrādivṛttir*), identified as such. As the last definition in the sequence, he gives the definition of Dignāga (*pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham*).[22] To establish one's own position it is customary to enumerate various opinions in order to discuss and eventually to reject or accept them. Here the last quoted statement evidently carries the position of greatest importance.

Scholars, such as R. C. Pandeya and P. Chakravarti, who have dealt with the *Yuktidīpikā* in one way or another, have employed the position of Dignāga's definition as an aid in establishing the date of the *Yuktidīpikā* to the middle of the sixth century A.D. We have quite exact dates for Dignāga (480–540 A.D.), thus the quotation could be used with some success for such a purpose. But in my opinion the placement of Dignāga's definition at the end of the list does not provide sufficient evidence for the date of the *Yuktidīpikā*. It is especially so since I have reason to claim that the placement of Dignāga's definition is

deliberate on the part of the Yuktidīpikākāra. Frequent references to Dignāga in the text (35.15ff., 77.16ff. & 40.1, 87.14-15) are used by the Yuktidīpikākāra to argue against his opponent, Dignāga, or to build on the opinion of his opponent. Therefore the Yuktidīpikākāra's listing of Dignāga's position last among the various definitions of perception reflects the author's intention to achieve the following points: (*i*) to argue against Dignāga's criticism of Sāṅkhya, (*ii*) to justify Sāṅkhya's theory of perception in its revised version, and (*iii*) to justify Sāṅkhya's conformity to Dignāga in the revised version of Sāṅkhya's theory of perception.

In giving this list, the Yuktidīpikākāra focused on the first quarter of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5: "perception is the non-doubting awareness (*adhyavasāya*) of each [faculty's] respective sense-content (*viṣaya*)" (*prativiṣayādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam*). Here the argument of the Yuktidīpikākāra against Dignāga and for establishing his own position begins with a criticism of Dignāga. Yuktidīpikākāra carries on by changing his position, and he eventually adopts a position conforming to Dignāga. He distinguishes, along with Dignāga, the various types of perception: sensory, mental, and yogic. Eventually he establishes the position of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's definition.

The Yuktidīpikākāra commences his argument by challenging Dignāga's position of identity between the instrument of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) and its result (*phala*). The Yuktidīpikākāra asserts that identity cannot be accepted. The instrument must be distinguished from the result, he claims, because each has a different substratum. The instrument of knowledge has for its substratum the intellect (*buddhi*), and the result has for its substratum consciousness (*puruṣa*). Because they have different substrata, they must be distinct, according to the Yuktidīpikākāra.

The Yuktidīpikākāra paraphrases *kārikā* 8cd of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1.1 in Sanskrit and the Tibetan commentary.[23] This forms a part of the Yuktidīpikākāra's argument and further supports the fact that the argument is directed against Dignāga.[24]

Next the Yuktidīpikākāra continues his arguments to establish the Sāṅkhya definition of perception by employing statements of Dignāga. He discusses the terms used for the perceptual instrument of knowledge. The term discussed here is *pratyakṣa* and not *dṛṣṭa*, although it is *dṛṣṭa* in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's definition. The term *pratyakṣa* is used in both Vārṣagaṇyas' and Dignāga's definitions: *śrotrādivṛttiḥ pratyakṣam* and *kalpanāpoḍhaṃ pratyakṣam*, respectively. In the *Nyāyasūtras* it is also *pratyakṣa* as in the following definition: *indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṃ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicārī vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣam.*

In explaining the term *pratyakṣa*, the Yuktidīpikākāra gives this analysis: *akṣam akṣaṃ prati vartate iti pratyakṣam*. This analysis is quoted by Kamalaśīla in his *Pañjikā* as the analysis given in the *Nyāyamukha* of Dignāga.[25] The Yuktidīpikākāra indeed uses Dignāga's own words in his discussion. But does he mean the same thing by them? The analysis of the term "*pratyakṣa*" quite likely can be traced to some common source, since similar analyses can be found in other philosophical texts.[26]

It can be argued that the Yuktidīpikākāra employed the analysis of Dignāga only in order to demonstrate his own interpretation of the term "*pratyakṣa*." The Yuktidīpikākāra interprets the double occurrence of the term "*akṣa*" as an indication of the respective sense faculties. At the same time, the Yuktidīpikākāra takes the double occurrence to express the duality that impresses upon the sense faculty, namely, the sense-content and the non-doubting awareness (*adhyavasāya*).

The source for the claim that in the case of perception the instrument of knowledge should be named in accordance with the sense faculty (*pratyakṣa*) lies before Dignāga, namely, in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*.[27] Vasubandhu gives two reasons for naming perception according to the sense faculty: (*i*) The sense faculty is the substratum (*āśraya*) of the discriminating awareness (*vijñāna*); since it depends on the strength or lack of strength of the sense faculty, the awareness will be either clear or lacking clarity in various degrees; and (*ii*) The sense faculty is the specific cause (*asādharaṇahetu*) of the awareness.[28]

Dignāga adopts the specific cause expressly in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1.1.4ab and the autocommentary thereon.[29] The specific cause for perception is also considered by the Naiyāyikas. But their specific cause is the relation between the sense faculty and the sense-content. The relation is executed by the functioning of the faculty.

Apparently both, the Yuktidīpikākāra and Dignāga, have in common the necessity for a specific cause in acquiring perception, but they do not acquiesce on the issue of specific cause. Examining the position of the Yuktidīpikākāra, it seems as if the Yuktidīpikākāra attempts to fit his interpretation in accordance with Dignāga, in that he makes a dual distinction himself—a distinction of the sense-content and non-doubting awareness, both impressing upon the specific cause, the sense faculty.[30] The specific cause is the same for both. Is non-doubting awareness (*adhyavasāya*) to be considered a mental perception as Dignāga understands it? It is clear that non-doubting awareness is a mental activity instrumental for the accomplishing of perception, yet it is not clear how these two mental processes compare.[31] Even without a clear understanding of this last issue, one can see from

the context that *adhyavasāya* is the focal point in the theory of perception as interpreted by the Yuktidīpikākāra.

It is the term *adhyavasāya* (non-doubting awareness) that is unique to the Sāṅkhya definition of perception. The term *adhyavasāya* is employed to prevent an over extensive definition. If the definition were without this specification it would follow that any sense faculty could respond to the sense-content, whether stimulating or hindering. Although four factors are involved in the perceptual process (sense faculty and the threefold internal instrument: intellect, ego-sense, and mind), it is this non-doubting awareness itself which is the instrument of knowledge. The Yuktidīpikākāra supports this claim by a quotation ascribed to Pañcaśikha: "There is only one instrument for perception (*darśana*), that one instrument is just this non-doubting awareness (*khyāti*)," (*ekam eva darśanaṃ khyātir eva darśanam*).[32]

Furthermore if the instrument of knowledge were not non-doubting awareness (*adhyavasāya*), the instrument of knowledge could be understood as the functioning of the respective sense faculties. Then Īśvarakṛṣṇa's definition would commit the fault of its predecessor, the followers of Vārṣagaṇya, of being too narrow. Vārṣagaṇya's definition of perception runs as follows: "Perception is the functioning of the ear and other sense faculties" (*śrotrādivṛttiḥ pratyakṣam*). The Yuktidīpikākāra takes up the criticism of Dignāga, who focuses on the definition of the followers of Vārṣagaṇya, as evident from the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1, *Pratyakṣa-pariccheda* 5,[33] in order to remove weaknesses and show strength by building a new definition (PERCEPTION IS THE NON-DOUBTING AWARENESS OF EACH [FACULTY'S] RESPECTIVE SENSE-CONTENT, *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5).

The Sāṅkhya school revised its definition of perception in this fashion, but the new definition of Īśvarakṛṣṇa incorporated the definition of the followers of Vārṣagaṇya.[34] Vārṣagaṇas' definition of perception in terms of sensation was extended through the addition of non-doubting awareness. This is justified by the postulation of the relation of the internal instrument and the sense faculty (*dvāradvāribhāva*). Thus Vārṣagaṇas' definition accounts only for the part which constitutes sensation in the perceptual process.[35]

The necessary conditions for having a veridical cognition are given in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's definition. Apart from the relation of the sense faculties to the internal instrument, it is also necessary to have a relation (*sannikarṣa*) between the sense faculty and the sense-content, which is expressed by the phrase "each respective" (*prati*). The word "respective" denotes "presence" (*ābhimukhya*) of both relata: the faculty and the content. This relation has as a

necessary condition the presence of both of them. This serves the purpose of excluding things that are erroneous, whether they are castles in the sky (*gandharvanagara*) or fire-circles (*alātacakra*).[36]

Not all contents are sense-contents. One of the serious objections of the Sāṅkhya opponents (including Dignāga) was that the Sāṅkhya definition of perception did not account for different types of perception, such as the perception of satisfaction (*sukha*), anger (*krodha*), frustration (*duḥkha*), and so forth.[37] To this argument the Yuktidīpikākāra replies that the revised definition does include mental perception; in fact, it includes two basic types of perception: external and internal. External perception covers the sensory perception. Internal perception covers intuitive perception (*prātibha*) of the yogis and also mental perceptions of emotions, and so forth. This interpretation is achieved by reading the compound in the definition *prativiṣayādhyavasāya* as an *ekaśeṣa* compound.[38] That is, although the compound is quoted only once, it is meant to be understood twice for both types of perceptions. The resemblance of the division of the types of perception to those of Dignāga is striking. Dignāga, in his chapter on perception (*pratyakṣapariccheda*, in the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1.5–6), speaks of sensory and mental perceptions. The mental perception falls further into two categories. He even discusses "conceptual construction" (*kalpanājñāna*) as perception. He points out that he distinguishes all these perceptions because he has to respond to the views of others. Thus Dignāga postulates several types of perception: sensory, mental, yogic, and self-aware perception. This self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*) is not always considered as a separate type of perception, but rather as a perception that confirms any of the first three in the above-mentioned list of four.[39] Indeed, Dignāga's division of perception seems to be more than echoed in the interpretation of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's definition of perception by the Yuktidīpikākāra.

It can be postulated that the Yuktidīpikākāra aims at defending the Sāṅkhya definition of perception against Dignāga's criticism of *śrotrādivṛttiḥ...* by analyzing and establishing Īśvarakṛṣṇa's definition. It is more than probable that Īśvarakṛṣṇa defined perception in a new fashion under the pressure of criticism, principally from Dignāga. The revision of the Sāṅkhya definition as interpreted by the Yuktidīpikākāra exhibits features that can be identified as characteristic of Dignāga, as in the case of different types of perception: sensory, mental, and yogic. We should therefore conclude that (*i*) the Yuktidīpikākāra quotes Dignāga as part of the strategy of his own argumentation and (*ii*) that we are not justified in regarding the Yuktidīpikākāra's placement of Dignāga's definition last in the list as an indication of the text's date.

SĀṄKHYA'S FORMS OF INFERENCE

Although Īśvarakṛṣṇa says in *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5 that there are three forms of inference, he does not list them. The commentators on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* agree on the set of three, also known from the *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.5. These are: inference-from-cause-to-effect (*pūrvavat*), inference-from-effect-to-cause(*śeṣavat*) and inference-from-general-correlation (*sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa*). Īśvarakṛṣṇa singles out for special attention inference-from-general-correlation in *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 6. Why does Īśvarakṛṣṇa focus on inference-from-general-correlation? Let us propose two possibilities. First, Dignāga in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* argues vehemently against Sāṅkhya inference;[40] and second, establishing consciousness requires an inference which is not based on a causal relation, as is the case of the first two forms of inference.[41]

Although Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *kārikās* show no evidence of being constructed as arguments, nevertheless, the Yuktidīpikākāra in explaining the *kārikās* argues against the criticism raised by the Sāṅkhya opponents. The Yuktidīpikākāra explains that Īśvarakṛṣṇa did not find any need to elaborate on inference because the topic was taken up and covered by Vindhyavāsin,[42] so that it would be useless to repeat the same. It is true that this claim occurs in the context of the discussion on the ten members of inference and not the forms of inference. The question arises about the Yuktidīpikākāra's confidence in making Vindhya-vāsin's inference compatible with Īśvarakṛṣṇa's, especially since it is a well-known fact that both the teachers differed with respect to the theory of the forms of inference, twofold *versus* threefold. The meager evidence of Vindhyavāsin's ideas shows that he believed in twofold inference, *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*.[43] As in the case of the perceptual instrument of knowledge,[44] the difference between the two Sāṅkhya thinkers is evident also in the case of inference.

Although Vindhyavāsin postulated two forms of inference and Īśvarakṛṣṇa three forms, the Yuktidīpikākāra still considers both the teachers to be from the same lineage. In this view, it can be speculated that the more recent teacher holding the theory of threefold inference must have revised his predecessor's ideas by focusing on the threefold division.

In spite of the fact that Īśvarakṛṣṇa and his *Sāṅkhyakārikā* are the more recent representation of the Sāṅkhya theories, teachers who flourished after the time of Īśvarakṛṣṇa still recall Vindhyavāsin and his twofold distinction of inference. Dharmakīrti[45] still refutes *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa*, although there is no doubt that Īśvarakṛṣṇa preceded him. And others such as Kamalaśīla in his *Pañjikā*[46] mention Rudrila, another name of Vindhyavāsin. The reason for

this is not clear, but one may speculate that these Buddhist teachers (Dharmakīrti, Kamalaśīla, and others) simply imitated their predecessors' criticism.

In the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, in the section criticizing the Sāṅkhya theory of inference, Dignāga takes up first a twofold distinction of inference: inference-from-a-particular-case (*viśeṣatodṛṣṭa*)[47] and inference-from-general-correlation (*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*). He shows that inference-from-a-particular-case cannot be considered as a proper inference because it is merely a recognition involving memory. When a person recognizes again an object previously cognized, this cannot be considered an appropriate instrument of knowledge. It does not prove anything not already known.[48] As for inference-from-general-correlation, Dignāga finds it to be useless, especially for the sake of establishing consciousness, since there is nothing that serves as a common basis between consciousness and anything else.

At the end of his critique, Dignāga briefly argues against the threefold distinction, which Frauwallner in his study curiously enough considered an older division among types of inference.[49] In general, the synthesizing of ideas (namely, the types of inference from 3 to 2) reflects an improvement in developing ideas. But I am not convinced that this is the case here. On the contrary, the twofold division appears to be abandoned in favor of the threefold division. This is the likely development: inference-from-a-particular-case is virtually a repetition of a previous experience, that is, recollection, and therefore there is no new knowledge. In this way, by discrediting inference-from-a-particular-case as not being an instrument of knowledge, the twofold distinction of inference-from-a-particular-case and inference-from-general-correlation has been abandoned. It is difficult to determine whether it was this discrediting that brought the three forms of inference to the foreground, since from Dignāga's account it seems that both the sets were employed in Sāṅkhya teachings. After Dignāga, criticism of the twofold distinction from other schools became nothing more than sporadic references to something outdated. Therefore I think that Frauwallner's claim for a sequence in development from three to two does not reflect the state of affairs for Sāṅkhya.

If we search for some kind of precursor of the twofold and threefold division, we find that the threefold division and the twofold subdivisions of inference are documented in the *Anuyogadvāra*,[50] a Jaina Śvetāmbara canonical text. First the threefold division is as follows: (*i*) *puvvava*, (*ii*) *sesava*, and (*iii*) *diṭṭhasāhammava*. The *diṭṭhasāhammava* has a twofold subdivision: *sāmannadiṭṭha* and *visesadiṭṭha*.[51]

The *puvvava* form of inference is where, for example, through a mole or a scar a mother recognizes her own child. This type of *puvvava* supposedly reflects an older tradition of this

form of inference.[52] The *sesava* form of inference is an inference of the other or the remaining (*sesa*), presumably of the two relata. This type of inference is of five kinds: (*i*) from effect to cause, (*ii*) from cause to effect, (*iii*) from property (*guṇa*) to its substance, (*iv*) from part to whole, and (*v*) from that which belongs to a particular substratum.

The twofold *diṭṭhasāhammava* has the following examples for *sāmannadiṭṭha*; "Just as there is one man so there are many men; just as there are many men so there is one man" and for *visesadiṭṭha*; "A man named so and so was previously seen and will be recognized as that very man even in a large gathering of people as he is that very man."

I surmise that this survey-like account of inference recorded in the *Anuyoga-dvāra* is the background to most of the known divisions. It is impossible for me to judge whether this is the original prototype, but in order to explain certain matters of inference, I shall treat it as such. It seems plausible that these divisions were adopted by various schools as they suited them. This was largely because the original division in its full extent has been forgotten and the old Jaina *Anuyogadvāra* had not been readily accessible to teachers of other systems. The *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* can be used as an example for such a hypothesis.

The threefold distinction of the *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.5 forms the basis for Pakṣilasvāmin's[53] effort in his *bhāṣya* to explain what the three are. He elaborates on *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* in two different ways. In the first explanation, the *pūrvavat* inference is an inference-from-cause-to-effect. In the second explanation, the *pūrvavat* inference is an inference from former experience, based on a sensory perception of a consistent relation, for example, smoke and fire. Pakṣilasvāmin explains *śeṣavat* inference as an inference-from-effect-to-cause, whereas in the second explanation he takes *śeṣavat* as an exclusionary inference.[54] Finally, the third form of inference, the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, is in the first place an inference-from-general-correlation and, in the second, an inference for establishing something supersensory on the basis of something sensory.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa in his *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5 mentions only three forms of inference. In *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 6 he explicitly mentions *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. It is not surprising that the later Sāṅkhya commentators adopted the interpretation found in the *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.5 and the *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* on it, since by the middle of the first millennium the *Nyāyasūtra* was a standard authoritative work. This is perhaps also the reason that the Yuktidīpikākāra and others interpret the *trividha* in *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5 as *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, accordingly.

Was Īśvarakṛṣṇa's choice of the threefold inference, made well known by the Naiyāyikas, an easy way out? Was it in response to Dignāga's criticism? If so, how is it that Īśvarakṛṣṇa

is still able to hold inference-from-general-correlation as tenable? Provided that the Yuktidīpikākāra accurately reflects Īśvarakṛṣṇa's intentions, it would be possible to propose that Īśvarakṛṣṇa was responding to the criticism of Dignāga. He did so by adopting the threefold inference and arguing against Dignāga so that he could re-establish inference-from-general-correlation for his purposes.

To examine this issue thoroughly, we must inquire as to the purpose of Sāṅkhya's inferential instrument. The answer is at hand; namely, inference was an instrument to establish Sāṅkhya's own theories, especially in arguments with the Buddhists. The main argument between the Buddhist and the Hindu systems was to prove existence or non-existence of consciousness or self. Just as Uddyotakara argued against Dignāga[55] to establish *ātman* or self, so too the Yuktidīpikākāra aimed to establish *puruṣa* or consciousness in support of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's position and against Dignāga's criticism. Consciousness being absolutely different from anything else, cannot be a cause or an effect for anything. Likewise since it is absolutely distinct from anything else it cannot be in a relation with anything else. Relation, or more precisely: consistent relation, is the basis of any inference. Therefore only a correlation to another case could be the means of establishing consciousness. Among the three forms of inference, it was inference-from-general-correlation that could be applied. This inference is suitable for cases of supersensory objects in the following way: Taking the stock example of the bed, the bed is composite of several components, such as the wooden frame, the jute strung tightly across the frame, and so forth. By itself the bed does not serve any purpose. Only if it is used as a bed for somebody to sleep on does it become purposeful. Likewise by way of manifestation of this universe, the primeval material stuff's causes and effects have the purpose of serving something else—that something else is consciousness.[56] The logical reason (*hetu*) here is purposefulness, both the bed and material stuff have in common purposefulness for somebody or something else, a sleeping person and consciousness, respectively.

Thus Dignāga's criticism of Sāṅkhya inference forced Īśvarakṛṣṇa and consequently the Yuktidīpikākāra to reconsider the inferential instrument of knowledge. This criticism forced them to re-establish inference-from-general-correlation as the vital means for consciousness.

THE CONSISTENT RELATION IN SĀṄKHYA INFERENCE

A whole section of the *Yuktidīpikā*, the commentary on the third *pāda* of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5 dealing with the definition of consistent relation for inference (*talliṅgaliṅgipūrvakam*), is missing. The commentary simply skips the *pāda* and the issue; the discussion on *pāda* 2 continues with the discussion on *pāda* 4.

The compound *talliṅgaliṅgipūrvakam* constitutes the definition of inference. It translates as follows: "[inference] is preceded by [perception][57] [and by a concomitance or consistent relation between] the thing-to-be-proven (*sādhya*) and the logical reason."[58]

The relation between the logical reason and the thing-to-be-proven (*sādhya*) is explained in the commentary *Sāṃkhyavṛtti* on *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5 in terms of seven consistent relations.[59] We know the seven relations, unique to the Sāṅkhya inference, primarily from the Buddhist opponent Dignāga, who took the Sāṅkhya logic to task quite thoroughly in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.[60] The question arises whether his criticism was sufficiently detrimental to the Sāṅkhya that the sevenfold set of relations and the definition of inference was abandoned by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. There is no reoccurrence of the seven-fold set nor the definition of inference in the literature past Dignāga.

The few references to Sāṅkhya logic that we find in the texts of their opponents are primarily criticisms directed against the sevenfold relation on which Sāṅkhya inference was based. The source of criticism was not so much against the definition of inference itself, although Dignāga did not spare the latter either. It is, however, quite noteworthy that the pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa definition itself disappeared, not only from the Sāṅkhya texts, but from the philosophical literature altogether. The definition was not replaced or revised. The pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa definition that was the target of Dignāga's criticism runs as follows: *sambandhād* [61] *ekasmāt pratyakṣāc cheṣasiddhir anumānam*.[62] This definition can be rendered in several ways:

Translation A: "Inference is a proof of the other [of the two relata] on the basis of a relation after perceiving one [relatum]."[63]

Translation B: "Inference is a proof of the other [of the two relata] on the basis of the perceived [relatum] due to one [particular] relation."[64]

Translation C: "Inference is a proof in the rest [of places or elsewhere] based on a relation [of two related things] through the perception [of such a relation] in one place."[65]

These differing interpretations of the one statement were apparently applicable to the various forms of inference, the *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa* and the *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*, and perhaps to the threefold division of *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* as well.

Viśeṣatodṛṣṭa is an inference based on observing a particular connection between two things, for example, smoke and fire. Once one has experienced burning eyes from wet fuel such as cow dung patties, one remembers the constant relation between smoke from wet fuel and fire. Therefore any other time at any given place when one sees smoke, one infers fire.

The other of two forms in the first set of inference according to the Sāṅkhya is *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*. This form of inference is based on observing a correlation between two unrelated sets of things, events, and so forth. One may be unclear about how the sun occurs at various places in the sky during the day. This particular doubt may be removed by an inference from a similar event, since there is no way by which one can verify the sun's "behavior." A similar event is when, for example, a fellow known as Devadatta walks from the village to the forest and is seen at a certain time at point *a*, then later at point *b*, and so forth; we know that he covered the distance between the two points by walking, that is, by motion. Similarly if one observes the sun to be at a certain time at point *o*, and then later at point *p*, one infers that the sun must have moved, just as Devadatta did.

Let us examine the sevenfold relation which has been such a source for criticism. Unfortunately, the sparse material available is not always consistent. The sources where the sevenfold relation occurs are: *Sāṃkhyavṛtti* (V2),[66] *Sāṃkhyavṛtti*,[67] *Nyāyavārttikatātpārya-ṭīkā*,[68] *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*,[69] *Viśālāmalavatī*,[70] *Jayamaṅgalā*,[71] and *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī*[72] (for editions please refer to the Bibliography). *Nyāyavārttika*[73] makes reference to the sevenfold relation, but does not enumerate it.

The following commentaries on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* do not show any evidence of the existence of the sevenfold relation when commenting on the section on inference: *Māṭharavṛtti*, *Sāṃkhyasaptativṛtti* (V_1), *Gauḍapādabhāṣya*, *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī*, and *Suvarṇasaptati*.[74]

The *Jayamaṅgalā* and the *Sāṃkhyavṛtti* are the only explicit Sāṅkhya accounts of the Sāṅkhya inference with reference to the sevenfold consistent relation. Commenting on the third *pāda* of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5 (*talliṅgaliṅgipūrvakam*) the commentator of the *Jayamaṅgalā* gives a list of seven relations between the thing-to-be-proven, the *sādhya* (*liṅgin*), and the logical reason (*liṅga*):

sambandhaś ca sapta tatra svasvāmibhāvasambandho yathā rājapuruṣayoḥ. kadācit puruṣeṇa rājā rājñā vā puruṣaḥ. evaṃ prakṛtivikārasambandho yathā yavasaktvoḥ. kāryakāraṇasambandho yathā dhenuvatsayoḥ. pātrapātrikasambandho yathā parivṛṭ tri-viṣṭabdhayoḥ. sāhacaryasambandho yathā cakravākayoḥ. pratidvandvisambandho yathā śītoṣṇayoḥ. tatraikasya bhāve 'nyābhāvaḥ pratīyate. nimittanaimittikasambandho yathā bhojyabhojakayor iti.

The seven relations are:
[i] The landlord and his property (*svasvāmibhāva*), such as the king and his subjects,
[ii] A primary substance and its transformed form (*prakṛtivikāra*), such as barley and the flour made from it,
[iii] Cause and effect (*kāryakāraṇa*), such as a cow and its calf,
[iv] Implement and its user, such as a mendicant and his staff,
[v] Mutual relation between a couple (*sāhacarya*), such as two Cakravāka geese,
[vi] Apposition (*pratidvandvin*), such as hot and cold,
[vii] Efficient causality (*nimittanaimittika*), such as consumer and goods.

The best available account of the seven relations from a non-Sāṅkhya source is Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* and in his commentator Jinendrabuddhi in his *Viśālāmalavatī*. According to Dignāga and Jinendrabuddhi,[75] the sevenfold relation is as follows:

(*i*) The relation between owner and his (the owner's) property.
(*ii*) The relation between a primary substance and its secondary transformed form.
(*iii*) The relation between cause and its effect such as an inherent cause of a thing.[76]
(*iv*) The relation between an auxiliary cause and its effect.
(*v*) The relation between a substance and its product.
(*vi*) The relation between two things mutually related.
(*vii*) The relation of two things always in apposition or in mutual exclusion.[77]

This sevenfold relation offers a map of all the existing relations in the Sāṅkhya system. At the same time, these seven relations are the basis for all the things whose existence the Sāṅkhya school would wish and need to prove. It is difficult to establish whether the seven

relations of the ontological point of reference determined the seven relations for epistemological purposes, or whether it was the force of early philosophical debate that determined the design of seven relations. With reference to these seven relations, I shall indicate in bold letters in (i) through (v) below which of the relata is the thing-to-be-proven (*sādhya*):

(*i*) *prakṛti* and **puruṣa**,
(*ii*) **pradhāna** and *mahat*,
(*iii*) **sattva**, **rajas**, and **tamas** and *pradhāna*,
(*iv*) *puruṣa* and **the operation of pradhāna**,
(*v*) **tanmātra** and *bhūtādi*,
(*vi*) *sattva* and *rajas* and *tamas*,
(*vii*) *sattva* and *rajas* and *tamas*.

The English terms for the seven relations are:
(i) material stuff and **consciousness**,
(ii) **primeval material stuff** and the large one,
(iii) "**intelligence**," **energy**, and **inertia** and primeval material stuff,
(iv) consciousness and **the operation of primeval material stuff**,
(v) **subtle elements** and material elements,
(vi) "intelligence" and energy and inertia,
(vii) "intelligence" and energy and inertia.

Buddhist logicians later established that there are three basic relations: negation, identity, and causation.[78] It is perhaps possible to suggest that a similar distinction of relations can be discerned here also. So relations (ii) through (v) are to be understood as causal relations, as seen in the comparison between Jinendrabuddhi's *Viśālāmalavatī* account with the one in the *Anuyogadvāra*. Relations (vi) and (vii) can perhaps be considered to represent relations of identity and difference and negation.

From the preceding set, relations (i) through (v) support translation A (above) of the definition of inference (*sambandhād ekasmāt pratyakṣāc cheṣasiddhir anumānam*). From seeing one [of the two relata] one infers the other [relatum]:

(*i*) from property or land, that is, *prakṛti*, one infers the owner of the property or

landlord, that is, *puruṣa*,
(*ii*) from yogurt, that is, *mahat*, one infers milk, that is, *pradhāna*,
(*iii*) from a chariot, that is, *pradhāna* or *prakṛti*, one infers the chariot's constituents: the spokes, the axle, that is, the *guṇa*s (*sattva*, *rajas*, *tamas*),
(*iv*) from a potter, an efficient cause [?], that is, from the stimulation (*anugraha*) of *puruṣa*, one infers that a pot will come into existence, that is, that *pradhāna* or *prakṛti* will evolve and transform itself into the evolutes that make up this world, thus manifesting her operation,
(*v*) from a tree, that is, the material elements, one infers branches, that is, subtle elements (*tanmātra*).
Relations (vi) and (vii) are based on mutual or reciprocal relations, on the basis of which another mutuality or reciprocity can be inferred. Relation (vi) is a relation of mutual connection, and relation (vii) is a relation of mutual disjunction or apposition. Perhaps translations B and/or C of the consistent relation would be more suitable for the two relations.

Surveying this set of relations invites a comparison with a set of relations given in the Jaina Śvetāmbara canonical text *Anuyogadvāra* discussed earlier. Relations enumerated under *sesavat* inference are especially compatible: (*i*) from effect to cause, (*ii*) from cause to effect, (*iii*) from property (*guṇa*) to its substance, (*iv*) from part to whole, (*v*) from that which belongs to a particular substratum. The relations 2 through 5 could be matched with the ones given in the *Vṛtti* of Dignāga and in the *Viśālāmalavatī* of Jinendrabuddhi analyzed above, namely, (*ii*) the relation between a primary substance and its secondary transformed form, (*iii*) the relation between cause and its effect, such as an inherent cause of a thing; for example, thread or a wheel are cause for cloth and a cart, respectively, (*iv*) the relation between an auxiliary cause and its effect, (*v*) the relation between a substance and its product.

In the *Nyāyavārttika*, Uddyotakara[79] in his criticism of the Sāṅkhya inference does not go into much detail. Instead, he argues, citing the above mentioned Sāṅkhya definition of inference, that the sevenfold relation as the basis for inference is invalid because none of the seven relations expresses the relation of inherence (*samavāya*).

Among the seven relations, the fifth relation, that is, the relation between a substance and its product (*mātramātrikābhāva*)[80] could possibly be interpreted as a relation of a part with the whole. Such a relation of a part with the whole in Nyāya terminology is understood as a

relation of inherence. This hypothesis is, however, questionable because there is so far no evidence that the Sāṅkhya recognized a relation of inherence. Since Sāṅkhya did not postulate such an entity in its system, there is no need to recognize such an entity. Furthermore when Uddyotakara's refutation is examined closely, we see that he refuted the Sāṅkhya in a superficial way, simply by finding fault with an issue that both schools did not share. It is therefore obvious that it could not have been Uddyotakara's criticism that brought about Sāṅkhya's discarding their own definition of inference. This brings us back to Dignāga, who took the inferential theory of the Sāṅkhya under scrutiny by:[81]

(*i*) Refuting the possibility of inferring the other unperceived relatum on the basis of a thing that is perceived, because (*a*) perception cannot be the instrument for cognizing a universal (for which inference is the instrument), (*b*) some perceptions are erroneous, and (*c*) if perception were the *viṣayin* of the universal and the particular, then the functioning of the intellect would also be called "perception." Dignāga had proved earlier that there is no difference between the instrument of knowledge and its result.[82]

(*ii*) Showing the impossibility of forming a valid inference on the basis of a relation such as the one of the owner and the owner's property.[83]

(*iii*) Ridiculing the postulation of grouping inference into a twofold division of *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* or a threefold division of *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*.[84]

Thus Dignāga completely undermines the Sāṅkhya position. If Dignāga's criticism was not directly instrumental to the destruction of the Sāṅkhya theory of inference, it surely must have influenced Īśvarakṛṣṇa to the extent that he became reluctant to deal with it. And therefore he just summarily announced its inclusion among the instruments of knowledge in the following way: *trividham anumānam ākhyātaṃ talliṅgaliṅgipūrvakam* (*Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5). The Yuktidīpikākāra resorted to the easy way out, omitting to comment on *pāda* 3: *talliṅgaliṅgipūrvakam*.[85] The commentary may have been censored later, but there is no proof for this. Therefore we are left to conclude it was Dignāga's argument which, in effect, undercut the original Sāṅkhya theory of inference.

EXCLUSIONARY PROOF

The term *avīta* or *āvīta* occurs without any clear indication of its function. The Sāṅkhya commentaries seem to employ it, as if it belonged there. The *Yuktidīpikā* opens as follows:

vītāvītaviṣāṇasya pakṣatā[86] *vanasevinaḥ*
pravādāḥ sāṃkhyakariṇaḥ sallakīṣaṇḍabhaṅgurāh.

The propositions (*pravāda*) [of the different parties] are as frail as the *sallakī* undergrowth for the Sāṅkhya elephant with the simple and exclusionary proofs as his tusks, frequenting the jungle of [different] parties (*pakṣa*).[87]

It seems that the two proofs enabled the Sāṅkhya to compete with its opponents, and yet there is barely a mention of the two proofs in any of the accessible material. Let's examine what is available and see why it may have disappeared.

In addition to the different forms of inference discussed above, the *Yuktidīpikā* testifies that the Sāṅkhya school employs simple (*vīta*) and exclusionary (*avīta*) proofs.[88] This distinction seems to be unique to Sāṅkhya.

In his *Nyāyavārttika*, while referring to *trividham* in *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.5, instead of discussing *pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* types of inference, Uddyotakara explains *trividham* as *anvayin*, *vyatirekin*, and *anvaya-vyatirekin*[89]—positive, negative, and both negative and positive proof. Hermann Jacobi calls this a new theory and ascribes its invention to Uddyotakara and claims that Uddyotakara is responsible for its introduction into Nyāya. Uddyotakara had done this to defend Pakṣilasvāmin (Vātsyāyana) against the criticism of a fierce opponent of the Hindu schools, the Buddhist logician Dignāga.

In Jacobi's opinion, this theory of threefold inference, divided into *anvayin*, *vyatirekin*, and *anvayavyatirekin* reflects the Buddhist requirement of the three-characters-of-the-valid-reason (*trairūpya*).[90] The definition can be put as follows: "the belief or absence of doubt is [based on] the very presence [of the three-characters-of-the-valid-reason (*trairūpya*)] in the object of knowledge, on [its] presence in the positive example and [its] absence in the negative example" (*anumeye sattvam eva sapakṣa eva sattvam asapakṣe cāsattvam eva niścitam*)[91] with the result that every inference is a case of a positive-negative inference (*anvayavyatirekin*).[92]

Uddyotakara claimed that it was not possible to prove everything by one kind of inference only. He attempted to attack Dignāga by showing that there can be purely positive cases of inference where there are no negative examples and purely negative cases of inference where there are no positive examples. For this he proposed a distinction between inference that is only positive (*kevalānvayin*), inference that is only negative (*kevalavyatirekin*), and inference that is both positive and negative (*anvayavyatirekin*). Uddyotakara strengthened his case by borrowing the old Sāṅkhya division of proof into simple and exclusionary. He was primarily interested in the exclusionary proof.[93] In fact, he equated it with the *kevalavyatirekin*. He was interested in equating *vyatirekin* with *avīta* in order to provide an instrument for establishing the existence of self.[94] Since it is not possible to find a positive instance of a case where a being is alive without a self, one may resort to the negative evidence: whatever doesn't have *prāṇa*, does not have *ātman* (*yad yad aprāṇādimattvam tad tad nirātmakam*). So the concomitance of all that is without breath or vital functions (*prāṇa*) and that which is without self (*ātman*) is always valid (*vaidharmyaṃ na vyabhicarati*). Uddyotakara's argument lies in stressing the difference between consciousness and all other things. This resembles the *apoha* theory: for any X one can divide all existing things into X and non-X. Was Uddyotakara impressed by Dignāga's *apoha* theory?

Why did Uddyotakara borrow *avīta*, and then equate it with *kevalavyatirekin*? After all, *avīta* is not identical with *vyatirekin*. The following discussion should prove that such an identification is a mistaken one, because if we had examined a case of *avīta* it would be clear that it is distinct from a *kevalavyatirekin*.

The Yuktidīpikākāra gives both a definition and an illustration of *avīta*.[95] The verse defining *avīta*, (along with *vīta*, the simple proof), runs as follows:

> *yadā hetuḥ svarūpeṇa sādhyasiddhau prayujyate*
> *sa vīto 'rthāntarākṣepād itaraḥ pariśeṣitaḥ*.[96]

> When the reason is applied in its own form to prove the *sādhya*, that is simple proof; the other [*avīta* gives a proof by] what remains after other [adventitious] things are excluded.

The gloss characterizes *avīta* in the following way:[97]

yadā tu svasādhyād arthāntarabhūtānāṃ prasaṅgināṃ kṣepam apohaṃ kṛtvā pariśeṣataḥ sādhyasiddhāv apadiśyate tadāvītākhyo bhavati. //tad yathā na cet paramāṇupuruṣeśvarakarmadaivakālasvabhāvayadṛcchābhyo jagadutpattiḥ sambhavati pariśeṣataḥ pradhānād iti tadā punar avītākhyo bhavati.//[98]

But when it [the reason] is employed in proving the *sādhya* as what remains after all adventitious things (*prasaṅgin*) other than that very *sādhya* are excluded, then this is called exclusionary proof. //For example, if the world could not possibly (*sambhavati*) originate from atoms, consciousness, God, *karma*, fate, time, its very nature, or chance (*yadṛcchā*), [and] can [have originated only] from what remains, namely (*iti*), unmanifest material stuff, then this again is called exclusionary proof.//

The illustration for a case of *avīta* given in the *Yuktidīpikā*[99] is introduced by a claim that one applies *vīta* and *avīta* proofs (*hetu*) when an argument remains indecisive:

yat tūktam—anekāntād iti atra brūmaḥ—vītāvītasāmarthyāt. vītāvītābhyāṃ hetubhūtābhyām abhipretārthasiddhir iti vakṣyāmaḥ. prasaṅgidharmāntaranivṛtti-mukhena cāvītaprayogaḥ. tatra yadā prasaṅgināṃ himavilayanādīnāṃ deśakālaliṅgaiḥ pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate tadā muktasaṃśayaṃ pratipattir bhavati. deśatas tāvat tad yathā—dakṣiṇāpathe nāsti himavilayanasambhavaḥ. kālato yathā prāvṛṭkāle. liṅgato 'pi yasmān mudgagavedhukaśyāmākakāṣṭhatṛṇasūtra[100]sakṛtprabhṛtīnām anupalambhas tathoṣmakaluśatvādīnām upalambhaḥ. tasmāt pariśeṣato meghya evāpa iti. tasmān nānekāntaḥ. evaṃ kṛtvā pūrvāṇy apy udāharāṇi upapannāni bhavanti. deśādi-vicārasāmarthyāt.

As for what you said, that [the examples] are not decisive, to that we respond [that they are in fact decisive] as they are confirmed (*sāmarthya*) by the kinds of proof: simple and exclusionary (*vīta* and *avīta*).

We shall show that the intended object [can be] proven by means of simple and exclusionary proofs, both being [equally accepted] arguments (*hetu*). Exclusionary proof is applied by means of eliminating any adventitious elements (*prasaṅgin*); for example (*tatra*), if adventitious elements such as melting of snow are eliminated on the grounds of place, time, and characteristic marks, then the cognition (*pratipatti*) is without doubt. To begin with (*tāvat*), with respect to place, [we offer] this example: it

> is impossible [to postulate] thawing of snow in the south. With respect to time, [we offer] this example: it is during the rainy season. Likewise, with respect to the characteristic marks, [we offer] this example: since mung beans, barley, *śyāmāka*-grains, wood and straw, urine[101] and feces, etc., are not perceived, yet (*tathā*), heat, turbidness, etc., are perceived—therefore it follows by process of elimination (*pariśeṣataḥ*) that the water is, in fact, cloud [that is, rain] water. Hence, this is not an indecisive [example]. And similarly the [other] preceding examples are correct, since they can be confirmed by examining (*vicāra*) the place, etc.

From the preceding it is obvious that *avīta* or the exclusionary proof is employed in order to prevent one of the possible fallacies of inference (*hetvābhāsa*). The Yuktidīpikākāra lists three: the unestablished, the contradictory, and the not decisive (*asiddha, viruddha, anaikāntika*).[102]

The exclusionary proof is perhaps part of a method that dates back to the times of pre-logical ways of debating. This method consisted of dividing things into two categories, positive and negative. The method relies on differentiating that for any X, all existing things are either X or non-X, just as the old Sāṅkhya differentiated consciousness from everything else (material stuff). Does not this resemble the *bhedāgraha* or *apoha* theory again?

A piece of evidence of a reciprocal awareness between the Sāṅkhya and Uddyotakara might be the statement of the Yuktidīpikākāra in which he brings up the negative example (*vyatireka*).[103] This statement occurs while he is discussing the members of inference and briefly defines "example" (*udāharaṇa*). He simply says that the negative example is included in the exclusionary proof and that is the reason why he does not give an example of dissimilarity. This apparently can be taken as a piece of evidence that the Yuktidīpikākāra is fully aware of Uddyotakara and perhaps appreciative of his arguments against Dignāga. Both the Yuktidīpikākāra and Uddyotakara were in the same camp of opponents against Dignāga. Whatever the case, the insightfulness and sincerity and perhaps originality of the Yuktidīpikākāra was not properly acknowledged, at least as far as we know. Consequently, thinkers of a later date did not understand what the Sāṅkhya tradition promulgated unless, of course, there were other texts or sources that followed the *Yuktidīpikā* that simply disappeared. In addition to the *Yuktidīpikā*, Vācaspati Miśra's commentary on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, the *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī*,[104] is our principal source. Here Vācaspati gives an account of *vīta* and *avīta*. In commenting on *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5, he interprets *vīta* and *avīta* in a way not found anywhere else. His distinction of *vīta* and *avīta*

is followed by a subdivision of the threefold division of inference discussed earlier. According to Vācaspati Miśra *vīta*, the simple proof, includes inference-from-cause-to-effect (*pūrvavat*) and inference-from-general-correlation (*sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*), whereas *avīta*, the exclusionary proof, includes inference-from-effect-to-cause (*śeṣavat*). This distinction does not agree with what is found in the *Yuktidīpikā*. In fact, it seems that Vācaspati Miśra presents a confused picture of these categories.

In discussing *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 9, Vācaspati Miśra brings in the exclusionary proof again. He uses it there for establishing the non-difference between thread and cloth, that is, between cause and effect. Interestingly, the example of employing *avīta*, when proving rain water as the cause for a river rising,[105] functions to differentiate what applies to the case and what does not. In other words, the way the Yuktidīpikākāra employs *avīta* is the way for differentiating what applies to the case and what does not. This is also how Uddyotakara found it useful. Why then does Vācaspati Miśra use it for the sake of proving non-difference between thread and cloth, that is, cause and effect? Perhaps by the time of Vācaspati Miśra the whole issue was forgotten and therefore easily misrepresented.

Having considered previous accounts in the philosophical literature, Vācaspati Miśra's commentary seems rather a common sense appraisal of positive and negative application. Since Vācaspati Miśra defines *śeṣavat* as an inference which proves by means of what remains, it appears that perhaps by the time of Vācaspati Miśra the original distinction of *vīta* and *avīta* might have fallen into oblivion. He was aware of its importance, but may have been only vaguely familiar with its existence.

From the definition and description of the *avīta* in the *Yuktidīpikā*, it is clear that it is a method that ensures the validity of an inference. *Avīta* did not function as an negative example or purely negative concomitance, as Uddyotakara wishes to interpret it. Although Uddyotakara was commenting on the *Nyāyasūtra* and the *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya*, he also was an original thinker who contributed new theories to the Nyāya tradition.

It seems that it was Uddyotakara's transformation of *avīta* into *kevalavyatirekin* which led to the disappearance of the exclusionary proof (*avīta*) as such. It is certainly noteworthy that Uddyotakara reached for Sāṅkhya's *avīta* in order to build a new theory to defend his school against the Buddhist logician's attack. Although *avīta* as such no longer found its use in the philosophical literature, its significance was in being adopted for a method in establishing consciousness.

MEMBERS OF INFERENCE CONSTITUTE THE SIMPLE PROOF

At the beginning of his commentary,[106] the Yuktidīpikākāra introduces ten members of inference (*avayava*) and divides them into two groups. The first group he calls *vyākhyāṅga* which can be described as the precondition of the analytical description of inference. The second he calls *parapratyāyanāṅga* (later *Yuktidīpikā* 41.3, 89.17-18: *parapratipādanāṅga*) which can be described as the demonstration to others. These designations are suitable as far as they express the respective functions of the terms at this point of their examination, but they are not necessarily exhaustive or final.

The following are the ten members divided into two groups:[107] (A) *vyākhyāṅga*: (*i*) inquiry (*jijñāsā*), (*ii*) doubt about the truth of the thesis (*saṃśaya*), (*iii*) the purpose of the inquy (*prayojana*), (*iv*) the possibility of a solution to the question (*śakyaprāpti*), (*v*) resolution of the doubt (*saṃśayaparyudāsa*); and (B) *parapratyāyanāṅga* or *parapratipādanāṅga*: (*vi*) thesis (*pratijñā*), (*vii*) reason (*hetu*), (*viii*) example (*dṛṣṭānta* or *udāharaṇa*), (*ix*) application (*upanaya* or *upasaṃhāra*), (*x*) conclusion (*nigamana*).

This list is almost identical with that in the *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* on *sūtra* 1.32. In commenting on the *sūtra* of the five members of inference, Pakṣilasvāmin ridicules certain logicians (*naiyāyika*) who postulate ten members of inference.[108] He believes that ten members for an inference are an excessive number. According to Nyāya five members, the latter (B) group: thesis, reason, example, application, and conclusion, will suffice for an argument. Pakṣilasvāmin argues that the first five—inquiry, doubt about the truth of the thesis, purpose of the inquiry, the possibility of getting a solution to the question, and the resolution of the doubt—are a psychological process unnecessary in an inference.

Apparently in spite of the criticism from the Nyāya teacher, Pakṣilasvāmin, the Sāṅkhya school still held this theory as valid during the classical period as it is documented in the *Yuktidīpikā*. A detailed example of how these first five members are employed is given in the *Yuktidīpikā* 41.4-15, 89.19-90.14:

tatra jñātum icchā jijñāsā. kaścit kaṃcid upasadyāha–puruṣaṃ jñātum icchāmi. kim asti nāstīti? kutaḥ saṃśaya iti paryanuyuktaḥ pratyāha—anupalabhyamānasyobhayathā dṛṣṭatvāt. ihānupalabhyamānam ubhayathā dṛṣṭam—sadbhūtam asadbhūtaṃ ceti. sadbhūtaṃ cārkendumaṇḍalāparabhāgādi, asadbhūtaṃ ca śaśaviṣāṇādi. ayam api

cātmā nopalabhyate. ataḥ saṃśayaḥ kim asti nāstīti? kim asyāś cintāyāḥ prayojanam iti pṛṣṭo vyācaṣṭe—śāstrasatattvādhigamaḥ, tataś ca mokṣāvāptiḥ. katham iti? yadi tāvad ayam ātmāsti tato 'sya aprakṛtitvaudāsīnyavibhutvādisatattvavijñānān nairātmya-bhrāntivipakṣabhūtād apavargaprāptir avaśyaṃ bhāvinīti yad uktaṃ vyaktāvyakta-jñavijñānān mokṣo 'vāpyata iti tac chāstram arthavad bhavatīti. atha nāstīti niścīyate tena sāmānyatodṛṣṭād anumānāt tadvad anye 'pi padārthā na santīti vipralambha-bhūyiṣṭham ārṣaṃ darśanam apahāyātmagrahadṛṣṭivigamāl lokottaram anava-lambanaṃ śūnyaṃ dhyānaviṣayam upasamprāptas traidhātukakleśanirodhalakṣaṇam ātyantikaṃ nirvāṇam avāpsyasīti. śakyaś cāyam artho niścetum, pramāṇatrayaparigra-hād iti vyavasthite, vyudasya saṃśayaṃ sādhyāvadhāraṇaṃ pratijñā. sādhyasya yad avadhāraṇam asti puruṣa iti sā pratijñā.

Of these [members], inquiry is the desire to know; as when someone approaches another and says: "I want to know about consciousness. Does it exist or not?" Then when he responds: "Where did this doubt come from?" He continues: "What [can]not be observed, can be understood in two ways. So [too] in this case, the unobserved thing may be perceived in two ways: as existent or as nonexistent. It is existent, for instance, in the case of the other side of the disc of the sun and the moon; it is nonexistent, for instance, in the case of a hare's horn. Now this self (*ātman*) is not observed. Therefore there is doubt as to whether it exists or not."

When asked: "What is the purpose of this question?" He answers firmly (*vyācaṣṭe*) that [it serves the purpose of] veridically experiencing (*adhigama*) the truth (*satattva*) of the teaching (*śāstra*) [of the Sāṅkhya], whereby one obtains liberation. How so? If this self does indeed exist, then liberation will simply be attained from knowing discriminately (*vijñāna*) the truth [that consciousness] is different from material stuff, is neutral, is omnipresent, etc. [This *vijñāna*] is opposed to the erroneous notion that there is no self, and thus (*iti*) the teaching that liberation is attained FROM KNOWING DISCRIMINATELY [the difference between] THE MANIFEST, THE UNMANIFEST MATERIAL STUFF, AND THE KNOWER becomes purposeful.

But if (*atha*) it is believed (presumably by the Buddhist opponent) that it [consciousness] does not exist, it follows from inference-from-general-correlation that other categories of things (*padārtha*) also do not exist; and having thus rejected the entirely deceptive (*vipralambha*) philosophy of the seer, by doing away (*vigama*) with the dogmatic view (*dṛṣṭi*) of cognizing consciousness, [it follows that] one acquires the

content (*viṣaya*) of meditation which is empty, other-wordly, and not dependent on anything (*anavalambana*). Then it follows that you will attain absolute extinction which is defined by destroying the afflictions that belong to the three realms (*dhātus*). Once it has been established that it is possible to believe (*niścetum*) that this intended object (*artha)* exists by applying the three instruments of knowledge. After resolving the doubt, the assertion (*avadhāraṇa*) of the *sādhya* [becomes] the thesis (*pratijñā*). // The thesis here is the assertion of the *sādhya,* namely, "consciousness exists." //

In this section, the dialogue between a Sāṅkhya teacher and a student, probably a Sāṅkhya student, demonstrates the five members of the inference of the *vyākhyāṅga* group.

(*i*) (*jijñāsā*): The student approaches the teacher with an inquiry about the existence or nonexistence of consciousness. The teacher asks why the questioner has this doubt.
(*ii*) (*saṃśaya*): The student answers that since consciousness is not readily perceivable it may not exist. That which is not readily perceivable can either exist or not exist, just as the other side of the moon is something that exists but is not readily perceivable, while a hare's horn is something that does not exist. The teacher asks about the motive of this questioning.
(*iii*) (*prayojana*): The student is determined to find the truth, because truth enables him to attain liberation. Whether it is by way of the Sāṅkhya teachings or by way of the Buddhist teachings, he will choose the teaching which will grant him liberation.
(*iv*) (*śakyaprāpti*): It is through the instruments of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) that it is possible to get a solution to the question.
(*v*) (*saṃśayaparyudāsa*): The resolution of the doubt becomes the assertion of the *sādhya*, namely, the thesis.

From here the rest of the members, that is, the thesis, reason, example, application, and conclusion, are only defined without illustrations. This is perhaps because these latter five are shared with other schools and are common knowledge.

In the following section of the *Yuktidīpikā* (pp. 41ff., 89ff.), the Yuktidīpikākāra explains that these two groups, the precondition of the analytical description of inference and the demonstration to others, are to be interpreted as inference-as-a-process-of-acquiring-new-knowledge (*svaniścaya*) and as inference-as-a-process-presenting-knowledge-to-others (*parapratipādana*),[109] respectively.

In his reconstruction of the pre-classical Sāṅkhya,[110] Frauwallner discusses Dignāga's division of inference into these two groups which he renders as inference for oneself (*svārthānumāna*) and inference for others (*parārthānumāna*). He, at the same time, claims that such a distinction is alien to the Sāṅkhya.[111] Frauwallner was not correct in his assessment. Of course, one may argue that this twofold distinction "for oneself and for others" was originally made by Dignāga and that the Yuktidīpikākāra adopted it to substantiate his theory of the ten members of inference. This claim would be supported by the fact that Dignāga and other Buddhists argued for only three members of inference. These would be either (*i*) thesis, (*ii*) reason, and (*iii*) example; or: (*v*) conclusion, (*iv*) application, and (*iii*) example. To the Buddhists, the thesis is identical with the conclusion, and reason is identical with the application; therefore only three members of inference suffice for an inference. But the Yuktidīpikākāra disagrees with this and insists on the ten members.[112]

It seems that this theory of the ten members of inference might have been an old though cumbersome theory that the Sāṅkhya was maintaining. Interestingly the Yuktidīpikākāra remarks that Īśvarakṛṣṇa did not mention the members of inference, whether ten or how many, because they were taken up by other teachers like Vindhyavāsin.[113]
The question of the similarities and differences between the two Sāṅkhya teachers, Īśvarakṛṣṇa and Vindhyavāsin, has been addressed in previous chapters. Although so little evidence is available especially about Vindhyavāsin's theories, it is quite clear that these two teachers differed in their definitions of inference as well as of perception.[114]

Why did the Yuktidīpikākāra suggest that both the teachers concurred with each other on the theory of the members of inference? Did he do so because Īśvarakṛṣṇa did not offer a separate theory?

These ten members also constitute the simple proof (*vīta*) which has been mentioned in connection with the exclusionary proof (*avīta*).[115] The simple proof is defined as an inference in a straightforward manner[116] and is equated with the ten members of inference.[117] While proving the primeval material stuff in the commentary on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 15, the Yuktidīpikākāra proclaims the simple proof to have only five members. Other occurrences of five members constituting the simple proof have been noted.[118]

Was it the Sāṅkhya which distinguished inference-as-a-process-of-acquiring-new-knowledge and inference-as-a-process-of-presenting-knowledge-to-others, or was it Dignāga's theory? If this distinction is based on the theory of the ten members of inference then this distinction must have been implicit in the Sāṅkhya school, though not articulated.

Dignāga was building on existing theories and could have formulated a twofold theory of inference in this way: inference-as-a-process-of-acquiring-new-knowledge-for-ourselves and inference-as-a-process-of-presenting-knowledge-to-others. Consequently, he did away with the cumbersome ten members. Thus if it were the case that Sāṅkhya did not distinguish inference-as-a-process-of-acquiring-new-knowledge-for-ourselves and inference-as-a-process-of-presenting-knowledge-to-others, its theory of the ten members of inference lent itself to such a theory. This could have been the reason for the Yuktidīpikākāra to adopt the twofold distinction which Dignāga articulated.

Conclusion

RECONSTRUCTION OF SĀṄKHYA EPISTEMOLOGY

This study aimed to reconstruct Sāṅkhya epistemology and succeeded to the extent that for the first time it is possible to state clearly what the features of the Sāṅkhya epistemology of the classical period were. The six sections of chapter three are arguments for establishing two overall hypotheses. One hypothesis concerns the existence and the content of Sāṅkhya epistemology. The second hypothesis postulates that Dignāga was instrumental in shaping Sāṅkhya epistemology and, at the same time, presumes that Dignāga may have been influenced by Sāṅkhya theories such as the qualification of perception being non-propositional.

The primary document for this study and reconstruction is the *Yuktidīpikā*, the most comprehensive commentary on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*. The *Yuktidīpikā* represents a rejuvenating movement towards a new formulation of epistemic theories in Sāṅkhya. The *Yuktidīpikā* lends itself as evidence in the hypothesis that Īśvarakṛṣṇa responded to Dignāga's criticism. Īśvarakṛṣṇa, along with his contemporaries (Kumārila, Praśastapāda, etc.), wrote the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* to reaffirm the Sāṅkhya position. The *Sāṅkhyakārikā* became a new manifesto of the Sāṅkhya school. The very existence of the *Yuktidīpikā* is evidence for such a hypothesis.

Each of the six sections of chapter 3 (Study) addresses a different topic. The first two deal with perception. In these, I argue for a two-level-perception that Īśvarakṛṣṇa already introduced, as Vācaspati Miśra correctly observed. Vācaspati Miśra has been generally mistrusted for this misinterpretation. This two-level-perception—non-propositional and propositional—was shared with other Hindu philosophical schools. This theory was in opposition to Dignāga's.

The second section on perception deals with a division of perception, similar to the one of Dignāga. Indeed the threefold division of perception bears a close resemblance to the division of perception into sensory and mental. Mental perception is further subdivided into yogic as held by Dignāga.

Although the topic of inference covered four sections, some of these are not based on the *Yuktidīpikā*. The first two sections were on the topic of perception, and based solely on the *Yuktidīpikā*. The following four sections on inference brought together a number of sources. The use of other sources, in particular Tibetan texts, applies especially to the

section on the consistent relation in Sāṅkhya inference. This is for the reason that my primary source (the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* and the *Yuktidīpikā*) does not supply information on the forms of inference nor on consistent relation. The *Sāṅkhyakārikā* does not name all forms of inference, rather it names only one—the inference-from-general-correlation. The Yuktidīpikākāra assumes the responsibility of naming the three forms and of discussing these three forms. These are also known in other Hindu and Jain philosophical schools. These three forms of inference which are discussed in the *Yuktidīpikā* are inference-from-cause-to-effect, inference-from-effect-to-cause, and inference-from-general-correlation. The Yuktidīpikākāra seems to support the position of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, which adopted the at-the-time popular distinction.

The most obscure topic in Sāṅkhya inference remains the consistent relation. There is no detailed record of the consistent relation in any of the Sāṅkhya texts. In the available sources there is barely a reference made to the consistent relation, with the exception of the Buddhist text, the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Dignāga. In his criticism of the Sāṅkhya logic, Dignāga also scrutinized the consistent relation. When Dignāga spoke of the two forms of the Sāṅkhya inference, rejecting them, he also examined the seven consistent relations of the Sāṅkhya. From this detailed criticism of Dignāga, Erich Frauwallner reconstructed the logic of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, the pre-*Sāṅkhyakārikā* Sāṅkhya teachings. An account of the reconstruction of the these early Sāṅkhya teachings is given below.

The topic of the consistent relation in the *Yuktidīpikā* is missing. It is possible for this to surmise a number of reasons which could be intentional as well as non-intentional. An intentional reason here would be the case in which the Yuktidīpikākāra decided to omit the discussion about the consistent relation because he would have had to modify the theory of consistent relation in accordance with the newly adopted theory of threefold inference. This compelled him to abandon the old twofold division of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*. So although the section on the consistent relation (*liṅgaliṅgipūrvakam*) is missing in the *Yuktidīpikā*, I drew information from other sources in order to discuss this subject. The best of these other sources was Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Nevertheless it is not clear whether the consistent relation as known from Dignāga would still be applicable to the Sāṅkhya logic of the classical period. In any case, since the study of the consistent relation is essential in the theory of inference, the survey of this relation may be used or discarded when it is possible to explain the Sāṅkhya inference with greater completeness.

A similar attitude of acceptance or rejection may be applied to the next topic, the exclusionary proof. It seems that the Sāṅkhya distinction between simple and exclusionary

proof might be an old fashioned one, dating back to the pre-logical period of Indian philosophy. Further inquiry may show in a specific way how the exclusionary proof served as the basis for other ideas or theories, such as negative example in inference. But the negative example should not be identified with the exclusionary proof.

The section on simple proof demonstrates a further division of the members of inference into acquiring new knowledge and demonstrating this knowledge to others, an old system that may have been revised and adopted by other thinkers such as Dignāga. There are several areas in which Dignāga's theories deserve further examination in order to determine whether he used the ideas of his predecessors and adversaries.

It is important to keep in mind that the reconstruction which Frauwallner offered some decades ago is a reconstruction of the pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṅkhya. It can be observed that Frauwallner's reconstruction shows one stage of the Sāṅkhya epistemology and logic, while the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* and the *Yuktidīpikā* provided me with material for reconstructing another, further stage of the Sāṅkhya teachings. In this way, we can distinguish two consecutive stages in the development of the Sāṅkhya epistemology and logic.

The classical Sāṅkhya which has been set down by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in his *Sāṅkhyakārikā* is distinct from the pre-classical or pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa Sāṅkhya. The classical Sāṅkhya text summarizes all the Sāṅkhya theories, including its epistemology. Since Frauwallner reconstructed the pre-classical Sāṅkhya epistemology from Dignāga's criticism and established that the material analyzed constitutes the theories of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* of Vārṣagaṇya, we can confidently say that the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa differs from the former in the following ways:

(*i*) Vārṣagaṇya's perception defined as the functioning of the sense faculties is incorporated in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's perception as the first level of the two-level-perception; the second level constitutes mental constructs. Vārṣagaṇya, on the one hand, by virtue of defining perception as the functioning of the sense faculties postulates the sensory type of perception. Īśvarakṛṣṇa, on the other hand, distinguished three kinds of perception: sensory, mental, and yogic under two subheadings—external for the sensory perception and internal for the mental and yogic perception.

(*ii*) Inference of Vārṣagaṇya is of two forms: inference-from-particular and inference-from-general-correlation. But Īśvarakṛṣṇa says that there are three forms, which the commentators identify as inference-from-cause-to-effect, inference-from-effect-to-cause, and inference-from-general-correlation. Īśvarakṛṣṇa seems to be mainly

concerned with inference-from-general-correlation, which is applied in proving supersensory things—for obvious reasons, since both the basic entities of Sāṅkhya philosophy, primeval material stuff and consciousness, are beyond sense perception. The Yuktidīpikākāra provides further information: inference has two proofs, simple and exclusionary. The simple proof constitutes ten members of inference. The ten members are subdivided into two: inference-as-a-process-of-acquiring-new-knowledge and inference-as-a-process-of-presenting-knowledge-to-others. In the existing literature on Indian philosophy these two are is called inference for oneself and inference for others.

(*iii*) As for verbal or scriptual testimony, we do not know much of Vārṣagaṇya's theory. We do know, however, the position of the Yuktidīpikākāra as he interprets Īśvarakṛṣṇa's definition. Verbal testimony is divided into two groups: the statement of a reliable person and the statement of authoritative literature (cf. *Manusmṛti*).

We also know that the Yuktidīpikākāra criticizes his opponent, whom we have proved to be Dignāga. In his criticism, the Yuktidīpikākāra accusses his opponent of confusing a common property and a universal. This causes the opponent to fail in distinguishing inference from verbal testimony. The Yuktidīpikākāra often demonstrates his ability to stand his ground by giving sound counterarguments, and thereby making it possible to restore the material for the reconstruction of the Sāṅkhya epistemology of the classical period.

POSSIBLE NEW DATE OF THE SĀṄKHYAKĀRIKĀ

In addition to reconstructing the Sāṅkhya epistemology on the basis of the *Yuktidīpikā* and Dignāga's criticism, it is possible to propose that Īśvarakṛṣṇa wrote his *Sāṅkhyakārikā* in response to Dignāga. If this is the case, then it is also possible to suggest the date of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* as the middle of the sixth century A.D., that is, around 550.

In his criticism, Dignāga may have not directed his attention only to one Sāṅkhya teacher. Frauwallner claims that the Sāṅkhya material he had recovered from Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* is material that Dignāga had drawn from the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* of Vārṣagaṇya. Dignāga does not mention anything of that sort, but he addresses a Sāṅkhya teacher by the name Mādhava. He calls him a destroyer of the Sāṅkhya school because of the radical modification of the system, such as the introduction of the atomic theory into the Sāṅkhya system. Since no other record is available in the literature, one can only surmise that Mādhava is one of the unknown teachers. The only known radical Sāṅkhya who reorganized some other theories within the system was Vindhyavāsin. But until there is some decisive evidence available, nothing conclusive can be said.

So although we do not have any particulars from Dignāga's words themselves, it is possible to say that the Sāṅkhya theories that were the target of criticism, were different from those of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. This by itself is of interest but inconclusive. The *Yuktidīpikā* also provides some evidence for the claim that the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* was written in defense against Dignāga's criticism of the Sāṅkhya school. But it is also possible that the *Yuktidīpikā*, definitely written after Dignāga, attempts to justify the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* in view of Dignāga's criticism.

The *Yuktidīpikā* interprets the basic text, the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, as an answer directed against an opponent who can be identified as Dignāga. This indentification is not by name, but by the ideas he represents. For example, the identity between the instrument of knowledge and its result. The Yuktidīpikākāra criticizes his opponent for collapsing these two, since he himself holds that the two are separate as they have two separate substrata, intellect and consciousness. What is relevant in this argument is that it is laced with actual quotes from the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and its *Vṛtti*, as we have seen above in the translation. The Yuktidīpikākāra's inclusion of mental and yogic perception into the revised definition of perception of Īśvarakṛṣṇa further supports the suggestion that it was Dignāga who influenced the revision of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's definition. Dignāga criticized the earlier Sāṅkhya

definition of sensory perception as too narrow, not allowing for mental perception. In his criticism Dignāga points to Sāṅkhya's confusion of mental perception with memory. The Yuktidīpikākāra shows that the revised definition of perception of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is a widening of the previous definition by including mental and yogic perception. He thus proposes a theory of three kinds of perception which resembles Dignāga's own. Another argument is unmistakenly directed against Dignāga, although again without mentioning his name. It is the argument on whether verbal testimony is different from inference. Dignāga does not acknowledge verbal testimony as a separate instrument of knowledge. The Yuktidīpikākāra shows that his opponent confuses common property and the universal, each of which figure in inference and verbal testimony, respectively. As a result of the confusion, he cannot separate inference and verbal testimony as distinct things.

The following points can be offered in favor of the hypothesis that the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* is a response to Dignāga's criticism:

(*i*) Dignāga's criticism of the pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa Sāṅkhya definition of perception,
(*ii*) *Yuktidīpikā* interpreting Īśvarakṛṣṇa as offering defense and counterarguments directed at Dignāga's epistemology,
(*iii*) Just as teachers of other schools responded to Dignāga's criticism, for example, Uddyotakara, Praśastapāda, and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa in their respective works, so also the Sāṅkhya teacher Īśvarakṛṣṇa responded by means of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*.

Since Īśvarakṛṣṇa neither argues explicitly against nor gives any names it is difficult to show any reference to Dignāga. The only case of indirect evidence is the addition of the non-doubting awareness (*adhyavasāya*) to Īśvarakṛṣṇa's definition of perception. After Dignāga criticized the pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa definition as too narrow, Īśvarakṛṣṇa redefined perception as non-doubting awareness. This allowed for other kinds of perception to be included into the definition of perception. The issue of other kinds is made clear in the *Yuktidīpikā*. It will be also important to point to the kinship with Praśastapāda in the matter of the distinction of two levels of perception, as it is likely that both Praśastapāda (ca.530 A.D.) and Īśvarakṛṣṇa were contemporaries.

If the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* is indeed a response by Īśvarakṛṣṇa to Dignāga's criticism, in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, which he wrote as a mature scholar toward the end of his life, then we can estimate a date for the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*. I would place the text in the middle of the sixth century A.D. since Dignāga's dates are 480–540 A.D. We can set 560 A.D. as the *terminus*

ad quem because it is certain that Paramārtha translated the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* into Chinese at that time. Consequently, if these arguments are accepted we can narrow down the date of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* to around 550 A.D.

SĀṄKHYA'S PLACE IN INDIAN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY

What we call Sāṅkhya ideas are some of the earliest attempts at proto-philosophical speculation, perhaps as early as 600 B.C. This assumes that this is the date for the early Upaniṣads, such as the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* and the *Chāndogya.* Kauṭilya lists Sāṅkhya as one of the three prominent philosophical schools (Sāṅkhya, Yoga, and Lokāyata) in the third century B.C. A century or two later, Caraka, one of the two foremost masters of medical science in ancient India, was a follower of Sāṅkhya. In the first century A.D., the poet Aśvaghoṣa represented the Sāṅkhya teachings in his *Buddhacarita,* chapter twelve. A remarkable amount of evidence for the importance and perhaps popularity of the Sāṅkhya teachings is documented in the *Mokṣadharma,* the twelfth book of the *Mahābhārata.*

There is very little record of Sāṅkhya in the first centuries A.D. There is a work or a theory called the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* that Frauwallner reconstructed from later sources, particularly the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* written by Dignāga that can be dated to ca. 540 A.D. This *Ṣaṣṭitantra* evidently was a doctrine of sixty topics, of which only a part could be restored since Dignāga's criticism was directed at only those theories which were the focal point of his criticism, that is, epistemology. Although this reconstruction constitutes only a part of the school's teachings, it is very valuable because the Sāṅkhya school is not known for its epistemology, rather for its ontology, metaphysics, and so forth. Therefore with the new evidence for an epistemology in the Sāṅkhya system during its pre-classical period, it was and still is a challenge to reconstruct the classical epistemology of the school.

Until now the only available source for all of the Sāṅkhya by the middle of the first millennium A.D. was the authoritative *Sāṅkhyakārikā* by Īśvarakṛṣṇa. The work is written in aphorisms which function as a syllabus of what the Sāṅkhya teachings are about. The so far available commentaries on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā,* with the exception of *Sāṅkhyatattva-kaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra, were rather sparse, sometimes only glosses. Certainly, there was very little that could be used as an evidence for debate. The *Yuktidīpikā* is a comprehensive commentary and therefore extremely important to our better understanding

of the Sāṅkhya teachings. The *Sāṅkhyakārikā* itself was considered the manifesto of the school and, as such, required explanations especially about philosophical issues. The *Yukti-dīpikā* addresses these philosophical issues. It also reveals the lively discussion and exchange between the Sāṅkhya and other schools.

The preceding pages on the various topics of the Sāṅkhya epistemology show that the development was stimulated especially by outside criticism. Dignāga, in particular, figures as the stimulating force in the development of Sāṅkhya epistemology through compelling Īśvarakṛṣṇa to reformulate the existing epistemology. But there was a larger application of Sāṅkhya epistemology, as for instance in chapter 3 (Study: Exclusionary Proof), where it is shown that Uddyotakara employed a Sāṅkhya theory to suit a purpose common to all Brāhmaṇical schools, namely, proving the existence of consciousness. Although this should be a subject of a separate study altogether, it is possible to suggest that not only was Dignāga instrumental in shaping the development of the other philosophical schools by their response to his criticism, but he himself absorbed and utililized features of these other schools that made his contribution to intellectual history so unique. Some of the features that Dignāga absorbed were originated in the Sāṅkhya school, for example, the ten members of syllogism that gave rise to the two kinds of inference, inference-as-a-process-of-new-knowledge and inference-as-process-of-presenting-know-ledge-to-others. It is difficult, though, to determine whether the distinction as such already existed in the Sāṅkhya school or whether this distinction was inspired by the theory of ten members of inference. It is also clear that Dignāga, in formulating the definition of perception as without mental constructs, had a predecessor in the Sāṅkhya teacher Vindhyavāsin. But this is not to say that he could have not drawn from his own Buddhist tradition. Still we may propose positively that there were others who were inspired by Sāṅkhya's ideas. For example, Uddyotakara of the Nyāya school transformed Sāṅkhya's exclusionary proof into a negative inference in order to argue against Dignāga. With this, Indian intellectual history was permeated with Sāṅkhya ideas. Thus many of these ideas which originated in the Sāṅkhya school and were adopted by other schools contributed to the continuum in the philosophical tradition. It is unfortunate that ideas the Sāṅkhya adopted from or shared with the other schools have been denied to the Sāṅkhya school. An example of this was the early articulation of non-propositional and propositional perception. This study of the *Yuktidīpikā*, not only has attempted to show that Sāṅkhya had been an active participant in the philosophical exchange between schools, but had also a direct impact on those schools' thoughts and development.

Notes

Introduction

1. Theoretically the *Yuktidīpikā* on *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 3 and 4 could have been included, since the former deals with the objects of knowledge, and the latter with establishing that there are only three instruments of knowledge. These are proved by eliminating the various instruments of knowledge which other schools operate with. Establishing the necessary number of instruments of knowledge by eliminating the ones the school does not accept is a common feature discussed in other writings and was therefore not included in the present study.
2. Just as in *Upadeśasāhasrī* (ch. 18) where the negative concomitance is used as an exclusionary method to distinguish self from not-self.
3. For more on this notion of consciousness, see the author's article on *puruṣa* in the *Encyclopedia of Religion,* ed. by Mircea Eliade (1987).
4. See discussion in Ch.2 Text: Place of the Text in the Sāṅkhya Tradition, 27ff.
5. The word "classical" in this study is used in the same sense as in Gerald Larson's *Classical Sāṃkhya,* p. 75, where he outlines four basic periods of the Sāṅkhya: (*i*) ancient speculations, (*ii*) proto-Sāṅkhya speculations, (*iii*) classical Sāṅkhya speculation, and (*iv*) renaissance or later Sāṅkhya speculation. Classical Sāṅkhya is to be understood as the time period and work of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Erich Frauwallner's *Ṣaṣṭitantra* according to this chart belongs to proto-Sāṅkhya speculations. I believe that he used the word "klassisch" in a general sense.
6. Cf. Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya,* p. 16.
7. See Ch. 4 Conclusion: Possible New Date of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā,* 107ff.
8. Cf. the *Yuktidīpikā* 3.8-9ff., 4.19ff.
9. The members of inference are inquiry, doubt about the truth of the thesis, the purpose of the inquiry, the possibility of a solution to the question, resolution of the doubt, thesis, reason, example, application, and conclusion. For further detail see Ch.3 Study: Members of Inference, 98ff.
10. For reasons not to translate *duḥkha* as suffering but as frustration, see Karl Potter, "Suffering in the Orthodox Philosophical Systems: Is There Any?" in *Suffering: Indian perspectives,* ed. Kapil N. Tiwari. Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1986. Of course, one could argue that *duḥkha* applies to all life, including animal and floral, and therefore "frustration" is not an adequate translation either; under given conditions the translation "frustration" is an improvement over "suffering," therefore I adopt it.
11. For the rest of the examples as for how the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* actually is an argument and how the members of the inference can be applied to the text or vice versa see *Yuktidīpikā* 3.10ff.
12. Note that the Buddhists, Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and so on, do not distinguish between the instrument of knowledge and the resulting knowledge.
13. See Frauwallner, "Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṃkhya-Systems." (1958).

Text

1. Pers. com. with A. Wezler, 1983.
2. See Pandeya, *Yuktidīpikā,* p.xii.

3. Pers. com. with R.C. Pandeya, 1982.
4. See Wezler. "Some Observations on the Yuktidīpikā," p. 435.
5. Kazuyuki Funatsu arranged for me to get a photocopy of the manuscript.
6. *ibid.*
7. Karl Potter kindly loaned me his copy.
8. Courtesy of Hisayoshi Miyamoto of Kyoto.
9. *Nyāyamañjarī* 2.48.23–25 reads: *uktaṃ hīndriyāṇāṃ svaviṣayagrahaṇaṃ viniścayārthaṃ yathāptodeśaḥ śabda ity āptagrahaṇam. viṣayopalabdhilakṣaṇatvaṃ hīndriyāṇāṃ bhūtaprakṛtitve sati nirvahati nānyatheti...*
10. See Wezler, op.cit.
11. See Frauwallner."Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṁkhya-Systems."
12. After the opening verses of the *Yuktidīpikā*, the Yuktidīpikākāra proclaims the *Yuktidīpikā* to be a scientific work (*tantra*) and cites a verse of the components for a complete scientific work:
sūtrapramāṇāvayavopapattir anyūnatā saṃśayanirṇayoktiḥ, uddeśanirdeśam anukramaś ca saṃjñopadeśāv iha [Wezler corrects to *iti*] *tantrasampat.* P. 2.11–12, 3.10–11.
Scientific work consists of (*iti*) aphorisms (*sūtra*), instrument of knowledge, and members of inference for simple proof, inclusion of all categories, arguments removing doubt and establishing certainty, brief and detailed statements, proper sequence [in evolution], theory of meaning, [and finally] instruction.
The Yuktidīpikākāra goes on explaining each of these components on the following three and half pages which forms the preface of the *Yuktidīpikā.* (Traditionally a *tantra* had to fulfill the requirement of having certain components. The requirements, that is, *tantrayukti*s were laid out in Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra*, but also in Caraka's *Carakasaṃhitā* and Suśruta's *Suśrutasaṃhitā.* They are not only known from these medical and political science works, we find them also in the *Nyāyasūtra.*) The Yuktidīpikākāra employs a modified term for these requirements, *tantraguṇa*, instead of the earlier *tantrayukti*, but also some of the *tantrayukti*s are different from those recorded in the works mentioned above. Originally there were some thirty-nine terms, whereas the Yuktidīpikākāra enumerates only eight. As we have seen in the verse quoted above, these are as follows: aphorisms (*sūtra*), instruments of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), members of inference for simple proof (*avayava*), inclusion of all categories (*anyūnatā*), doubt (*saṃśaya*), certainty (*nirṇaya*), brief explanation (*uddeśa*), detailed explanation (*nirdeśa*), proper sequence (*anukrama*), theory of meaning (*saṃjñā*), and instruction for application (*upadeśa*). The Yuktidīpikākāra reminds his audience that this is not an exhaustive account, but the most pertinent for a scientific work. The reason for discussing the requirements for a proper scientific work is to prove that the text, the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, which he is about to explain, defend, and argue for, is such a scientific work.
13. See Wezler, op.cit.; see also Pandeya's *Yuktidīpikā* and Mainkar, *Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa with the commentary of Gauḍapāda.*
14. Part of the text is missing here, it is therefore difficult to determine exactly where the tenth chapter ends and the eleventh begins.
15. See Mainkar, op.cit. p. 31.
16. See Pandeya's edition of the *Yuktidīpikā*, p. xxiv.
17. *Jayamaṅgalā...āptaśrutir āptavacanaṃ ca.*
18. Other texts read *...pratītir anumānāt.*
19. The *Yuktidīpikā* and *Māṭharavṛtti* read *sādhyam.* Poona manuscript of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* and other commentaries read *siddham.*
20. Other texts read *tadupalabdheḥ.*
21. Only the *Yuktidīpikā* and *Māṭharavṛtti* read *rūpādiṣu*, other Sāṅkhya texts read *śabdādiṣu.*
22. *Nyāyasūtra* 1.1.4: *indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṃ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṃ pratyakṣam.*
23. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 3.1.18: *ātmendriyamano' rthasannikarṣād yan niṣpadyate tad anyat.*
24. *Mīmāṃsasūtra* 1.1.4: *satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma tat pratyakṣam.*

25. *Ṣaṣṭitantra: śrotrādivṛttiḥ pratyakṣam.* Cf. Frauwallner. Op.cit. (1958), p. 124 (text), p. 127 (translation).
26. *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1.3c: *pratyakṣaṃ kalpanāpoḍham.*
27. *Viṣaya* literally means range, sphere of the faculty. Karl Potter and Anima Sengupta suggest translating *viṣaya* as "content," instead of the usual translation "object," since the term is more suitable for translating *artha* or *prameya.* Since I too distinguish between these terms, I adopt here the translation "content" or "sense-content" as appropriate after Potter and Sengupta. For the purposes of the Sāṅkhya, rendering *viṣaya* as "content" is appropriate. Sāṅkhya believes that the sense faculties reach out to their corresponding range or sphere (eye to color, or ear to sound, and so forth), they assume the form of the sense-content, or the sense-content is delivered up by the sense faculties, so the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) could perform its mental constructing, which has to be illumined by consciousness (Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 103.14, 203.12 for example; on *sākāra* theory, see below note 34 on *Yuktidīpikā* 35.19–20, 78.4-5).
28. *Viṣiṇvanti* is an etymological explanation of *viṣaya. Viṣiṇvanti* is from the root *si* which takes both 5th and 9th class with the meaning "to bind." The *upasarga* "vi" may intensify the meaning of the root, or it may give it the opposite meaning. Vācaspati Miśra in his *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī* while commenting on kā. 5, glosses *viṣiṇvanti* as *anubandhanti,* "to draw toward," "to attract." It is actually not entirely clear whether the root is *so* with the meaning "to finish, to determine, to know, etc." which seems better suited here.
29. Cf. *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 38.
30. *Ūrdhvasrotas* refers to one of the three creations, which are based on the combination of the constituents. The predominance of *sattva* is responsible for the creation that is called *ūrdhvasrotas,* here in particular *deva* (see the discussion in *Yuktidīpikā* 138.3; also 127.11 identifies *ūrdhvasrotas* with *deva*). I suppose the term applies to any perfected or advanced being.
31. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 31.19, 70.12.
32. The sentences indicated by double slashes are recovered only from the Ahmedabad manuscript. It is not clear whether there is anything missing, since the *pūrvapakṣa* = *āha* appears twice without being interchanged with the *siddhānta* = *ucyate* as is the usual practice of this text.
33. Cf. Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* on kā. 8cd; see Hattori's translation (1968: 28), the verse of the text is preserved in Sanskrit, but the commentary thereon is only available in Tibetan. Hattori's translation runs: "The resulting cognition arises bearing in itself the form of the cognized object, and [thus] is understood to include the act [of cognizing] (*savyāpārā*)." In a personal communication, Christian Lindtner proposed to revise this translation in this way: "According to us [that is, in the *Ālambanaparīkṣā*] the instrument of knowledge is not different from the result of knowledge, as others hold. One says that when a result closely resembles the form of its cause then it [that is, the result] takes the form of the cause."
34. The Yuktidīpikākāra argues against Dignāga on the issue that without the stimulation of consciousness one could not have any cognition at all. Although both parties share the *sākāra* theory, according to the Sāṅkhya any cognition is possible only if one accepts the existence of consciousness. But the Sāṅkhya is a *sākāravādin* only to a certain extent, that is, the sense faculty assumes the form of the sense-content, or the sense-content is delivered up by the sense faculties so that the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) could perform its *adhyavasāya,* that is, mental constructing, which, in turn, has to be illumined by consciousness. Consciousness, according to Sāṅkhya, stays distinct and does not take on an *ākāra* as consciousness does for the Vijñānavādins. Consciousness, according to Sāṅkhya, lends as it were luminosity to the intellect (*buddhi*), although the intellect as well as the sense faculties are without luminosity themselves because they are part of a distinct category, the material stuff. Consciousness makes intellect appear as if conscious by illumining it. In this respect the Sāṅkhya has to be labelled as a *nirākāravādin.* Apparently, the Sāṅkhya was both *sākāravādin* and *nirākāravādin* at the same time.
35. The application of the word "perception" to a sense-content is secondary, because of the two reasons given here: (*i*) perception makes sense-content known, and (*ii*) the sense-content is one of the causes for perception.
36. Kamalaśīla in his commentary *Pañjikā* on Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha* (1236 or 1237 in Ganganātha

Jha's translation) quotes this analysis of the word *pratyakṣa* from the *Nyāyamukha*: *yat jñānārtharūpādau viśeṣaṇābhidhāyakabhedopacāreṇāvikalpakaṃ tad akṣam akṣaṃ prati vartata iti pratyakṣam.* The same analysis is found in Śaṅkarasvāmin's or Dignāga's *Nyāyapraveśa*, p.7, lines13–14, while other schools gloss the word *pratyakṣa* by using a paraphrase which strongly resembles this definition. So compare Pakṣilasvāmin's *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* on 1.1.3, the opening line, and also Praśastapāda's gloss on *pratyakṣa* in the *Padārthasaṃgraha, Guṇa, Pratyakṣaprakaraṇa.* In the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, Vasubandhu explains *prati* of the verse I.16 (*vijñānaṃ prativijñaptiḥ...*) as referring to *viṣaya*: *viṣayaṃ viṣayaṃ prati vijñaptir....*

37. Poona manuscript reads *viṣayaṃ prati vartate tena kiṃcit pratīyate* which is a better reading; although *pramīyate* as Pandeya adopted might be preferable to *pratīyate* (cf. a similar phrase in *Yuktidīpikā* 37.16 uses *pramīyate*).

38. *Yuktidīpikā* 36.12–13 *abhisambhantsyāmaḥ* is a *lṛt*-future (Pāṇini 3.3.13) from *bandh.*

39. The group of four is one sense faculty and three internal organs (intellect, ego, and mind) which are involved in a single cognition, cf. *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 30.

40. This quote is also used in the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* on 1.4 and is usually ascribed to Pañcaśikha (cf. Nandalal Sinha, *Pañcaśikhasūtra* 2 and Hariharānanda Āraṇya, *Sāṃkhya-sūtra* 3).

41. Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya,* p.7, line 5.

42. In Pandeya, the "response" (*ucyate*) is at 36.22. It makes better sense to use *ucyate* in 36.23, that is, after the sentence rather than in front of it. This *ucyate* is missing in the Ahmedabad manuscript altogether.

43. The word *grahaṇa* is used here as a synonym for *ālocana* with the meaning "sensation" (cf. the usage of *grahaṇa* in the *Yuktidīpikā* pp. 102–103, 201ff. where the Yuktidīpikākāra explains *ālocana* of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 28).

44. This is the Sāṅkhya definition of perception from the *Ṣaṣṭitantra.*

45. *Gauṇamukhyayor mukhye sampratipattiḥ* resembles closely the reading of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa's *Paribhāṣenduśekhara*: *gauṇamukhyayor mukhye kāryasampratyayaḥ.* Since this text is a much later text than the *Yuktidīpikā*, it can be surmised that this is a *mūrdhābhiṣikta udāharaṇa.*

Also cf. *Śabarabhāṣya* 10.2. (17) 47. The passage in *Śabarabhāṣya* is about primary and secondary use of language. In the sentence "The bull should be sacrificed," the meaning is that an animal of the genus "bull" should be sacrificed and not a draft animal, for example, an ox.

anyena hi pramāṇena paricchine 'rthe gauṇaḥ śabdaḥ sambadhyate. yathā, gaur anubandhya iti gojātiviśiṣṭaḥ paśur anubadhyate, na vāhikaḥ. gaur ayaṃ vāhika iti tu samvāde vāhike gauṇaśabdaḥ pravartate.

The part of the quotation *ajo 'gniṣomīya iti* is from *Śabarabhāṣya* 6.8.30 in which the question arises which animal should be sacrificed for Agni and Soma at the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice. The answer is "a goat" (*aja*). According to Garge (1952) this quotation is from *Saṃhitā* of *Kathā Śākhā.*

46. The compound *liṅgaliṅgipūrvakam* is the only evidence of the existence of the third *pāda* of *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5, although not in its complete form which is *talliṅgaliṅgipūrvakam.* The compound is part of the definition of inference, that is, "preceded by [or: based on the relation between] the logical reason and the-thing-to-be-proven," yet it occurs here in the middle of the discussion on perception. I have no explanation other than (*i*) it either has to do with the *savikalpa* which according to Dignāga belongs to inference (whereas in Sāṅkhya according to Īśvarakṛṣṇa and the Yuktidīpikākāra *savikalpa* belongs to perception in the two-level-perception) or (*ii*) the possibility that the compound strayed from its proper place in the text which is not extant. This can be supported by comparing this sentence with the sentence in the conclusion of this section (38.23). where the compound *liṅgaliṅgipūrvakam* does not occur, although the sentence is virtually identical, see also Ch.2 Text: On the Text...31ff.

47. This statement is quoted in Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjarī* I.100.17 when he refers to a Sāṅkhya teacher Rāja to criticize the Sāṅkhya views of perception. *Sanmatitarkaprakaraṇa* quotes this in the footnote on page 533 (cf. *Mahābhāṣya* 1.292.26–293.2, 1.330.15–17).

48. Compare *Yuktidīpikā* 37.12–15, 81.16 with the *Yuktidīpikā* 15.25–26, 33.15ff. also *Mahābhāṣya* 1.383.24–381.1, 1.115.2–4.

49. The maxim of Kauṇḍinya is used to indicate an exception to a general rule, in other words, a particular sublates a general. This maxim is also applied in *Yuktidīpikā* 15.26, 33.17; in *Mahābhāṣya* 1.115.2–4, 3.6.24, 3.121.24–122.1, 3.232.23–24, 3.264.14–15, 3.315.9–10, 3.354.18–19; and more in the *Vākyapadīya*, *Ślokavārttika*, *Tantravārtika*, *Bhāmatī*, and also in Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa's *Paribhāṣā*.
50. *Ākūṭa* as "incite" (cf. *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 31).
51. This sentence requires a negation, *na*, just as in the sentence above which has the same construction (lines 21-22).
52. Cf. Pāṇini 1.2.64.
53. Cf. *Ṛg Veda* 7.4.7 which reads: *na śeṣo anyajātam asty acetanasya mā pātho vidūkṣaḥ*. The same idea, though formulated in a different way, is also found in the *Carakasaṃhitā* 11.21–22: *vahnir nigūḍho dhūmena, maithunaṃ garbhadarśanāt....*
The text here (*Yuktidīpikā* 38.9) *na śeṣogner anyasya jātam ity asti* should be corrected to *na śeṣo 'gner anyasya jātam astīti*, even though it is not exactly as found in *Ṛg Veda* 7.4.7 .
54. Droṇa's birth—a test tube baby after a fashion—is described in the *Mahābhārata* 1.7.121.1–6.
55. Correct reading in text: instead of *sūtra* read *mūtra*.
56. Chakravarti emends the reading from *vṛkṣāntarāṇāṃ* to *phalāntarāṇāṃ* (both manuscripts read *vṛkṣāntarāṇāṃ*); the emendation, at first sight, seems an improvement, but is it necessary?
57. I read the text: *atyantadṛṣṭam jyotiṣām*.
58. Apparently the discussion on the relation of *hetu* and *sādhya* is incomplete since the whole third *pāda* of kā. 5 *talliṅgaliṅgipūrvakam* is missing and no trace of a commentary on this *pāda* is detectable.
59. The thesis of the opponent obviously is that every instance of inference involves a causal relation. The Buddhists admitted causality and identity as the only possible relations for inference. They strongly opposed any attempt to establish any instrument that led to knowledge of things such as consciousness; that is, our inference-from-general-correlation, which the opponent tried to identify with the inference-from-effect-to-cause.
60. The fallacious reasons have not been discussed here in full. Only the third one of these three was given attention. This omission supports the suspicion that a considerable part of the commentary on kā. 5 is missing. Interestingly enough, the three *hetvābhāsas* given here are the three given in Śaṅkarasvāmin's or Dignāga's *Nyāyapraveśa* 3.8.
61. Cf. *Kāśikā* on Pāṇini 5.2.117. *tundādibhya ilac ca*, a small group of words called "protuberant pot" take the *taddhita* affix *ilac* to indicate possession.
62. Again, on *ekaśeṣa*, cf. Pāṇini 1.2.64.
63. The claim that verbal cognitions are to be included under inference is well established by Dignāga in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 5.1cd. Furthermore a word expresses its object by excluding what it is not. In this respect it is comparable to logical reason (*hetu*) and its three characteristics, namely, *pakṣadharmatva*, *sapakṣe sattva*, and *vipakṣe sattva* in this way: *śiṃśapā*, being the case here, expresses a particular piece of wood, refers to other pieces of wood of the same sort, and does not express other wooden pieces or things that are other than wood all together.
64. The implication is that each school could claim that the word of the tradition and/ or teacher is the verbal testimony without having to establish anything by means of a proof; thus each school could proclaim its own teaching as the truth, which would result in a chaos of various dogmatic views.
65. We have here three cases of inference-from-general-correlation. The first one is a stock example with concomitance: Whatever is produced is impermanent, just as with a pot. This concomitance is then applied to sound. Since sound is produced it must be impermanent. Similar, after a fashion, is the case of proving the cause and effect of material stuff. A chip of wood is proven to be a sandal wood chip because it has sandal wood properties such as sandal fragrance like that of a larger chunk of sandal wood. The proof is established on the basis that both, chip and chunk, belong to the same class. The concomitance is: Whatever has sandal wood smell belongs to the same class, sandal wood. In the same way, the three constituents of material stuff,

satisfaction, frustration, and confusion, are the property of a thing, just as the property of sandal wood. This property of a thing, common to both the unmanifest and manifest material stuff, serves as the basis for establishing that the cause, unmanifest material stuff, and the effect, manifest material stuff, belong to the same class. Therefore the concomitance, whatever has the three constituents must belong to the same class, proves that cause and effect are not different things. This argument is meant to prove the nature of the cause, the unmanifest material stuff, in showing its composition. The composition, in turn, is used in the following argument: the third case of inference-from-general-correlation—where a composite nature does not really have purpose by itself, like a bed made of pieces of wood and strings of jute, but it serves for the purpose of sleeping on it. The concomitance here is: Whatever is composite is for another's purpose. This argument is used to establish consciousness. The composite parts of the material stuff, that is, the *guṇas* are there for another's purpose. Since consciousness is without composite parts, it cannot experience anything by itself, but has to rely on the experience of material stuff, as it were.

66. Because a relation, whether causal or other, cannot be employed for proving consciousness, the implication is that consciousness is never the subject of a relation, let alone a causal one.

67. I am adopting the reading of Poona manuscript *viśeṣagrahaṇeṣu*, since it makes better sense here than Pandeya's reading of *viśeṣāṇām*, which seems to be confusing.

68. The Yuktidīpikākāra discusses in 104.20ff., 205.9ff. the possibility of knowing sensory faculties by their functioning, since it is not possible to know them in their essence. The faculties function during a present time as opposed to an inferential process that overlaps past, present, and future. I believe that the present time here refers to the present time of the functioning of consciousness, ego, and so on, and the particular properties (*viśeṣaṇa*) here (40.17, 88.15) are to be understood as the *svālakṣaṇya* (in 104.20ff., 205.9ff.) by which we identify the subtle things through their functioning.

69. The implication is that consciousness, according to the Sāṅkhya, can be established by means of reason that differs from the causal relation. According to the Buddhist logician there are basically two relations, one of identity, the other of causality, by means of which one can prove something. But for the Sāṅkhya, consciousness is established by means of concomitance between compositeness and being for another's purpose (cf. *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 17, for example).

70. It is not clear what "it" refers to here. Since this first part of *kārikā* 6 concerns inference-from-general-correlation, I presume that "it" refers to the instrument of proof (cf. 4 lines below in the text). I suspect that the passage starting with it is quoted from an authoritative text, and therefore not properly introduced with a subject matter. Of course, it is always possible that a section preceding this "it" is missing. The two types of proofs (*vīta* and *avīta)* discussed here are applied in other parts of the *Yuktidīpikā*, for example, 38.23., 84.19, where the inference is an inference-from-effect-to-cause. On the two ways of reading of *avīta* and *āvīta*, see notes to Ch.3 Study: Exclusionary Proof, especially n.88.

71. The readings of two words in this line have to be corrected. Correction can be easily supported by comparison with the gloss on the verse: 40.24, for example, and 40.28. The verse reads incorrectly: *ākṣepa* and *pariśeṣitaḥ* in the phrase *arthāntarākṣepād itaraḥ pariśeṣitaḥ*. The gloss reads correctly: *prasaṅgināṃ kṣepam apohaṃ kṛtvā pariśeṣataḥ*. See also 44.7 *pariśeṣataḥ*. The verse should be corrected to: *arthāntarakṣepād itaraḥ pariśeṣataḥ.*

72. *Anvaya* here stands for *samanvaya*. Size, homogeneity, and so on, are the specific properties in the proof for establishing material stuff, just as "being composite" is used as the specific property in the proof for establishing consciousness (cf. *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 15 and 17, respectively).

73. The simple proof (*vīta*) sets aside anything other than what is involved in the straightforward proof, other possibilities not being taken into consideration; unlike the exclusionary proof, which is based on taking into consideration other possibilities, and by examining them, removing all but one, and thereby establishing the object.

74. The word *ākṣepa* appears to be a synonym for *apoha*. There is a whole literature of *apoha* in Indian philosophy. Dignāga dealt with *apoha* exclusively in the fifth chapter of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. A

simplified way of putting *apoha* is that X is that which is not X or, then in other words, "a" is everything but "b–z." In the case here, the exclusion refers to a type of logical proof, in which exclusion is applied to remove adventitious things which are not conducive to establishing a thing (cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 38.25ff., 84.21ff.).

75. The section between // // is available only in Poona manuscript and is missing in Ahmedabad manuscript.

76. *Vyākhyāṅga* is a term often used in *śāstra* literature with the meaning of the preliminary condition for analytical description of a subject.

77. *Ātman* is a term for self used in many of the Hindu philosophical schools, such as the Nyāya and the Vedānta. In the Sāṅkhya schools, the prevalent expression used is *puruṣa.* On the use and the development of the term *puruṣa,* see Harzer (1987).

78. This passage appears to be a continuation of the discussion following *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 2, *pāda c* and *d* (*tadviparītaḥ śreyān vyaktāvyaktajñavijñānāt*). *Pāda c, tadviparītaḥ śreyān,* means that *mokṣa* is better than heaven which is attained by means of the Vedas. *Pāda d,* which is actually quoted here 41.10–11, 88.5f. means that one attains *mokṣa* by knowing discriminately the manifest, unmanifest material stuff, and consciousness (cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 21ff., 48ff.).

79. This is a reference to the Sāṅkhya teacher Kapila.

80. *Dṛṣṭi* is a term used in the Buddhist literature for referring to views of other schools, views which are considered as dogma or speculations (cf. secondary literature in Bibliography, for example, Ruegg 1981: 3).

81. *Dhātu* refers to the three realms according to the Buddhists: *rūpadhātu, ārūpyadhātu,* and *kāmadhātu.*

82. The three instruments of knowledge are perception, inference, and verbal testimony.

83. The section between // // is available only in Poona manuscript and is missing in Ahmedabad manuscript.

84. From the preceding examples such as 38.25ff., 84.21ff. one would not consider *vyatireka* to be something that can be interchanged with the exclusionary proof (*avīta*); yet Uddyotakara for instance will claim that *avīta* and *vyatireka* fall under the same category because they use negation in their methodology. As will be shown in the Ch.3 Study: Exclusionary Proof, 93ff., the instances of *avīta* found in the *Yuktidīpikā* are methods of proof and not mere negative examples. The case of *avīta* on 38.25ff., 84.21ff. is a case of overflow of water in the river. The cause for the overflow is rain water which is established by examining other possible causes such as thawing of snow in the Himalayas; when they are found not to be possible, the increase of water can clearly be said to be from the clouds. On the other hand, the stock phrase for a negative example in Indian philosophy is "unlike the lake," referring to locations of fire, which has as its positive example "like in the kitchen." The *vyatireka* example does function as exclusion of what does not exist, in that it points to a contrary to fact situation; only as such could it possibly be interpreted as an exclusionary proof.

85. Cf. *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 17c.

86. I have adopted, although in some modified way, the translation of these terms from Hayes (1980).

87. These are the factors involved in the perceptual process, therefore they are not applicable in the inferential process of cognizing.

88. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 41.15, 90.13.

89. The section between // // is not available in Poona manuscript, only in Ahmedabad manuscript.

90. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 41.16, 90.15.

91. All constituent terms employed in a definition have to be clearly stated before they are employed. Apparently, here the fault of neglecting such a clarification is criticized.

92. The word *ādhyātmika,* in Buddhist literature used is as an antonym to "external" (*bāhya*), however, here the context is the Sāṅkhya notion of having a composite thing which is both homogenous and heterogeneous, and the word *ādhyātmika* refers to "that which pertains to mind and body."

93. Chakravarti's reading *tasmān na* instead of *tasyātra* makes more sense here, therefore I have adopted it.

94. Pandeya emended *pramāda* to read *prasāda,* although the manuscripts and Chakravarti's edition have *pramāda.* I am reading with the manuscripts *pramāda.*

95. This seems to be a paraphrase of the definition of "application" (*upanaya*) in 41.23ff, 91.3.
96. By naming something one cannot turn it into a real object.
97. This is a customary discussion on the reasonableness of postulating certain claims.
98. *Svaniścaya* should be here understood as *svārthānumāna*.
99. In a case of a well-known concomitance, just as the one of sound (*śabda*), it is not necessary to spell out the whole concomitance, but one of the relata expressed will automatically bring to mind the other relatum of the concomitance.
100. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 42.1, 91.20–21. (Note that endnotes 100–109 are references to the various issues of the opponent's argument to which the Yuktidīpikākāra responds in detail, point by point.)
101. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 41.34–42.1, 91.19–21.
102. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 42.3, 92.3 .
103. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 42.7–8, 92.9.
104. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 42.11, 92.14.
105. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 42.16–17, 92.22.
106. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 42.18–19, 92.24–25.
107. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 42.13, 92.18.
108. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 42.20, 93.1.
109. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 42.23–24, 93.6–7.
110. Cf. The Hindu and the Buddhist philosophers disagreed on the number of members in an inference. The Buddhists, Dignāga in particular, employed and argued for an inference with only three members: thesis, logical reason, and example.
111. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 40.20–21, 88.20–21. This statement aims to wrap up the above claim on inference-from-general-correlation. For other references that simple proof should be applied first, cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 44.6, 97.5-6. and also verse 40.23, 89.2. which probably is a quotation from some authoritative source.
112. Similar accounts of reasons for not perceiving an existing thing can be found in *Mahābhāṣya* 4.1.3. and in *Carakasaṃhitā, Sūtrasthāna* 11, as Pandeya had pointed out. This commentary on *kārikā* 6 is intertwined with *kārikā* 7 and its entire commentary. The commentator could have had conceivably a reason to place *kārikā* 7 and its commentary within the commentary of *kārikā* 6. Yet this explanation is not thoroughly convincing because first, the text is corrupt. Secondly, the placement of *kārikā* 7 within the text on 6 interrupts the argument on inference-from-general-correlation which returns to verbal testimony. Thirdly, the topic of *kārikā* 7, that is, reasons for imperceptibility of an existent thing, is taken up by *kārikā* 8 again. It is possible to consider that the section might have been in the wrong place due to a displacement of a manuscript folio. This may not apply to the present state of the manuscript, since Poona manuscript does start a new page/folio with *kārikā* 7, but the same folio continues into *kārikā* 6. Lack of any supporting evidence for either consideration does not allow for any suggestion of changing the text.
113. The Poona manuscript and Chakravarti read *badhirādīnām*, "being deaf, etc.," which is an example of a person with an impaired sense faculty. Nevertheless, the surrounding examples are examples of what a person might not perceive, although these words "not perceive" are only understood, but not expressed. Pandeya therefore adopted the Ahmedabad manuscript by reading *śabdādīnām*. Pandeya's choice between the readings is supported with the elaboration of the example by the commentator (cf. 44.29–31).
114. The *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī* does not have the vehicle example, but just mentions a person whose mind is distracted by passion. Such a person will not perceive a thing in front of his eyes. The example of a vehicle in the *Yuktidīpikā* perhaps refers to a vehicle that is not perceived by a person with a distracted mind, whether the distraction may be due to emotions or other things.
115. The *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī* gives as an example for interference a wall interfering with the perception of the queen. The example of gold in the *Yuktidīpikā* is perhaps comparable to something special, just as a queen is. One does not perceive gold when it is hidden in the ground, by tarnish or other things that may interfere in seeing the shining properties of gold.

116. *Yuktidīpikā* 44.26 reads *gṛhyayate* which obviously should read *gṛhyate.* The sentence is corrupt, furthermore the subject of *gṛhyate* is missing. It seems that the sentence was disjoined and a part was lost, or two sentences have been joined after they omitted parts of their construction.
117. The word *śabda* could be taken here (*Yuktidīpikā* 44.30, 99.3–4) in the two occurrences in two different ways. The word *śabda* refers to two different kinds of sound, or it refers to the same kind of sound. The first interpretation would imply *anyaśabda* at the second occurrence of the word. For example, one first hears a deafening sound, and thereafter one does not hear the sound that a person for all visible reasons is producing. One then infers that one has become deaf. The second interpretation reads the two occurrences of the word *śabda* as the same kind of sound. For example, one hears a sound in a place at one time and when one does not hear the sound although evidently present, one infers that one has become deaf. This second interpretation is taken up in the current translation of the sentence.
118. Objects of knowledge in Indian philosophy are divided into immediate (*aparokṣa*) and mediate (*parokṣa*). Although some thinkers will admit the mediate objects only for the purpose of arguments, they will not ascribe to them a real existence. Immediate objects are objects of perception, whereas mediate objects are objects which will be known in a mediated way, such as inference. Because the mediated way involves human mental capacities, it is therefore not considered by many as a reliable source to know something because human mental capacities are prone to commit errors. Yet the realists and the naturalists delimited with precision the mediated way so that it will be conducive to truth and not falsehood, and thereby established it as a reliable means for acquiring knowledge.
119. The order of these categories resembles the order given in the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 8.6–7. These categories have been also accepted by the Naiyāyikas, cf. *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* 1.1.9. I believe that the mentioning here refers to Dignāga's criticism of the Sāṅkhya with reference to applying names and genus to things, just as the Naiyāyikas do.
120. Ḍittha is a proper name often used in the examples for a verbal designation of a thing, associating a name with a thing, which is a mental construct (cf. Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1.1, p. 25 where Ḍittha is such an example; also *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* p. 125.3–12. in exemplifying a *savikalpaka* level of perception).
121. Cf. 46.9 and 45.27. The printing reads incorrectly *vakrapekṣa-* and not *vaktrapekṣa-* (as in 46.11).
122. One of the stock examples in the literature of logic is a cow which is possessing horns and dewlap. The horns are the logical reason by which one may recognize a cow. The cow in this instance is the possessor of the logical reason and at the same time the locus of the thing-to-be-proven, therefore the cow as a *liṅgin* may refer to both, the *pakṣa* and the *sādhya.* From the discussion one may presume that the term *liṅgin* refers to the *pakṣa.*
123. Kamboja was a place in Eastern Afghanistan (cf. Dey 1971; also see Yāska's *Nirukta* 2.2; *Mahābhāṣya* 1.1.1., p. 9, line 25).
124. This passage of the *Yuktidīpikā* (46.1–2, 102.3–4) is almost indentical to *Mahābhāṣya* 1.1.1., p. 9.27. *Dātra-* occurs in the examples given for various regional expressions for cutting.
125. Cf. Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.1.1, *vṛddhir ad aic.*
126. Cf. 45.27 and 46.9. The printing reads incorrectly *vakrapekṣa-* and not *vaktrapekṣa-* (as in 46.11).
127. The Buddhists do not believe in *ātman* or in "all-pervasiveness," therefore the sentence should read "are not true." The proposed emendation is as follows: instead of *dharmyasiddhatvādāyo yathārthās* the *-ayo* at the end of the first compound should be dropped and a short *a* as *alpha privativ* before the second compound should be supplied. I read this phrase *dharmyasiddhatvād ayathārthās.*
128. Cf. *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 9.
129. The two theses or arguments referred to here are the simple and exclusionary, cf. below 47.17.
130. *Yuktidīpikā* 47.21, 107.5 may use the addition of *iti* after *nābhāvāt* for clarity.
131. Text within // // is not found in Poona manuscript.
132. Cf. *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 10 and 11.

133. Cf. *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 2.
134. The functions are divided into two types, individual and combined. The individual functions are the functions of the thirteen faculties: the three of the internal organ, the five sensory faculties, and the five faculties of action (which are, according to the Sāṅkhya, included in the cognitive apparatus, cf. n.162 below). The combined functions pertain to the functions of the vital breaths which constitute a common function of the faculties.
135. Read *upalambha* instead of *upālambha.* The word *upalambha* means perception and fits the context.
136. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 99.25, 198.10.
137. D.N. Shastri interprets Praśastapāda's use of the term *ālocana* as "mere apprehension of the form." *Sāṅkhyakārikā* applies the term *ālocana* to the function of the senses.
Following *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5, which gives the definition of perception, *Yuktidīpikā* offers an exposition on perception. This section documents that the Sāṅkhya distinguishes three kinds of perception: sensory, mental, and yogic. Compare *Yuktidīpikā* 38.2, 82.24–25: *tatraikena bahiraṅgasyendriyasya pratyakṣasya parigrahaḥ. dvitīyenāntaraṅgasya prātibhasyeti rāgādiviṣayaṃ yogināṃ ca yad vijñānaṃ tat saṃgṛhītaṃ bhavatīti vyākhyātaṃ pratyakṣam.*
Furthermore the *Yuktidīpikā* distinguishes two levels of perception, non-propositional and propositional (cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 103.9–12, 104.15–16, 203.4–9, 205.5–6). Taking these factors into consideration, the term *ālocana* will perhaps be best translated as "sensation."
"Pure sensation" (*ālocanamātra*) is distinguished from mental construction in the *Yuktidīpikā.* One of the reasons for revising the original Sāṅkhya definition of perception might have been to take account of this distinction. Hattori (1968: 149) suggests that the *Yuktidīpikā* and Jinendrabuddhi in his commentary on the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* give the narrow scope of the original definition (that is, *śrotrādivṛttiḥ*) as the cause for the need for improving the definition of perception. In the original definition, perception was identical with the sensory function. The need to widen the definition was gradually accomplished. The *Yuktidīpikā* recorded it, cf. the quote above. And earlier, there was an attempt at specifying non-propositional cognition (*avikalpikā*) by Vindhyavāsin. (It may be observed that there is a similarity between Vindhyavāsin's and Dignāga's definitions of perception.) Whatever the reason, the elaboration did not stop with the efforts of Vindhyavāsin, and the Sāṅkhya school developed a distinct definition (*prativiṣayādhyavasāyo dṛṣṭam*) which became codified by the *Sāṅkhyakārikā.*
138. *Rūpa* as an object of a sense faculty is usually translated as "color" to match the objects of sensation. It is the prototype example, especially, in the Buddhist Sautrāntika literature. The non-Sautrāntika, that is, the Sarvastivādins understand *rūpa* as "color-form" (see also discussion on *rūpa* under n.139).
139. The author of the *Yuktidīpikā* refers here to the original Sāṅkhya definition of perception: *śrotrādir vṛttiḥ pratyakṣam.* The *Yuktidīpikā* often draws on the *śāstra* for its authority.
The schools of Brāhmaṇic traditions often use "sound" as a stock example in illustrating various points of their teaching. In the present discussion, these features of sound are relevant: Sound is eternal, and sound is the sensory object of the ear. Other schools will agree on the characteristics of sound with respect to its feature of a sensory object, but not necessarily on the matter of eternality. This is true of the Buddhists in particular, for whom a question of eternality is alien. In their examples, they use "color," which is the object of the sensory faculty, the eye. Also, other schools preferred the color-eye example over the sound-ear example. So *Nyāyasūtra* and Pakṣilasvāmin's (Vātsyāyana's) *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* discuss perception with the help of the eye example.
In the body of the Sāṅkhya texts, it can be observed that the materials available to Western scholars usually employed "sound." Nevertheless, with the more recent discoveries of such materials as *Yuktidīpikā*, the *Sāṅkhyavṛtti* of Nakada, V_1 and V_2 of E. Solomon, *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī* and *Māṭharavṛtti*, it was also noticed that these texts exemplified their points on perception by "color." It is difficult to determine why Sāṅkhya texts did not present one kind of example only. Perhaps owing to the influences of other schools, the Sāṅkhya literature reflects this discourse.

140. In *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 26 the ear (*karṇa*) is the first sense faculty mentioned in the listing.
141. Cf. the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* under 3.47 for the nature of *grahaṇa.*
142. The theory of universals and particulars was not one that developed within the Sāṅkhya school. At the time of Vindhyavāsin, the Sāṅkhya school incorporated notions which belonged to other schools (cf. Frauwallner. *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie.* 1953, I: 404), among these were the notions of universals and particulars. Universals and particulars were dealt with at length in the Vaiśeṣika school in connection with causality. This issue also had applications to epistemology. Cognition was the grasping of a whole (*avayavin*), whereas the parts (*avayava*) were only inferred. It is the universal that is perceived, rather than the particular. An example frequently used in the Vaiśeṣika school was one of a pot. It was the universal property of the pot, the potness, that was cognized. Yet, the clay or the brown color consisting of atoms were the real parts of the object. None of the these parts, whether the brown color or the atoms themselves, could be called a pot. The speaker of the *Yuktidīpikā* opposes the Vaiśeṣika view of perceiving particulars by means of the mental constructing apparatus, and of universals by means of the sensory faculties.
The position of the Yuktidīpikākara resembles here the Buddhist position (cf. Dignāga, Dharmakīrti). This position advocates that the sense faculties perceive the particulars and the internal organ the universals.
143. My Pandit Śrī Nārāyaṇa Miśra and Phyllis Granoff propose to eliminate the negation here, and I agree. The sentence should read: *yadi khalv indriyasya sāmānyajñānaṃ syāt.*
144. In this section *pratyaya* will be translated as "mental constructing." Alternative translations are "determinate perception" and "propositional cognizing." The latter term is used by Potter and Mohanty in referring to *savikalpaka* cognition. A propositional statement is a statement that has to contain a proposition in the form of an assertion, or denial, doubt, and so on (cf. Potter 1977: 148).
145. The characteristics of mental constructing (*pratyaya*) described here are taken up in a similar fashion by the Buddhist logicians. The three characteristics given here in the *Yuktidīpikā* are the following: (*i*) having an indefinite or unrestricted object (*aniyata*), (*ii*) having an object at all three times (past, present, and future), and (*iii*) having the form of an object previously perceived (*ādirūpa*).
Having an indefinite or unrestricted object refers to the mental construction such as a generic object, a concept, an idea. This object is a universal in contrast to a sense datum which is definite and restricted by a particular.
Having an object at all three times indicates the dependence of an idea on causal relation to the impressions that arise from the direct experiences of the sense perception. A cognition of an idea, that is, propositional cognition is based on impressions from previous propositional cognitions, that is its past condition. Any present propositional cognition generates impressions for propositional cognitions in the future. (The operation of the internal organ is said to be at all three times, cf. kā. 33, also *Yuktidīpikā* 103.10–12., 203.6–9.) This condition contrasts the condition of pure sensing that has as its object a particular, that is, a sense datum and occurs at present time only.
The depositing of the impressions occasions memory which is closely connected to the third characteristic, that is, the form of a previously perceived object. The Mīmāṃsā and the Yogācāra schools disputed whether cognitions have a content or not. The *Yuktidīpikā,* adopting the *sākāra* theory, postulates that an idea has form (*rūpa*).
In the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* on 1.11, Vyāsa discusses whether the mind remembers the *pratyaya* or the object.
146. Raghavan suggests reading *karaṇa* instead of *kāraṇa.* This is a reasonable suggestion, in view of the use of *karaṇa* in the following lines, although in this context, both terms *kāraṇa* meaning cause and *karaṇa* meaning instrument are synonymous. The instrument of cognition is the most efficient cause of the cognition.
The discussion here centers around the question of an additional cause needed or not needed in the process of acquiring cognition. It could be possible that this discussion is a response to the Buddhist view of the necessity of having a second cognition (C2) to validate a first cognition (C1). According to the Buddhists, validity is extrinsic (that is, a cognition has to be validated by another cognition), whereas invalidity is

intrinsic. The Sāṅkhya school, on the other hand, holds both validity and invalidity to be intrinsic. According to this school, the requirement for additional validating leads to infinite regress. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools compromise between these two views: to validate C1 requires C2, but no more cognitions (cf. *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* 2.1.17–20).

147. The subject of illumination is discussed in *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 32. In commenting on the functions of the faculties in *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 32, the commentators disagree on the illumination function of the faculties. Gauḍapāda holds that action organs (see below) grasp and retain, and the sensory organs illuminate (cf. *Gauḍapādabhāṣya* p. 129). Vācaspati Miśra believes that the action organs grasp, the internal organ retains, and the sensory organs illuminate (cf. *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī* p. 109).

The author of the *Yuktidīpikā* (cf. 112.26ff., 216.10ff.) maintains that the organs of action grasp, the sensory organs retain, and internal organ illuminates (because it is capable of ascertainment). In this particular passage, the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* concludes his argument regarding the functions of these respective faculties by ascribing to them these functions: the lamp illuminates, the senses grasp, and the internal organ ascertains (cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 103.14–15, 203.12). The *Sāṅkhyavṛtti* (V2), of which Solomon speculates that it is Paramārtha's version, claims that the organs of action grasp and retain, whereas the sensory faculties illumine. Further, the *Sāṅkhyasaptativṛtti* (V_1) perhaps identical with Māṭhara's version, establishes that the sensory faculties illuminate and the organs of action grasp the objects and retain them (p. 48). Just as a lamp illuminates a pot placed in a dark spot, so the hand seizes and holds it. This is identical with Māṭhara's text (*Māṭharavṛtti* on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, p. 36). Lastly, the *Jayamaṅgalā* believes that while the the organs of action grasp, *buddhi*, ego-sense, and attention faculty (*manas*) retain, and sensory faculties illuminate (*Jayamaṅgalā* on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*, p. 94).

148. Different views were held on the matter of the internal organ. Some of the ancient teachers of the Sāṅkhya school believed that everything is experienced in *buddhi*, yet for Vindhyavāsin the experiencing took place in *manas*, cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 91.10, 187.14. He did not specify mental constructing, self-appropriation, and attention as functions of *buddhi*, ego-sense, and *manas* respectively, but maintained that there was only one internal organ, that is *manas* (cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 91.9–10, 187.13–14). This conformed to his view that there were only eleven faculties: five sensory organs, five organs of action, and *manas*. He did not admit the ego-sense as belonging to the psychic organism, that is, internal organ (cf. Frauwallner. *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie*. I: 1953, 402).

149. According to the Vaiśeṣika school, successive (*krama*) operations apply to heterogeneous (*vijātīya*) parts (*avayava*) which remain parts because only homogeneous (*sajātīya*) parts can comprise a whole (*avayavin*). Homogeneous parts, on the other hand, compose a whole, and this is established by simultaneous (*yugapat* or *akrama*) cognitions.

The focus of the Sāṅkhya school on the issue of succession and simultaneity is of a different nature. The *Yuktidīpikā* on kā. 30 acknowledges that operations of faculties proceed both simultaneously and successively. When any one sense faculty and the three members of the internal organ function, they function simultaneously. They do so to perceive an external object as opposed to an internal one, an idea. Thus a single cognition is formed of simultaneous operations of the just mentioned faculties. In a case where there is more than one cognition, the operations of the faculties proceed successively. For example, the eye functions with respect to color, the function of the eye is accompanied by the function of the internal organ. The same pattern applies to other functions; the skin, for example, grasps its own object, the tactile data, and this again is accompanied by the operation of the internal organ. The perception of the tactile data cannot happen at the same time as the perception of the color because that would result in a confusion of operations.

150. The assuming (*āpatti*) a similarity of form with the object on the part of the sense faculty is known as the representative theory of perception. An object produces a copy of itself in the consciousness of the cognizing agent. The mechanics of this depend on the properties of the sense faculty. On this point, however, the Sāṅkhya and the Vaiśeṣika differ (cf. n.161 below).

151. The distinction between grasping and ascertaining in the perceptual process is a distinction between

non-propositional cognition and propositional cognition. Until now, only Vācaspati Miśra in *Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī* has ascribed this distinction to the Sāṅkhya teaching, and scholars viewed his ascription skeptically. They assumed that Vācaspati Miśra is a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, where this distinction is well observed, and he therefore read this distinction into the Sāṅkhya text. Conversely, it is also known that Vācaspati Miśra gave accurate accounts of other schools without injecting his own interpretations (cf. D.N. Shastri 1976).

In the following, the *Yuktidīpikā* gives a precise account of the respective operations of grasping and conceptualizing, in our terms of non-propositional and propositional cognitions. The difference does not lie only in the different faculties carrying out the operations, but also in the different temporal conditions of the operations. This eventually involves the *karma* system. Impressions arise from the initial experience of cognizing (*anubhava*). The depositing of impressions gives way to a further process that occasions the mental activity of ascertaining which, in turn, involves memory.

152. Raghavan in his *Corrections and Emendations...* suggests a period after *apagamo*, which would change the ending to *-aḥ*. In addition to this emendation, it is necessary to remove the comma after *vartamānakālatā*.

153. *trikālaviṣayā* should read *trikālaviṣayatā*, which would be a parallel form to the above *vartamānakālatā* and would make reading of this sentence intelligible (also cf. Raghavan. *Corrections and Emendations...*)

154. The Buddhist logicians criticized the Sāṅkhya thinkers for defining *manovṛtti* as *smṛti*. Since *manas* has no recollection of a previous experience, *manovṛtti* cannot be defined as *smṛti* (cf. Hattori 1968: 61 and notes thereon). It seems that the *Yuktidīpikā* avoided a similar confrontation and adopted the Vaiśeṣika teaching of *smṛti* based on depositing of impressions that are a necessary accompaniment of any experience (cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 103.11, 203.7–8). Memory (*smṛti*) is an essential part of mental operation by means of which propositional cognition operates (also cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 102.26, 14–15 and notes thereon; n.145 above).

155. Impressions hinder the capacity for clear perception, even the ordinary perception of a jar, let alone the perception of insight into the truth (such as the difference between *puruṣa* and *prakṛti*).

156. Raghavan suggests to delete the sentence: *atha karmendriyāṇāṃ kā vṛttir iti*, including *ucyate* that follows this sentence. The same appears on line 29 of this page. It introduces there a section on the organs of action and is therefore proper in line 29.

157. Neither Chakravarti nor Pandeya offered a solution for this corrupt reading of the manuscript. Raghavan himself did not comment on it. The *Nyāyamañjarī* contains an identical clause, repeated twice, where it reads *nirvahati*. With this double evidence, there need not be any doubt that the reading is *nirvahati*. *Nyāyamañjarī* 2.48.23–25 reads: *uktaṃ hīndriyāṇāṃ svaviṣayagrahaṇaṃ bhūtaprakṛtitve sati nirvahati nānyatheti tattadviniścayārthaṃ yathāptopadeśaḥ śabda ity āptagrahaṇam. viṣayopalabdhilakṣaṇatvaṃ hīndriyāṇāṃ bhūtaprakṛtitve sati nirvahati nānyatheti.*

158. According to the Nyāya and the Mīmāṃsā schools, the mechanics of the auditory faculty differ from the visual, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile faculties. The latter four reach out to meet the object, whereas the former, the ear is the receptacle of *ākāśa*, which is the substratum of sound. Since *ākāśa* is one of the five eternal substances (the other four are: time, space, *manas*, and *ātman*), it does not produce any effect (*akaraṇadravya*) and is all pervading (*vibhu*). *Ākāśa* is at the same time considered by the Naiyāyikas as an element (*bhūta*). It is an inherent cause of sound, and its existence is inferred. Since *ākāśa* is all pervading, it is present in the orifice of the ear carrying sound to the faculty of hearing.

159. *Adhigantam* should read *adhigantum* (cf. Chakravarti's edition 123.8 and R.S.Tripathi's 144.28).

160. Lines 103.17–23, 203.16–24 are virtually identical with *Nyāyamañjarī* 2.48.25–49.2. The *Yuktidīpikā* ascribes the content to the Naiyāyikas without mentioning its source. This section is found in the *Nyāyamañjarī* as part of a discussion on the Sāṅkhya teaching of the sensory faculties.

Historical questions regarding the *Yuktidīpikā* still remain unresolved. Attempts have been made to identify the author, place, time of composition, and so on. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa mentions in *Nyāyamañjarī* 1.100.17 the name of Rāja. Rāja's views on perception seemed to be a target for Jayanta's criticism. In his translation of the *Nyāyamañjarī*, V. Bhattacharyya claims that Rājā is the author of the *Yuktidīpikā*. This might be hasty,

especially in the light of Wezler's hypothesis suggesting that the present *Yuktidīpikā* consists of two commentaries: the *Rājavārttika* and the *Yuktidīpikā* as a commentary thereon. Wezler (1974) models this hypothesis according to the discovery of Kātyāyana's *vārttikas* on Pāṇini's *sūtras* contained in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya.* Ram Shankar Bhattacharya (co-author with G. Larson of *Sāṁkhya: A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy*) considered certain phrases interpolated into the text. (Personal communication when I studied with R.S. Bhattacharya in 1982 in Varanasi.) When I compared them to Wezler's established *vārttika*, they did not coincide.

161. The Vaiśeṣika school holds that the sense faculties are based on the elements, in other words, that they are made out of material stuff and as such each of the senses are related to a respective element. The Sāṅkhya thinkers argue that if senses were material they could not grasp a distant object, either a big object or a small one. The Sāṅkhya school believes that the sense faculties reach out and transform themselves into the form of the object, whether or not the object is distant or large. The capacity of the sense faculty to do so lies in its pervasiveness. That a sense faculty possesses pervasiveness is a sufficient reason for establishing that the senses are not produced from the elements, but from the ego-sense. The sense faculty becomes effective in reaching (*prāpyakārin*) only when it comes in contact with the object. The contact is the stimulus for the faculty's function (*vṛtti*). The view of the pervasiveness of the sense faculties is ascribed earlier to Vindhyavāsin, cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 91.8–9, 187.11–12. For the Nyāya sources, see *Nyāyamañjarī* 2.49.5–10, *Nyāyasūtra* 33.

162. The faculties of action (*karmendriya*) in the Sāṅkhya system are included in the cognitive apparatus. Functions, such as speaking, taking, and so on, are performed by the respective organs of action: the mouth, hands, and so on. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and other thinkers, including Jains, disagree and do not accept the mouth, hands, feet, and so on as faculties with particular functions. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa argues that the shoulders, for example, would also have to be included among the faculties since they have a function of carrying burdens. Similarly, the same could be applied to other parts of the body.

163. The word *viśiṣṭa* is an etymological gloss of the *vi-* in the word *viharaṇa.*

164. A change in gender is required here. The *visarga* of the compound ending with *-ādi,* marking the noun as masculine, has to be dropped. The compound's antecedent is *yad* which refers to the neuter noun *viharaṇa* in the preceding sentence. Therefore the compound must be of the same gender.

165. The word *utkṛṣṭa* is an etymological gloss of the *ut-* in the word *utsarga.*

166. Pandeya in his edition reads *strotas*, which does not make sense and must be a misprint, since the Poona manuscript has *srotas* (cf. folio 86 b).

Study

1. Frauwallner reconstructed the Sāṅkhya pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa epistemology of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* on the basis of Dignāga's criticism. See Frauwallner, "Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṃkhya-Systems." WZKSO 2 (1958) 84–139. Frauwallner called the author of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* Vṛṣagaṇa. See n.9 below on the discussion of this name. Now that Steinkellner has extracted some further materials on the theory of perception of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* from Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* we may be able to gain a much better understanding of the development of the theory of perception. I think it is clear that the tendency toward distinguishing a two level theory has been indicated long before Īśvarakṛṣṇa.

2. *ibid.* Vṛṣagaṇa's name is mentioned in the *Yuktidīpikā* 110.1 (Pandeya's edition), 212.16 as Vṛṣagaṇavīra. Also see n.9 below.

3. Cf. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's *Nyāyamañjarī* 93.10, *Sanmatitarkaprakaraṇa* 533.2, Abhayadeva's *Tattvabodha-vidhāyinī,* Hemacandra's *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* 28.4 (1.1.114ff.), and so on. The references given to Vindhyavāsin in the *Yuktidīpikā*, for example, pp. 3, 91, 121, 123, are not references, interestingly enough, to his definition of perception. Vindhyavāsin has given the occasion to various speculations since references

to him are not always consistent. Further details on Chinese references, see Chakravarti, *Origin and Development of the Sāṃkhya System of Thought*, pp.135–54. Gerald Larson, *Classical Sāṃkhya*, pp. 140–45, gives a comparable account. As for translating *vikalpa, kalpanā, avikalpikā* as "mental constructs," rather than making a distinction between the schools' usage and interpretation of these terms, in this study within the larger historical context it is simpler to apply a more uniform terminology. The distinctions made by the various schools are later developments which arose from these early discussions under scrutiny.

4. Pakṣilasvāmin, *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* 198.21–22, Praśastapāda, *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* 99 and Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, *Ślokavārttika, Pratyakṣasūtra* 111ff.

5. Cf. *Nyāyasāra*, 173-187, but also 99.

6. See *Nyāyamañjarī* 93.10: *śrotrādivṛttir aparair avikalpiketi / pratyakṣalakṣaṇam avarṇi tad apy apāstam. / sāmyān na yasya na ca siddhyati buddhivṛttyā / dṛṣṭatvam ātmana iti pratipāditaṃ prāk.*

7. See Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya*, p. 25. Cf. fragment of the text *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1.3c.

8. Frauwallner, *Geschichte der indischen Philosophie* (I: 1998 p. 482, n.212) refers to Vyāsa's commentary on the *Yogasūtra* as expressing Vindhyavāsin's ideas: "Es ist hier nicht der Raum, meine Darstellung der Lehre Vindhyavāsīs genauer zu begründen. Die Grundlage bilden die ihm zugeschriebenen Fragmente, daneben Texte, welche wegen ihrer Übereinstimmung mit diesen Fragmenten als Wiedergabe seiner Anschauungen betrachtet werden können. Vor allem glaube ich, dass die Darstellung des Sāṃkhya in Vyāsas Yogabhāṣyam auf den Anschauungen Vindhyavāsīs fusst."

9. Larson in his *Classical Sāṃkhya* (140ff.) gives a brief survey of references to the association of Vindhyavāsin, alias Vārṣagaṇya, with the *Yogasūtrabhāṣya*. This "alias" finds its sources in Paramārtha's "Life of Vasubandhu," where a teacher by the name of Vārṣagaṇya is described as having lived at the foot of the Vindhya mountains. The *Yuktidīpikā* 110.1, 212.16 also mentions the name Vṛṣagaṇavīra.Vārṣagaṇāḥ (always in plural) in a few other places, such as 35.1,76.21 and 91.3, 187.5 but also gives the name Vārṣagaṇya, cf. 91.7, 187.11 and 97.13, 187.19. The *Yuktidīpikā* distinguishes three different versions of the name; Walter Slaje pointed out to me that nowadays it is generally accepted that Vārṣagaṇya is the name of a particular teacher. Vārṣagaṇāḥ (in plural) may refer to Sāṅkhya adherents of this lineage. Pulinbihari Chakravarti in his *Origin and Development...* (1951) discussed these names and their mutual relation. He indeed has a discussion on several pages 126 and 135–141. Chakravarti proposes that Vārṣagaṇya is the proper name. Vārṣagaṇya, evidently, is a *taddhita* formation from Vṛṣagaṇa.Vṛṣagaṇavīra can be translated as "son of Vṛṣagaṇa." Vṛṣagaṇa may refer to the father who may not be a teacher. Chakravarti also points to the grammatical rule by Pāṇini which one can make a derivation from a taddhita, signifying the name of the followers (see Pā. 4.2. 111, *kaṇvādibhyo gotre*). E. Franco sums this up in his article on "Avīta and Āvīta" (1999) in footnote 2 referring to the name Vārṣagaṇya. A. Wezler in his article "Paralipomena zum Sarvasarvātmakatvavāda II..." (1992) footnote 4 disagrees with Frauwallner who originally proposed to consider Vṛṣagaṇa as the name of the teacher. Wezler insists on reading Vārṣagaṇya. How Vindhyavāsin fits into this picture is difficult to decide since the *Yuktidīpikā* in the same passage on p. 91, 187 mentions next to Vārṣagaṇāḥ (plural), Vārṣagaṇya, as well as Vindhyavāsin, each associated with one theory or other.

10. *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* on *Yogasūtra* 1.7: *indriyapraṇālikayā cittasya bāhyavastūparāgāt tadviṣayā sāmānya-viśeṣāt mano'rthasya viśeṣāvadhāraṇapradhānā vṛttiḥ pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam.*

11. *Yogasūtra* 1.6 runs as follows: *pramāṇaviparyayavikalpanidrāsmṛtayaḥ.*

12. Cf. *Vākyapadīya* 1 verse 124.

13. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 31.19, 70.12.

14. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 92.7ff., 188.18ff. *Adhyavasāya* is said to be a mental construction (*pratyaya*) as: this is a cow, this is a man.

15. Cf. n.4 above.

16. *Yuktidīpikā* 36.24ff, 80.10ff.

17. *Yuktidīpikā* 36.25, 80.12.

18. Cf. *Śabarabhāṣya* 10.2 (17) 47. See also translation of the text (*Yuktidīpikā* 36.25, 80.12) and notes.
19. Cf. the glossary and also the usage of such terminology in the writings of Mohanty and Potter.
20. The reader may wonder why Dignāga is mentioned in such a way that he appears to precede Īśvarakṛṣṇa. In the present study, I propose a possible new date for Īśvarakṛṣṇa as around 550 A.D., see Ch.4 Conclusion: Possible New Date of the *Sāṅkhyakārikā*.
21. For example, to a Sāṅkhya proponent, sense faculties are psychological. This theory is necessary to explain how sense faculties can perceive an object in the distance. Pakṣilasvāmin had a differing characterization of the sense faculties. To him they are material. This subject belongs to the mechanics of the perceptual process, which cannot be dealt with here.
22. *Yuktidīpikā* 35.1, 76.21.
23. Cf. Hattori, op.cit., p. 28.
24. *Yuktidīpikā* 35.15–16, 77.17–19: *viṣayanirbhāsā hi jñānasyotpattiḥ adhigamarūpādi loke savyāpāreva pratīteti kalpanāyā karaṇabhāvo 'abhyupagamyate na paramārthataḥ.*
25. Cf. Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* on Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha* 1236: *tatrāyaṃ nyāyamukhagranthaḥ—"yat jñānārtharūpādau viśeṣaṇābhidhāyakabhedopacāreṇāvikalpakaṃ tad akṣam akṣaṃ prati vartata iti pratyakṣam..."* (p. 456).
26. Cf. Notes, n.36 (Text) on the translation of the *Yuktidīpikā* 36.2, 78.22–23.
27. Hattori offers this English translation (p. 86, n.1.31) in discussing the question what is the reason for naming the perceptual awareness according to the sense and not according to the object. Although both sense and object are instrumental for the awareness, he recalls the evidence from the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, p. 12b and p. 18ff. Also, Pradhan's 1967 edition p. 34.23ff.
28. Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* 1.45: *tadvikārāvikāritvād āśrayaś cakṣurādayaḥ / ato 'sādhāraṇatvāc ca vijñānaṃ tair nirucyate* (p. 126–27).
29. Cf. Hattori (op.cit. 1.4ab, p. 26): it is named after the sense organs because they are its specific cause (*asādharaṇa-hetu*). [It is] not [named] after the object such as color. The reason is that the object is common (*sādharaṇa*) [to many cases], for it is a cause of mental cognition (*mano-vijñāna*) and perceptions in other persons (*anya-saṃtānika-vijñāna*) [as well as of one's own perception]. We find that a designation is generally by means of a specific [cause]; for example, [we use expressions like] "the sound of a drum" or "a sprout of barley" [to indicate a certain sound or a certain sprout, instead of calling it "the sound of a stick" or "a sprout of the earth," although the stick or the earth is also a cause].
30. Cf. *Abhidharmakośa* of Vasubandhu provides a second reason for naming perception according to the corresponding faculty. Neither the sense-content nor the mental operations can be the specific causes of perception. Only the faculty itself can be the specific cause.
31. See Ch.3 Study: Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Two-level-perception: Propositional and Non-propositional, 71ff.
32. *Yuktidīpikā* 36.18, 79.25. Cf. *Pañcaśikhasūtra* 2, *Yogasūtrabhāṣya* on 1.4, and *Sāṅkhyasūtra* 3 (ed. by Hariharānanda Āraṇya).
33. Dignāga in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1.5 takes up the criticism of the Sāṅkhya school by quoting Vārṣagaṇya's definition. He follows through in great detail why such a definition is not tenable (cf. Hattori op.cit, pp. 52–62).
34. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 36.23, 80.8–9.
35. See Ch.3 Study: Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Two-level-perception: Propositional and Non-propositional.
36. *Alātacakra* is a stock example for erroneous perceptions especially in Buddhist philosophical literature.
37. Hattori often refers to satisfaction (*sukha*) and frustration (*duḥkha*) as the constituents (*guṇa*) of the material stuff of the Sāṅkhya ontology, for which I do not see any good reason. In the given context, I am inclined to take *sukha* and *duḥkha* as referring to mental perceptions (*mānasa pratyakṣa*). They do not refer to the establishment of the constituents of the primeval material stuff which is beyond sensory perception and therefore can only be established by inference. (In some discourses on the Sāṅkhya, in explaining the three elemental constituents of material stuff—*sattva, rajas,* and *tamas*—are paralled with *sukha, duḥkha,*

and *moha,* as a corresponding triad. I surmise this to be the reason why Hattori connected the two sets.
38. Pāṇini 1.2.64.
39. For example, *Pramāṇasamuccaya* 1.1.9ab: *svasaṃvittiḥ phalaṃ vātra tadrūpo hy arthaviniścayaḥ.*
40. Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* in Tibetan translation by Vasudhararakṣita and Sen-rgyal from *The Tibetan Tripitaka* (Peking edition, 130, folios 37b.4–41b.6). I am indebted to Ngawang Samten of Sarnāth and Christian Lindtner of Copenhagen for reading this Tibetan translation with me. Also find a brief synopsis of Dignāga's criticism in Ch.3 Study: The Consistent Relation in Sāṅkhya Inference, 87ff.
41. Unlike later in Udayana and Navya-Nyāya, the establishing of an imperceptible entity, God, relied on a causal relation, namely, this imperceptible entity was the cause of the universe. Otherwise the existence of the universe could not have been explained. This argument resembles the one of the Sāṅkhya concerning the primeval material stuff. The primeval material stuff can be known by means of inference on the basis of its effects, that is, this universe. It seems that Sāṅkhya kept on distinguishing the various forms of inference, proofs, etc. Including the *prācīna* Nyāya, the application of the various forms, proofs, etc. overlapped or were mixed in Uddyotakara's employment of the exclusionary proof as a negative concomitance (see Ch.3 Study: Exclusionary Proof, 93ff.) or Vācaspati Miśra's interpretation of the exclusionary proof as inference-from-effect-to-cause.
42. See *Yuktidīpikā* 3.18, 5.6-7.
43. In Kumārila's *Ślokavārttika, Anumānaparicceheda* 143, the *viśeṣadṛṣṭa* inference is discussed in reference to Vindhyavāsin. And so also in Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṃgraha* in 1445, and consequently in Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā.*
A twofold division is also known from the *Śabarabhāṣya* 1.1.5: *pratyakṣadṛṣṭa* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa.* Another twofold division is known from the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* of Praśastapāda. Under 104, he distinguishes *dṛṣṭa* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa.* See also: Candramati's *Daśapadārthi* in Ui's translation into English from the Chinese translation (p. 97).
Arnold Kunst in his *Probleme der Buddhistischen Logik in der Darstellung des Tattvasaṃgraha,* (p. 78, n.2) warns that *viśeṣatodṛṣṭasambandha—anumāna* should not always be considered the same as the *pratyakṣatodṛṣṭasambandha-anumāna* since in the early period these two were not treated as identical. Also see above for the texts that identify these two inferences.
44. See Ch.3 Study: Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Two-level-perception: Propositional and Non-propositional, 71ff.
45. See Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika* 2.77 and 2.118.
46. Cf. *Tattvasaṅgraha* and *Pañjikā* (Bauddha Bhāratī edition, 1968), p. 29: *yad eva dadhi tat kṣīraṃ yat kṣīraṃ tad dadhīti ca / vadatā rudrilenaiva khyāpitā vindhyavāsitā.*
47. The discussions given on *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa* in these texts is as surveyed here. It seems that distinguishing into various forms of inference was abandoned in the Buddhist literature after Dignāga. That applies to some other schools too, but especially with respect to *viśeṣatodṛṣṭa.*
48. The rule requiring that a piece of knowledge has to be new each time is called *anumānamudrā* in the literature of Indian logic.
Dharmakīrti in his *Pramāṇavārttika* 2.118. and Manorathanandin's *Vṛtti* thereon show that *viśeṣadṛṣṭa* is recognition or recollection only, and therefore cannot be an instrument of knowledge. Similarly in the same text under 2.77, another instrument of knowledge would have to be considered since this one does not qualify.
49. Cf. Frauwallner, "Candramati und sein Daśapadārthaśāstram," p. 76, and Frauwallner, "Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṃkhya-Systems," p. 136. In his reconstruction of the pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa epistemology, of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra,* Frauwallner claims that there was a twofold inference. But *Jayamaṅgalā,* a commentary on the *Sāṅkhyakārikā,* in commenting on kā. 5 says that the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* distinguished three forms of inference.
50. *Anuyogadvāra sūtras* 221–22, p. 493ff.
51. The Sanskrit equivalents of these terms are: *pūrvavat, śeṣavat, dṛṣṭasādharmyavat, sāmānyadṛṣṭa, and viśeṣadṛṣṭa,* respectively.

52. Cf. Dhruva, "Trividham Anumānam," p. 258.
53. The date of Pakṣilasvāmin (Vātsyāyana, Drāmila, Drāviḍa) according to K. Potter, *Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṅgeśa,* p. 239, ranges from as early as 600 BC to as late as 539 A.D. Potter personally narrows it down to an approximation of 425 to 500 A.D.
54. Exclusionary proof (*avīta*) is applied through excluding all adventitious elements on the basis of place, time, and characteristic marks (see Ch.3 Study: Exclusionary Proof, 93ff.) Inference-from-effect-to-cause (*śeṣavat*), on the other hand, is one of the three forms of inference by which one infers the cause of an occurrence. It is possible to apply the exclusionary proof to inference-from-effect-to-cause.
55. See Ch.3 Study: Exclusionary Proof, 93ff.
56. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 40.13–14, 88.9–11. Also *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 17 expresses clearly this argument: *saṃghātaparārthatvāt triguṇādiviparyayād adhiṣṭhānāt / puruṣo 'sti bhoktṛbhāvāt kaivalyārthaṃ pravṛtteś ca.* Also see the commentary of the Yuktidīpikākāra on *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 17, pp. 77–82, 167–176.
57. Cf. *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* on 1.1.5. *tatpūrvakam ity anena liṅgaliṅginoḥ sambandhadarśanam. liṅga—darśanaṃ cābhisambadhyate. liṅgaliṅginoḥ sambaddhayor darśanena liṅgasmṛtir abhisambadhyate. smṛtyā liṅgadarśanena cāpratyakṣo 'rtho 'numīyate* (Thākur's edition, p. 291).
58. The entry under *liṅgi* in the *Nyāyakośa* (p. 714) refers to *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5 among others *...yathā vā talliṅgaliṅgipūrvakam* (*Sāṃkhyakā.* 5) *ity ādau. atra liṅgi ity asya liṅgajñānajñeyam ity artho jñeyaḥ.*
59. The *Sāṃkhyavṛtti* edited by Nakada gives the list of seven relations, with the reading of *patrapātrika* as opposed to the reading of *mātrāmātrika* known from Frauwallner's reconstruction. (Solomon's edition of the *Sāṃkhyavṛtti* (V_2) also coincides with Frauwallner.) The rest of the relations are compatible with Frauwallner's reconstruction on the basis of Dignāga and Jinendrabuddhi's sources.
60. Cf. *Pramāṇasamuccaya* in Vasudhararakṣita's translation into Tibetan, available in the Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking edition (vol. 130, folio 37b.4–41b.3).
61. A variant reading *sambaddhāt* is found in the commentary on the *Dvādaśāranayacakra* the *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* (vol. I., p. 240).
62. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 3.21, 5.12 *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* 1.240. See also Frauwallner's reconstruction of the epistemology of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* in "Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṃkhya-Systems."
63. This seems to be Dignāga's reading in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*; Christian Lindtner is in favor of this reading of the definition (personal communication).
64. This interpretation expresses Frauwallner's understanding of the definition.
65. Interestingly enough, the *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* reads *sambaddhāt* instead of *sambandhāt* and interprets *ekasmāt* as "in one place."
66. *Sāṅkhyavṛtti* (V_2), ed. by Solomon 10.14–15: *liṅgaliṅgisambandhas tu svasvāmiprakṛtivikāra-kāryaka(kā)raṇa-mārtrātrikā(mātrāmātrika?)-pratipatti(pratidvandvi?)-sahacara-nimittanaimittika-prabhāvair iti.*
67. *Sāṅkhyavṛttiḥ* (12.7–8): *liṅgaliṅgisambandhas tu svasvāmiprakṛtivikārakāryakāraṇapātrapātrikaprati-dvandvi sahacaritanimittanaimittikaprabhāvair iti.*
68. Vācaspati Miśra in *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* (Thākur's edition, p. 309): *mātranimittasamyogi-virodhisahacāribhiḥ // svasvāmivadhyaghātādyaiḥ saṃkhyānāṃ saptadhānumā.*
69. Peking edition 130, folios 37b.4–41b.3 for Dignāga, and 139, folios 133b.7–146a.8 for Jinendrabuddhi. In reading Dignāga and Jinendrabuddhi, I am obliged to Ngawang Samten of Sarnāth and Christian Lindtner of Copenhagen. The only complete versions are Tibetan translations from Sanskrit. The Sanskrit fragments are helpful, but too few.
70. *ibid.*
71. *Jayamaṅgalā* ascribes the threefold division (*pūrvavat, śeṣavat,* and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*) to the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* and also gives the seven relations of inference, with a variant reading (*pātrapātrika* instead of *mātramātrikā*) (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series edition, p. 71).
72. The commentary on the *Dvādaśāranayacakram* of Mallavādin, called the *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* of

Siṃhasūri, on p. 240 deals with an analysis of this definition.
73. *Nyāyavārttika* p. 302.8 (Thākur's edition).
74. N. Aiyaswami Sastri reconstructed the text from the Chinese translation into Sanskrit.
75. Cf. n.69 above.
76. In comparison to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, this could be considered as a relation between a part and whole, which is one of inherence. But this does not seem to be the case here.
77. In "Candramati und sein Daśapadārthaśāstram," pp. 75–76, Frauwallner drew up the following list on the basis of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* and the *Viśālāmalavatī*:
(i) das Verhältnis von Herr und Eigentum (nor daṅ bdag-po'i dṅos-po),
(ii) das Verhältnis von Grundstoff und Umwandlung (raṅ-bźin daṅ rnam-'gyur-gyi dṅos-po),
(iii) das Verhältnis von Ursache und Wirkung ('bras-bu daṅ rgyu'i dṅos-po),
(iv) das Verhältnis von Anlass und Veranlasstem (rgyu-mtshan daṅ rgyu-mtshan-can-gyi dṅos-po),
(v) das Verhältnis von Teil und Ganzem (tsam-po daṅ tsam-po-can-gyi dṅos-po),
(vi) das Verhältnis des Beisammenseins (lhan-cig-spyod-pa'i dṅos-po).
(vii) das Verhältnis von Vernichtendem und Vernichtetem (gnod-bya-gnod-byed-kyi dṅos-po).
In "Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṃkhya-Systems," pp. 126–127, Frauwallner gives Sanskrit equivalents for the relations:
(i) das Verhältnis von Herr und Eigentum (svasvāmibhāvaḥ) wie bei König und Diener oder Seele und Urmaterie,
(ii) das Verhältnis von Grundstoff und Umwandlung (prakṛtivikārabhāvaḥ) wie bei Milch und saurer Milch oder Urmaterie und Grossem usw. (mahadādi),
(iii) das Verhältnis von Ursache und Wirkung (kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ) wie bei einem Wagen und seinen Bestandteilen oder der Güte usw. (sattvādi),
(iv) das Verhältnis von Anlass und Veranlasstem (nimittanaimittikabhāvaḥ) wie bei Töpfer und Topf oder Seele und Tätigkeit der Urmaterie,
(v) das Verhältnis von Stoff und Gebilde (mātrāmātrikabhāvaḥ) wie bei Zweig usw. und Baum oder Ton usw. und grossen Elementen,
(vi) das Verhältnis des gemeinsamen Vorkommens (sahacāribhāvaḥ) wie bei Cakravāka-Enten oder bei der Güte usw,
(vii) das Verhältnis zwischen Hemmendem und Gehemmtem (vadhyaghātakabhāvaḥ) wie bei Schlange und Ichneumon oder bei der Güte usw., sofern sie Hauptsache und Nebensache sind (aṅgāṅgībhūtaḥ).
78. Cf. Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu* and Dharmottara's commentary *Ṭīkā*; Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, 2, p. 60.
79. See Uddyotakara's *Nyāyavārttika* on *Nyāyasūtrabhāṣya* 1.1.5 (Thākur's edition p. 302).
80. In the *Jayamaṅgalā*, commenting on *Sāṅkhyakārikā* 5, this relation is called *pātrapātrika*. The nature of this relation is not very clear, since once the example is the relation between the mendicant and his staff, the other time, the tree and its branches. Supposedly these are examples for the relation between the subtle elements and the material elements.
81. See reference on the Tibetan Tripitaka above, n. 69.
82. Cf.Ch.3 Study: Classical Sāṅkhya and Dignāga's Threefold Division of Perception, 78ff.
83. Dignāga is known for his new departure in the theory of inference, for example, the requirements for a valid inference (*trairūpya*), cf. Ch.3 Study: Exclusionary Proof, 93ff. Dignāga disregarded the "old" definitions of relations as the basis for inference.
84. Dignāga does not list them as such at first, but he directs his criticism to them later in the section.
85. Part of the compound *liṅgaliṅgipūrvakam* is found in the text in *Yuktidīpikā* 37.1, 80.18 in the middle of discussion on perception.
86. Wezler, "Some Observations on the Yuktidīpikā," p. 454, proposes to read *pakṣakanana-*, *kanana* forest instead of *pakṣatāvana-*.

87. The opening verses of the *Yuktidīpikā* are considered to belong to the Sāṅkhya text *Rājavārttika*. In "Some Observations on the *Yuktidīpikā* " Wezler suggested that the first verse *vītāvītaviṣāṇasya* is the opening verse of the *Yuktidīpikā*. Wezler also proposes that the second verse starting *ṛṣaye* is the opening verse of the *Rājavārttika*. Apparently there must have been some confusion about this verse. In the Kashmir manuscript the text starts with the second verse *ṛṣaye* and the Ahmedabad manuscript starts with *vītāvītavisāṇṇasya* and repeats the same verse between verses 5 and 6.
88. The terms *vīta* and *avīta* are difficult to analyze etymologically. Some texts read *āvīta* instead of *avīta*, such as the Ahmedabad manuscript. Pandeya reads a few times *āvīta* but not consistently. The following are the texts which read *āvīta*: Jambuvijayī's *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* p. 323, 1.12, etc. *Śarkarikā* p. 75.4–11, *Mīmāṃsakośa* p.1011, 1.9–11, etc. So does Frauwallner read *āvīta*. Recently Eli Franco discussed the two spellings in his article "*Avīta* and *Āvīta*." Franco gives obvious preference to the reading of *āvīta*, the reading he found in the Spitzer manuscript which he currently studies. He finds further support in the important Ahmedabad manuscript of the *Yuktidīpikā* which consistently reads this term with "ā." Still it is inconclusive which reading is the correct one, for the majority of the *Yuktidīpikā* manuscripts seems to favor the short "a." Also Wezler and Motegi in their critical edition of the *Yuktidīpikā* have opted for the short "a" reading. Prets and Prandstetter discuss both the readings inconclusively.
89. Jacobi in his article "*Vīta* und *Avīta*" p. 9, fn.1 points out that the terms *anvayin*, etc., have masculine endings in the text. Thus their antecedent must be *hetu* as a masculine noun. Their antecedent cannot be *anumāna* which is neuter, although it is *anumāna* in the *sūtra* which Uddyotakara discusses.
90. In a somewhat modified fashion, I have adopted Randle's translation of *trairūpya* as the "three characters of the valid middle term."
91. Oddly enough Jacobi quotes Dharmakīrti's definition from the *Nyāyabindu* 2.5–7, although the formulation of the *trairūpya* theory is accredited to Dignāga. As recorded in Uddyotakara's argument against Dignāga, Dignāga's definition of *trairūpya* runs as follows: *anumeye 'tha tattulye sadbhāvo nāstitāsati.* (Thākur's edition p. 301. Thākur reads in the verse *anumāne* which is incorrect. The following text commenting on the verse reads properly *anumeye.*).
92. Jacobi, "*Vīta* und *Avīta*," p.11, traces the theory of *trairūpya* back to Maitreya who required that inference will have both *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*. Chinese reports (according to Sugiura, *Hindu Logic as Preserved in China and Japan*, p. 20ff.) led Jacobi to even earlier sources of these theories of *sapakṣa* and *vipakṣa*, namely to Akṣapāda, the Nyāya teacher.
93. Uddyotakara defining *avīta* in his *vārttika* on *sūtra* 1.1.35 starts with: *so 'yam avītaḥ parapakṣapratiṣedhāya bhavatīti.*
94. The argument for employing a negative proof (*vyatirekin*) starts in Uddyotakara's commentary on *sūtra* 1.1.5.
95. See *Yuktidīpikā* 40.23–24, 89.2–3.
96. Correct reading *akṣepa/ākṣepa* and *pariśeṣitaḥ* to *kṣepa* and *pariśeṣataḥ*, as it is in the gloss following it, also cf. Ch.2 Text: Manuscript Tradition and Ch.2 Text: Translation of the *Yuktidīpikā* 40.6, 87.22–23, p. 35 and also p. 97, n. 71.
97. See *Yuktidīpikā* 40.28–30, 89.9–12.
98. The text within // // reflects Pandeya's marking of the omission of this sentence in the Ahmedabad manuscript.
99. See *Yuktidīpikā* 38.23ff., 84.19ff.
100. Note correction in reading: it makes better sense to read here *mūtra*, rather than *sūtra*.
101. Translation follows the corrected reading.
102. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 39.20, 86.13.
103. In explaining the members of inference, under example (*udāharaṇa*), the Yuktidīpikākāra claims that an example of dissimilarity was not mentioned because the negative inference is included in *avīta*. As he says: *vyatirekas tv avītasya prasaṅgidharmāntaranivṛttirūpatvāt tadantarbhūta iti na tadarthaṃ vaidharmyadṛṣṭānta*

ucyate (*Yuktidīpikā* 41.21–22, 90.23–91.2).

104. In commenting on the three forms of inference (*pūrvavat*, *śeṣavat*, and *sāmānyatodṛṣṭa*), Vācaspati Miśra also brings in the division of *vīta* and *avīta* (Jhā's edition with his translation, p. 22)

105. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 38.25ff, 84.21ff.

106. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 3.1, 4.6-7.

107. Cf. *Yuktidīpikā* 41.2, 89.16 and 41.4ff.-89.19ff.

108. The ten members are also mentioned in the *Mahābhāṣya* 5.2.42, p. 379.

109. The translation of these terms is after Hayes, "Diṅnāga's Views on Reasoning (*svārthānumāna*)," though somewhat modified.

110. Frauwallner, "Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṃkhya-Systems."

111. *ibid*, p.88.

112. Also *Yuktidīpikā* 44.3–5, 97.1–5.

113. *Yuktidīpikā* 3.18, 5.7.

114. For comparisons of inference between Vindhyavāsin and Īśvarakṛṣṇa, see Ch.3 Study: Sāṅkhya's Forms of Inference, 83ff.; and for comparisons of perception, see Ch.3 Study: Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Two-level-perception, 72ff.

115. Cf. Ch.3 Study: Exclusionary Proof, 93ff.

116. The definition of *vīta* is quoted from an unknown, but apparently authoritative source in *Yuktidīpikā* 40.23–24, 89.2–3: *yadā hetuḥ svarūpeṇa sādhyasiddhau prayujyate / sa vīto*; in translation: When the reason is applied in its own form to prove *sādhya*, that is simple proof.

117. For example, *Yuktidīpikā* 44.5, 97.4–5.

118. Ten members of *vīta* are mentioned in *Yuktidīpikā* 44.5, 97.4–5, whereas in *Yuktidīpikā* 42.19, 92.26 and 68.19, 154.11, *vīta* has five members only.

Glossary

Propositional and nonpropositional perception are terms adopted from writings on Indian philosophy, such as T. N. Mohanty's and Karl Potter's. See *adhyavasāya, niścaya,* and *pratyaya* for propositional perception; *avikalpikā, grahaṇa,* and *ālocana* for nonpropositional perception.

adhyavasāya	Non-doubting perceptual awareness, if it is both held with certainty and true under the Sāṅkhya's canon of truth.
avadhāraṇa	Assertion; stating something to be the case.
avīta	A proof by which all adventitious things can be excluded on the basis of place, time, and characteristic features.
avyabhicāra	Consistent relation between the logical reason and the thing-to-be-proven, such as that between smoke and fire.
grahaṇa	A sensation as opposed to a cognition involving mental constructs, such as concepts.
jñāna	Awareness; cognition in general, either veridical or non-veridical.
niścaya	Non-doubting awareness that can be either perceptual or inferential in character. Can be suitably rendered as belief. For example, a person has the belief that consciousness exists.
paṛapratyāyana	The second five of the ten members of inference constituting inference-as-presenting-knowledge-to-others. This is in contrast to the first five members of the ten members of inference which constitute inference as acquiring new knowledge for oneself.
parapratipādana	see *parapratyāyana.*
pratyaya	A cognition involving mental constructs, such as concepts as opposed to purely sensory cognition (*grahaṇa*). Sometimes equated with *niścaya* of the perceptual sort and also *adhyavasāya.*
pramāṇa	(*i*) An instrument by means of which a veridical cognition is acquired. (*ii*) The result of the process of cognizing. (*iii*) A subject dealing with *pramāṇa* may by extension be designated as epistemology.

prasaṅgin Adventitious or vitiating things that may interfere with the successful completion of an inference, and therefore have to be excluded from the process by means of the exclusionary proof (*avīta*)

prāpyakārin The immediate cause of successful cognitive activity.

buddhi (*i*) One of the three internal organs— reason, ego-sense, attention faculty (*buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra*, and *manas*) which is the substratum of the cognitive process while engaging an instrument of knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

(*ii*) A synonym for *adhyavasāya*, *niścaya*, and *pratyaya*.

liṅga (*i*) Logical reason, the second member of inference, by which means one infers the thing-to-be-proven (*liṅgin/sādhya*).

(*ii*) The term or object that is alleged to prove the thing-to-be-proven, for example, smoke; one of the relata of the consistent relation (*avyabhicāra*).

(*iii*) Sometimes refers to material stuff.

liṅgin (*i*) The thing-to-be-proven, a synonym to *sādhya*, for example, fire.

(*ii*) The locus of the logical reason (*pakṣa*), for example, mountain.

vijñāna Awareness; a certain type of cognition such as that performed by the internal organ of the passions. Included in this type is the insight of yogis.

vīta Simple proof of inference which either employs the five members or ten members of inference/argument. This simple proof can be complemented by the exclusionary proof provided the inference is not decisive.

viṣaya Content of a true cognition; that which a correct cognition ranges over.

sādhya The thing-to-be-proven, for example, fire; one of the relata of consistent relation (*avyabhicāra*); a synonym to *liṅgin*.

svaniścaya The first five of the ten members of inference according to Sāṅkhya constitute inference-as-acquiring-new-knowledge-for-oneself as opposed to the second five of the ten members which constitute inference-for-presenting-knowledge-to-others.

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